Vh*  Campaign  and  Battle 
of  Gettysburg 


The  Campaign  and  Battle 
of  Gettysburg 


From  the  Official  Records  of  the  Union  and  Confederate  Armies 


PREPARED  FOR  THE  USE  OF  THE  CADETS  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES  MILITARY  ACADEMY 


BY 

Colonel  G.  J.  FIEBEGER 

Professor  of  Engineering,  U.  S.  Military  Academy 


West  Point,  N.  Y. 

United  States  Military  Academy  Press 
1915 


The  reports,  etc.,  quoted  in  this  book  are,  unless 
otherwise  specified,  from  the  official  records  of  the 
Union  and  Confederate  armies  contained  in  the  serial 
numbers  43,  44  and  45,  series  I,  volume  XXVII,  parts 
I,  II  and  III.  The  quotations  are  not  as  a rule  given  in 
full  but  only  such  parts  as  give  the  thread  of  the  story. 
The  parts  inclosed  in  brackets  have  been  inserted  to 
explain  the  meaning  of  the  quotations. 


I 

1 

J 

i 

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THE  FlQwers  collect^ 


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CONTENTS 


Military  Situation,  June  1,  1863  1 

Eastern  Departments 2 

Army  of  the  Potomac 3 

Army  of  Northern  Virginia 6 

Plans 8 

Fredericksburg  to  Culpeper 9 

Cavalry  Engagement  at  Brandy  Station 13 

Rappahannock  River  to  the  Shenandoah  Valley  and  Manassas  Junction.,  14 

Ewell’s  Valley  Operations 17 

Cavalry  Engagements  in  the  Loudoun  Valley 19 

The  Advance  into  Pennsylvania 20 

Ewell’s  Operations  in  Pennsylvania 30 

Concentration  of  the  Armies  at  Gettysburg 37 

Topography  of  the  Battlefield 45 

Engagement  at  Gettysburg,  July  1,  a.  m 46 

Engagement  at  Gettysburg,  July  1,  p.  m 50 

Battle  of  July  2 63 

Attack  of  the  Confederate  Right 79 

Attack  by  Ewell’s  Corps 81 

Battle  of  July  3 87 

Engagement  on  the  Confederate  Left  88 

Engagement  on  the  Confederate  Right 89 

Cavalry  Operations  July  1,  2 and  3 100 

Cavalry  Engagement  on  the  East  Flank,  July  3 103 

Cavalry  Engagement  on  the  South  Flank,  July  3 106 

Cavalry  Engagement  near  Fairfield,  July  3 107 

The  Retreat 108 

Cavalry  Operations  during  the  Retreat 112 


468596 


P L AT  E S 


1.  Map  of  country  showing  march  of  Confederate  army  from  Fredericksburg 
to  the  Chester  Gap  and  of  the  Union  Army  from  Fredericksburg  to 
Manassas  Junction  and  Fairfax  Station. 

r.  Map  of  country  showing  march  of  Confederate  army  from  Chester  Gap  to 
the  Potomac  River  and  of  the  Union  army  from  Manassas  Junction  and 
Fairfax  Station  to  Frederick,  Maryland. 

3.  Map  of  country  showing  movements  of  both  armies  while  north  of  the 

Potomac  River. 

4.  Map  showing  topography  of  the  battlefield. 

5.  Plate  showing  position  of  the  troops  in  the  engagement  a.  m.  July  1,  and  in 

the  battle  of  July  3. 

6.  Plate  showing  position  of  the  troops  in  the  engagement  p.  m.  July  1. 

7.  Plate  showing  position  of  the  troops  in  the  battle  of  July  2. 


The  Campaign  and  Battle  of  Gettysburg. 


Military  Situation  June  1,  1863. — The  Civil  War,  begun  in  the 
spring  of  1861,  had  been  in  progress  two  years.  The  United 
States  had  500,000  troops  actually  in  the  field  and  625,000  on 
the  rolls. 

In  the  Atlantic  coastal  plain,  Union  troops  occupied  West 
Point,  Yorktown,  Norfolk  and  Suffolk,  Va.,  Plymouth,  Washing- 
ton, Newbern  and  Beaufort,  N.  C.,  the  islands  along  the  coast  of 
South  Carolina  between  Charleston  and  the  Savannah  River,  and 
Fernandina  and  St.  Augustine,  Fla.  To  protect  the  railroad 
connecting  Richmond,  Wilmington,  Charleston  and  Savannah 
and  the  important  towns  along  the  railroad  from  raids  or  more 
serious  operations  by  these  Union  troops,  the  Confederate  govern- 
ment was  compelled  to  leave  a considerable  force  in  the  South 
Atlantic  States. 

In  northern  Virginia,  where  active  operations  had  temporarily 
ceased,  the  opposing  armies,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  under 
Maj.  Gen.  Joseph  Hooker  and  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia 
under  Gen.  Robert  E.  Lee,  lay  on  opposite  banks  of  the  Rap- 
pahannock River  midway  between  Washington  and  Richmond. 

In  West  Virginia  there  were  a number  of  Union  garrisons  to 
protect  the  State,  and  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  which 
traversed  it,  from  Confederate  raids. 

In  Kentucky,  Maj.  Gen.  Ambrose  E.  Burnside  was  organizing 
the  Army  of  the  Ohio  to  advance  against  Knoxville,  Tenn.,  held 
by  Maj.  Gen.  Simon  B.  Buckner. 

In  Tennessee,  the  Confederate  troops  had  complete  possession 
of  the  Tennessee  Valley  in  the  eastern  part  of  the  State,  and  the 
Union  troops  had  complete  possession  of  the  western  part  of  the 
State  between  the  Tennessee  and  Mississippi  rivers.  In  middle 
Tennessee,  between  Murfreesboro  and  Shelbyville,  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland  under  Maj.  Gen.  William  S.  Rosecrans  was  facing 
the  Army  of  Tennessee  under  Gen.  Braxton  Bragg. 


468596 


2 . 

On  the  Mississippi  River,  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  under 
Maj.  Gen.  Ulysses  S.  Grant  was  investing  a Confederate  force  of 
30,000  men  under  Lieut.  Gen.  John  C.  Pemberton  at  Vicksburg, 
and  at  the  same  time  holding  off  the  Army  of  Mississippi  under 
General  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  which  was  being  organized  at  Jack- 
son,  Miss. 

In  Louisiana,  the  Army  of  the  Gulf  under  Maj.  Gen.  Nathaniel 
P.  Banks  was  occupying  New  Orleans  and  the  surrounding  terri- 
tory and  also  besieging  Port  Hudson,  which  was  held  by  a Con- 
federate garrison  of  6,000  men  under  Maj.  Gen.  Franklin  Gardner. 

In  Arkansas,  the  Union  troops  held  that  part  of  the  State  north 
of  the  Arkansas  River. 

The  situation  on  the  Mississippi  River  gave  the  Confederate 
government  great  anxiety  as  the  fall  of  Vicksburg  would  be  a 
serious  blow  to  the  Confederate  States.  Since  Johnston  believed 
his  army  too  weak  to  relieve  the  garrison  of  Vicksburg  without 
material  reinforcements,  two  plans  had  been  suggested  to  meet 
the  situation.  One  was  to  send  one  or  more  divisions  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  to  Johnston,  and  the  other  was  to  send  these 
divisions  with  Johnston’s  army  to  Bragg  in  Tennessee.  It  was 
thought  that  a Confederate  victory  in  Tennessee  would  compel 
Grant  to  raise  the  siege  of  Vicksburg  and  to  go  to  the  assistance 
of  Rosecrans. 

In  view  of  the  time  required  to  make  these  combinations  and 
the  uncertainty  of  the  results,  neither  President  Jefferson  Davis 
nor  his  principal  military  adviser,  Gen.  Lee,  was  willing  to  assume 
the  responsibility  for  either  plan.  By  them  it  was  deemed  best 
to  attempt  to  offset  the  probable  disasters  on  the  Mississippi 
River  by  a victorious  campaign  in  the  East  by  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia,  strengthened  as  much  as  the  resources  of  the 
East  would  permit. 

The  Eastern  Departments. — The  total  strength  of  the  Union 
troops  in  the  East  on  May  31,  was  approximately: 


3 


Troops  Present. 

Department  of  Army  of  the  Potomac 122,000  W.  R.  40  p.  574 

Maj.  Gen.  Joseph  Hooker. 

Department  of  Washington 46,000  W.  R.  40  p.  586 

Maj.  Gen.  Samuel  G.  Heintzelman. 

Middle  department  (Maryland  and  West  Virginia). . 37,000  W.  R.  40  p.  589 

Maj.  Gen.  Robert  C.  Schenck. 

Department  of  Virginia 37,000  W.  R.  26  p.  733 

Maj.  Gen.  John  A.  Dix. 

Department  of  North  Carolina 19,000  W.  R.  26  p.  736 

Maj.  Gen.  John  G.  Foster. 

Department  of  the  South 19,000  W.  R.  20  p.  461 

Maj.  Gen.  David  Hunter. 

Total 280,000 


The  total  strength  of  the  Confederate  troops  in  the  East  on 


May  31,  was  approximately: 

Troops  Present. 

Department  of  Northern  Virginia 89,000  W.  R.  40  p.  846 

Gen.  Robert  E.  Lee. 

Department  of  Western  Virginia 7,000  W.  R.  40  p.  846 

Maj.  Gen.  Samuel  Jones. 

Department  of  Richmond 10,000  W.  R.  26  p.  1087 

Maj.  Gen.  Arnold  Elzey. 

Department  of  North  Carolina 27,000  W.  R.  26  p.  1087 

Maj.  Gen.  Daniel  H.  Hill. 

Department  of  South  Carolina,  Georgia  and  Florida. . 22,000  W.  R.  20  p.  964 


Total 155,000 


In  the  report  for  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  the  Valley  District  and  two 
battalions  of  artillery,  about  3,000  men  are  omitted,  which  would  make  the 
total  158,000. 

These  territorial  departments  were  under  the  War  Departments 
of  the  United  and  Confederate  States,  and  no  transfer  of  troops 
from  one  to  another  was  possible  without  an  order  from  their 
respective  Presidents  or  Secretaries  of  War. 

Army  of  the  Potomac. — After  the  Chancellorsville  campaign, 
the  infantry  divisions  of  the  army  were  partially  reorganized  due 
to  the  expiration  of  the  term  of  service  of  22  regiments  which 
were  sent  to  their  States  to  be  mustered  out.  These  losses  were 
made  up  in  the  course  of  the  campaign  by  transfers  from  other 
departments.  The  artillery  was  reorganized  by  consolidating 
the  corps  and  divisional  batteries  of  each  army  corps  into  a single 


4 


brigade  of  corps  artillery,  and  the  artillery  reserve  of  the  army 
into  five  brigades  of  four  batteries  each.  In  the  Chancellorsville 
campaign,  the  cavalry  corps  had  been  much  reduced  by  its  loss 
of  horses.  In  the  course  of  the  Gettysburg  campaign  its  strength 
was  restored  by  the  transfer  of  two  brigades  from  another  depart- 
ment. 

On  the  battlefield  of  Gettysburg,  the  organization  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  was  as  follows : 

ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 


Corps. 

Maj.  Gens. 

I 

John  F.  Reynolds 
John  Newton 


II 

Winfield  S.  Hancock 


III 

Daniel  E.  Sickles 


V 

George  G.  Meade 
George  Sykes 


VI 

John  Sedgwick 


Maj.  Gen.  Joseph  Hooker,  until  June  28. 
Maj.  Gen.  George  G.  Meade,  after  June  28. 


Divisions. 

1 Janies  S.  Wadsworth,  B.  G. 

2 John  C.  Robinson,  B.  G. 

3 Abner  Doubleday,  M.  G. 

1 John  C.  Caldwell,  B.  G. 

2 John  Gibbon,  B.  G. 

3 Alexander  Hays,  B.  G. 

1 David  D.  Birney,  M.  G. 

2 Andrew  A.  Humphreys,  B.  G. 

1 James  Barnes,  B.  G. 

2 George  Sykes,  M.  G. 

Romeyn  B.  Ayres,  B.  G. 

3 Samuel  W.  Crawford,  B.  G. 

1 Horatio  G.  Wright,  B.  G. 

2 Albion  P.  Howe,  B.  G. 


Brigades. 

1 Soloman  Meredith,  B.  G. 

2 Lysander  Cutler,  B.  G. 

1 Gabriel  R.  Paul,  B.  G 

2 Henry  Baxter,  B.  G. 

1 Thomas  A.  Rowley,  B.  G. 

2 Roy  Stone,  Col. 

3 George  J.  Stannard,  B.  G. 

1 Edward  E.  Cross,  Col. 

2 Patrick  Kelly,  Col. 

3 Samuel  K.  Zook,  B.  G. 

4 John  R.  Brooke,  Col. 

1 William  Harrow,  B.  G. 

2 Alexander  Webb,  B.  G. 

3 Norman  J.  Hall,  Col. 

1 Samuel  S.  Carroll,  Col. 

2 Thomas  A.  Smyth,  Col. 

3 George  L.  Willard,  Col. 

1 Charles  K.  Graham,  B.  G. 

2 J.  H.  Hobart  Ward,  B.  G. 

3 Regis  de  Trobriand,  Col. 

1 Joseph  B.  Carr,  B.  G. 

2 Wm.  R.  Brewster,  Col. 

3 George  C.  Burling,  Col. 

1 William  S.  Tilton,  Col. 

2 Jacob  B.  Sweitzer,  Co!. 

3 Strong  Vincent,  Col. 

1 Hannibal  Day,  Col. 

2 Sidney  Burbank,  Col. 

3 Stephen  Weed,  B.  G. 

1 William  McCandless,  Col. 

2 Joseph  W.  Fisher,  Col. 

1 Alfred  T.  A.  Torbert,  B.  G. 

2 Joseph  J.  Bartlett,  B.  G. 

3 David  A.  Russell,  B.  G. 

1 Lewis  A.  Grant,  Col. 

2 Thomas  H.  Neill,  B.  G. 


5 


Corps. 
Maj.  Gens. 


Divisions. 

3 John  Newton,  M.  G. 
Frank  Wheaton,  B.  G. 


XI 


1 Francis  C.  Barlow,  B.  G. 
Oliver  O.  Howard  2 Adolph  von  Steinwehr,  B.  G. 

3 Carl  Schurz,  M.  G. 

1 Alpheus  S.  Williams,  B.  G. 


XII 

Henry  W.  Slocum 


2 John  W.  Geary,  B.  G. 


1 John  Buford.  B.  G. 


Cavalry 

Alfred  Pleasonton  2 David  McM.  Gregg,  B.  G. 


3 Judson  Kilpatrick,  B.  G. 


Brigades. 

1 Alexander  Shaler,  B.  G. 

2 Henry  L.  Eustis,  Col. 

3 Frank  Wheaton,  B.  G. 

1 Leopold  von  Gilsa,  Col. 

2 Adelbert  Ames,  B.  G. 

1 Charles  Coster,  Col. 

2 Orlando  Smith,  Col. 

1 Alexander  Schimmelfennig,  B.  G. 

2 W.  Krzyzanowski,  Col. 

1 Archibald  L.  MeDougall,  Col. 

2 Henry  H.  Lockwood,  B.  G. 

3 Thomas  H.  Ruger,  B.  G. 

1 Charles  Candy,  Col. 

2 George  A.  Cobham,  Col. 

3 George  S.  Greene,  B.  G. 

1 William  Gamble,  Col. 

2 Thomas  C.  Devin,  Col. 

3 Wesley  Merritt,  B.  G. 

1 John  B.  McIntosh,  Col. 

2 Pennock  Huey,  Col. 

3 J.  Irvin  Gregg,  Col. 

1 Elon  J.  Farnsworth,  B.  G. 

2 George  A.  Custer,  B.  G. 


Chief  of  Artillery.  . . Brig.  Gem  Henry  J.  Hunt. 


I 

corps 

1 brigade 

5 batteries 

28 

guns 

II 

corps 

1 brigade 

5 batteries 

24 

guns 

III 

corps 

1 brigade 

5 batteries 

30 

guns 

V 

corps 

1 brigade 

5 batteries 

26 

guns 

VI 

corps 

1 brigade 

8 batteries 

48 

guns 

XI 

corps 

1 brigade 

5 batteries 

26 

guns 

XII 

corps 

1 brigade 

4 batteries 

20 

guns 

Artillery  Reserve ....  Brig.  Gen.  Robert  O.  Tyler. 

5 brigades  21  batteries  110  guns,  of  which  two 

batteries,  eight  4 Yi- 
inch  rifles,  were  not 
at  Gettysburg. 

Cavalry  Corps  2 brigades  9 batteries  50  guns 


Total  guns  in  the  artillery,  362;  total  guns  at  Gettysburg,  354. 

Note. — Stannard’s  infantry  brigade  joined  the  I corps  at  Gettysburg  on  the 
evening  of  July  1. 

Hays’  infantry  brigade  joined  the  II  corps  at  Gum  Spring  on  June  26. 
Crawford’s  infantry  division  joined  the  V corps  at  Frederick  June  28. 
Lockwood’s  infantry  brigade  joined  the  XII  corps  at  Gettysburg  July  2. 
Kilpatrick’s  cavalry  division  (formerly  Stahel’s)  joined  the  cavalry 
corps  at  Frederick  June  28. 


6 


Army  of  Northern  Virginia.— Between  the  battle  of  Fredericks- 
burg in  December,  1862,  and  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville  in 
May,  1863,  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  sent  about  20,000 
troops  to  southern  Virginia  and  North  Carolina  to  temporarily 
strengthen  the  Confederate  forces  threatened  by  Union  move- 
ments from  Suffolk,  Va.,  and  Newbern,  N.  C.  In  view  of  the 
importance  of  the  campaign  he  was  about  to  undertake,  Lee  did 
not  deem  it  wise  to  move  until  these  troops,  or  an  equivalent 
number  of  others,  had  been  sent  him.  This  delayed  the  opening 
of  the  campaign  until  the  first  week  in  June.  In  the  meantime 
the  army  was  reorganized  and  as  thoroughly  armed  and  equipped 
as  possible. 

During  the  Manassas,  Antietam,  Fredericksburg  and  Chan- 
cellorsville campaigns,  the  army  had  been  divided  into  two  corps, 
commanded  by  James  E.  Long  street  and  Thomas  J.  Jackson. 
When  the  latter  died  in  May,  Lee  decided  to  reorganize  his  army 
into  three  corps.  For  the  new  corps  commanders  he  recommended 
Richard  S.  Ewell  and  Ambrose  P.  Hill.  Ewell  was  the  senior 
division  commander  in  the  army  and  was  the  senior  division 
commander  of  Jackson’s  corps  in  its  operations  in  the  Shenandoah 
Valley,  around  Richmond,  and  in  the  Manassas  campaign.  In 
the  last  campaign  mentioned,  he  was  severely  wounded  and  lost  a 
leg.  He  returned  to  duty  the  latter  part  of  May,  but  was  hamp- 
ered in  his  field  duties  by  his  inability  to  move  without  crutches 
when  dismounted.  A.  P.  Hill  had  been  a division  commander  in 
the  operations  around  Richmond,  and  a division  commander  in 
Jackson’s  corps  during  the  campaigns  of  Manassas,  Antietam, 
Fredericksburg  and  Chancellorsville.  He  was  the  senior  division 
commander  in  that  corps  after  Ewell  was  wounded,  and  the  senior 
in  the  army  with  the  exception  of  Ewell  and  McLaws.  Lee  had 
formed  a high  opinion  of  his  abilities  in  the  previous  campaigns. 
He  was  somewhat  handicapped  for  active  service  by  ill  health. 

In  forming  the  army  into  three  corps,  the  eight  infantry  divis- 
ions were  expanded  to  nine,  thus  giving  three  divisions  to  each 
corps.  The  artillery  was  reorganized  by  distributing  the  batteries 
of  the  artillery  reserve  among  the  three  army  corps  so  as  to  give 
each  corps  five  battalions  of  four  batteries  each.  As  the  regula- 


7 


tion  battery  contained  four  guns,  the  normal  artillery  armament 
of  each  corps  was  fixed  at  eighty  guns.  Although  the  five  bat- 
talions were  under  the  direction  of  the  chief  of  artillery  of  the 
corps,  one  battalion  was  usually  assigned  to  each  infantry  division 
and  two  were  retained  as  a corps  reserve.  The  cavalry  division 
had  a battalion  of  six  batteries,  and  each  of  the  brigades  of  the 
Valley  District  had  one.  In  the  Chancellorsville  campaign,  the 
Union  cavalry  had  shown  unusual  boldness.  This  caused  Lee  to 
strengthen  the  cavalry  of  his  own  army  by  recalling  one  of  its 
brigades,  which  had  been  sent  to  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  and  by 
adding  a new  one  of  two  regiments,  received  from  North  Carolina. 
Under  his  cavalry  commander,  Maj.  Gen.  James  E.  B.  Stuart,  the 
regular  cavalry  division  was  being  recruited  and  equipped  near 
Culpeper,  Va. 

The  organization  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  in  the 
Gettysburg  campaign  was  as  follows: 


ARMY  OF  NORTHERN  VIRGINIA. 


General  Robert  E.  Lee. 


Corps. 
Lieut  Gens. 


Divisions. 
Maj.  Gens. 


Brigades. 
Brig.  Gens. 


1 Lafayette  MeLaws 


1 John  B.  Kershaw 

2 William  Barksdale 

3 Paul  J.  Semmes 

4 William  T.  Wofford 


First 

James  E.  Longstreet  2 George  E.  Pickett 


1 Richard  B.  Garnett 

2 James  L.  Kemper 

3 Lewis  A Armistead 


3 John  B.  Hood 


1 Evander  Law 

2 Jerome  B.  Robertson 

3 George  T.  Anderson 

4 Henry  L.  Benning 


1 Jubal  A.  Early 


1 Harry  T.  Hays 


2 Robert  F.  Hoke  (Isaac  E.  Avery) 


3 William  Smith 

4 John  B.  Gordon 


Second 

Richard  S.  Ewell  2 Edward  Johnson 


1 George  H.  Steuart 

2 James  A.  Walker 

3 Francis  T.  Nicholls  (J.  M.  Williams) 

4 John  M.  Jones 


3 Robert  E.  Rodes 


1 Junius  Daniel 

2 Alfred  Iverson 

3 George  Doles 


4 Stephen  D.  Ramseur 

5 Edward  A.  O’Neil 


8 


Corps. 

Divisions. 

Brigades. 

Lieut  Gens. 

Maj.  Gens. 

Brig.  Gens. 

i 

Richard  H.  Anderson 

i 

Cadmus  M.  Wilcox 

2 

Ambrose  R.  Wright 

3 

William  Mahone 

4 

Edward  A.  Perry  (David  Lang) 

5 

Carnot  Posey 

Third 

Ambrose  P.  Hill 

2 

Henry  Heth 

1 

James  J.  Pettigrew 

2 

John  M.  Brockenbrough  (Col.) 

3 

James  J.  Archer 

4 

Joseph  R.  Davis 

3 

William  D.  Pender 

1 

James  H.  Lane 

2 

Edward  L.  Thomas 

3 

Alfred  M.  Scales 

4 

Samuel  McGowan  (Abner  Perrin) 

1 

Wade  Hampton 

2 

Beverly  H.  Robinson 

James  E.  B.  Stuart 

3 

Fitzhugh  Lee 

(Cavalry) 

4 

Wm.  F.  H.  Lee  (John  R.  Chambliss) 

5 

William  E.  Jones 

Valley  District  and  Department  of  Western  Virginia 

1 

Albert  G.  Jenkins 

(cavalry  and  mounted  infantry) 

2 

John  D.  Imboden 

Chief  of  Artillery.  . . .William  N.  Pendleton. 


Longstreet’s  corps 
Ewell’s  corps 
A.  P.  Hill’s  corps 
Cavalry  corps 


5 battalions 
5 battalions 
5 battalions 
1 battalion 


84  guns 
84  guns 
80  guns 
24  guns 


Total,  272 


Plans. — The  object  of  the  Gettysburg  campaign  is  explained 
by  Lee  in  his  report. 

The  position  occupied  by  the  enemy  opposite  Fredericksburg 
being  one  in  which  he  could  not  be  attacked  to  advantage,  it  was 
determined  to  draw  him  from  it.  The  execution  of  this  project 
embraced  the  relief  of  the  Shenandoah  Valley  from  the  troops 
that  had  occupied  the  lower  part  of  it  during  the  winter  and 
spring,  and,  if  practicable,  the  transfer  of  the  scene  of  hostilities 
north  of  the  Potomac. 

It  was  thought  that  the  corresponding  movements  on  the  part 
of  the  enemy,  to  which  those  contemplated  by  us  would  probably 
give  rise,  might  offer  a fair  opportunity  to  strike  a blow  at  the 
army  then  commanded  by  Gen.  Hooker  and  that  in  any  event 
that  army  would  be  compelled  to  leave  Virginia  and,  possibly,  to 
draw  to  its  support  troops  designed  to  operate  against  other  parts 
of  the  country. 

In  this  way  it  was  supposed  that  the  enemy’s  plan  of  campaign 
for  the  summer  would  be  broken  up  and  part  of  the  season  of 


9 


active  operations  be  consumed  in  the  formation  of  new  combina- 
tions and  the  preparations  they  would  require.  In  addition  to 
these  advantages,  it  was  hoped  that  other  valuable  results  might 
be  attained  by  military  success.  Actuated  by  these  and  other 
important  considerations,  that  may  hereafter  be  presented,  the 
movement  began  June  3. 

Fredericksburg  to  Culpeper. — On  June  3,  the  army  corps  of 
Ewell  and  A.  P.  Hill,  with  the  division  of  McLaws  of  Long- 
street’s  corps,  occupied  the  line  of  hills  on  the  south  bank  of  the 
Rappahannock  River  above  and  below  Fredericksburg;  Hood’s 
division  was  at  Verdiersville,  and  Pickett’s  division  was  near 
Hanover  Junction,  where  it  had  been  detained  on  its  way  from 
southern  Virginia  to  observe  a Union  force  that  had  been  landed 
at  West  Point  on  the  York  River.  With  Pickett  was  Pettigrew’s 
brigade  of  Hill’s  corps  on  its  way  to  join  him  from  North  Carolina; 
Davis’  brigade  from  the  same  State  was  expected  by  rail  in  a few 
days.  Stuart  had  united  his  five  regular  cavalry  brigades  at  Cul- 
peper. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  on  the  Falmouth  side  of  the 
Rappahannock  River  opposite  Fredericksburg.  Toward  the  end 
of  May,  it  was  known  that  Stuart’s  cavalry  was  at  Culpeper; 
fearing  a raid,  the  Union  cavalry  corps  was  concentrated  along 
the  Alexandria-Gordonsville  railroad  and  the  V army  corps  was 
directed  to  relieve  the  cavalry  pickets  from  Banks  Ford  as  far 
up  the  Rappahannock  as  Kelly  Ford. 

The  opening  movement  of  the  campaign  is  described  by  Lee 
in  a letter  to  President  Davis,  dated  June  7. 

I commenced  to  draw  the  army  from  the  vicinity  of  Fredericks- 
burg on  Wednesday  morning,  June  3.  McLaws’  division  of 
Longstreet’s  corps  moved  on  that  day.  It  was  followed  Thursday 
morning  by  Rodes’  division  and  on  Friday  by  Early’s  and  John- 
son’s, of  Ewell’s  corps.  Hood’s  division  of  Long  street’ s corps, 
which  had  been  previously  advanced  to  the  Rapidan,  was  directed, 
on  the  3d  instant  to  move  to  Culpeper  Court-House. 

On  the  afternoon  of  Friday,  the  5th  instant,  the  enemy  made 
open  preparations  to  cross  the  Rappahannock  at  the  old  position 
at  the  mouth  of  Deep  Run.  After  driving  back  our  sharpshooters, 
under  a furious  cannonade  from  their  batteries,  by  a force  of  skir- 
mishers, they  crossed  a small  body  of  troops,  and  occupied  the  bank 
of  the  river.  It  was  so  devoid  of  concealment,  that  I supposed  the 
intention  was  to  ascertain  what  forces  occupied  the  position  of 


IO 


Fredericksburg,  or  to  fix  our  attention  upon  that  place  while  they 
should  accomplish  some  other  object.  I thought  it  prudent  to 
send  that  night  to  Gen.  Ewell  to  halt  his  march  until  I could  see 
what  the  next  day  would  develop,  and  placed  A.  P.  Hill’s  corps 
in  position  to  meet  any  attack  that  might  be  made  the  next 
morning. 

After  watching  the  enemy’s  operations  Saturday  (6th),  and 
being  unable  to  discover  more  troops  than  could  be  attended  to 
by  A.  P.  Hill,  and  no  advance  having  been  made  by  them,  I sent 
forward  to  Gen.  Ewell  to  resume  his  march  and  left  Fredericks- 
burg myself  in  the  evening.  My  conclusion  was  that  the  enemy 
had  discovered  the  withdrawal  of  our  troops  from  Fredericksburg, 
and  wished  to  detain  us  there  while  he  made  corresponding  changes. 

I have  with  me  two  divisions  of  Longstreet’s  corps  and  the  three 
divisions  of  Ewell’s.  I desire  to  bring  up  the  remaining  division 
of  Longstreet  ( Pickett’s ),  and  send  you  a dispatch  in  the  morning, 
requesting  that  (J.  R.)  Cooke  should  be  advanced  to  this  place, 
and  that  {M.)  Jenkins  be  brought  from  the  Blackwater  to  replace 
Cooke.  If  it  is  true,  as  reported  by  Gen.  Elzey,  that  only  1,500  of 
the  enemy  remain  at  Suffolk,  Ransom’s  brigade  will  be  more  than 
sufficient  for  that  line.  West  Point  being  evacuated,  and  the 
force  at  Yorktown  reduced,  there  is  nothing  to  be  apprehended 
from  that  quarter  and  Cooke  and  Jenkins  should  be  directed  to 
follow  me  as  soon  as  you  think  it  safe  for  them  to  do  so. 

As  far  as  I can  learn,  the  enemy  appears  to  be  extending  up  the 
Rappahannock  from  Fredericksburg.  The  whole  line  of  the 
Rappahannock  is  guarded  closely,  every  ford  defended  and  closely 
picketed  to  Beverly’s  above  Rappahannock  [railroad]  bridge. 
His  cavalry  is  massed  from  Catletts  to  Bealeton,  Stoneman’s 
headquarters  being  on  Cedar  Run. 

I think  if  I create  an  apprehension  for  the  safety  of  their  right 
flank  and  the  Potomac,  more  troops  will  be  brought  from  their 
line  of  operations  in  the  south.  But  to  gain  any  material  ad- 
vantage I should,  if  possible,  have  a large  force,  as  their  army  by 
all  accounts,  is  represented  as  very  large. 

If  it  is  true,  as  stated  in  the  Northern  papers,  that  Gen.  Hunter’s 
forces  have  been  reduced  by  reinforcements  being  sent  to  the 
Gulf,  it  would  be  well  for  Gen.  Beauregard,  with  the  force  made 
available  by  this  withdrawal,  to  be  sent  to  reinforce  Johnston  in 
the  west,  or  be  ordered  to  reinforce  this  army.  If  these  troops 
remain  where  they  are,  their  services  will  be  lost  to  the  country, 
and  they  will  become  a prey  to  disease. 

Forseeing  Lee’s  probable  movement,  Hooker  had  already 
decided  that  if  Lee  withdrew  a part  of  his  army,  he  would  attack 
the  part  left  at  Fredericksburg;  it  was  with  this  intent  that  he 
sent  a division  across  the  river  as  described  by  Lee.  At  the  same 


time,  however,  he  requested  authority  for  this  attack  in  a telegram 
to  President  Lincoln,  June  5. 

Under  instructions  from  the  major  general  commanding  the 
army,  dated  January  31,  I am  instructed  to  keep  in  view  always 
the  importance  of  covering  Washington  and  Harpers  Ferry,  either 
directly  or  by  so  operating  as  to  be  able  to  punish  any  force  of  the 
enemy  sent  against  them.  In  the  event  the  enemy  should  move, 
as  I almost  anticipate  he  will,  the  head  of  his  column  will  probably 
be  headed  for  the  Potomac,  via  Gordonsville  or  Culpeper,  while 
the  rear  will  rest  at  Fredericksburg. 

After  giving  the  subject  my  best  reflection,  I am  of  the  opinion 
that  it  is  my  duty  to  pitch  into  his  rear,  although  in  so  doing  the 
head  of  his  column  may  reach  Warrenton  before  I can  return. 
Will  it  be  within  the  spirit  of  my  instructions  to  do  so? 

Replies  were  sent  the  same  day  both  by  the  President  and  by 
Maj.  Gen.  Henry  W.  Halleck,  commanding  the  army,  disapproving 
his  proposed  movement.  In  the  meantime,  however,  Hooker  had 
sent  a division  of  the  VI  corps  across  the  river  and  intrenched  it 
there.  One  division  of  this  corps  was  kept  on  the  south  bank 
until  the  night  of  June  13. 

En  route  to  Culpeper,  Lee  dispatched  the  following  orders, 
dated  June  7,  to  the  commanders  of  the  two  mounted  brigades  of 
the  Valley  District  and  the  Department  of  Western  Virginia. 

Brig.  Gen.  A.  G.  Jenkins,  via  Staunton. 

General: — I desire  you  to  have  your  command  ready  to  be 
concentrated  at  Strasburg  or  Front  Royal,  or  any  point  in  front 
of  either,  by  Wednesday  the  10th  instant,  with  a view  to  cooperate 
with  a force  of  infantry.  Your  pickets  can  be  kept  in  advance  as 
far  as  you  deem  best,  toward  Winchester.  See  to  their  arms, 
ammunition,  and  equipments,  and  make  arrangements  for  pro- 
visions and  forage.  Send  me  all  the  information  you  have  about 
the  position  and  strength  of  the  enemy  at  Winchester,  Charles- 
town, Berryville  and  any  other  point  where  they  may  be.  Keep 
your  horses  as  fresh  as  you  can,  and  have  your  whole  command 
prepared  for  active  service. 

Brig.  Gen.  John  D.  Imboden,  via  Staunton. 

General: — In  view  of  the  operations  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley, 
I desire  you  to  attract  the  enemy’s  attention  in  Hampshire  county, 
and  to  proceed  down  to  Romney  or  such  other  point  as  you  may 
consider  best  calculated  for  the  purpose.  After  leaving  a sufficient 
guard  on  the  Shenandoah  Mountain,  you  can  use  the  rest  of  your 
command  for  the  purpose  specified.  In  attracting  their  attention 
and  detaining  whatever  force  they  may  have  at  New  Creek, 


12 


Cumberland,  Cacapon,  etc.,  you  will  of  course  do  them  all  the 
damage  in  your  power  by  striking  them  a damaging  blow  at  any 
point  where  opportunity  offers,  and  where  you  deem  most  prac- 
ticable. 

It  will  be  important,  if  you  can  accomplish  it,  to  destroy  some 
of  the  bridges,  so  as  to  prevent  communication  and  the  transfer 
of  reinforcements  to  Martinsburg. 

After  accomplishing  what  you  can  in  Hampshire,  should  you 
find  it  practicable  or  advantageous,  you  can  cooperate  with  any 
troops  you  may  find  operating  in  the  valley.  Forward  to  the 
commanding  officer  of  the  force  there,  any  information  that  you 
may  deem  important,  and  comply  with  any  requisition  on  his 
part. 

I desire  you  to  move  into  Hampshire  as  soon  as  possible.  Let 
me  know  the  time  of  your  departure  and  the  time  of  your  expected 
arrival.  In  connection  with  this  purpose,  it  is  important  that  you 
should  obtain  for  the  army,  all  the  cattle  that  you  can.  I hope 
that  you  will  also  be  able  to  collect  recruits  for  your  brigade,  both 
cavalry  and  infantry,  and  bring  them  out  with  you. 

Hampshire  was  the  county  of  which  Romney  was  the  county 
seat.  A demonstration  there  would  divert  attention  from  the 
Shenandoah  Valley.  The  bridges  were  on  the  B.  and  0.  Railroad. 

From  Culpeper  on  June  8,  Lee  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  War  as 
follows: 

As  far  as  I can  judge,  there  is  nothing  to  be  gained  by  this  army 
remaining  quietly  on  the  defensive,  which  it  must  do  unless  it  can 
be  reinforced.  I am  aware  that  there  is  difficulty  and  hazard  in 
taking  the  aggressive  with  so  large  an  army  in  its  front,  intrenched 
behind  a river,  where  it  cannot  be  advantageously  attacked. 
Unless  it  can  be  drawn  out  in  a position  to  be  assailed,  it  will  take 
its  own  time  to  prepare  and  strengthen  itself  to  renew  its  advance 
on  Richmond,  and  force  this  army  back  within  the  intrenchments 
of  that  city.  This  may  result  in  any  event;  still,  I think  it  is 
worth  a trial  to  prevent  such  a catastrophe.  Still,  if  the  depart- 
ment thinks  it  better  to  remain  on  the  defensive,  and  guard  as  far 
as  possible  all  the  avenues  of  approach,  and  await  the  time  of  the 
enemy,  I am  ready  to  adopt  that  course.  You  have  therefore 
only  to  inform  me. 

I think  our  southern  coast  might  be  held  during  the  sickly 
season  by  local  troops,  aided  by  a small  organized  force,  and  pred- 
atory excursions  of  the  enemy  be  repressed.  This  would  give  us 
an  active  force  in  the  field  with  which  we  might  hope  to  make 
some  impression  on  the  enemy  both  on  our  northern  and  western 
frontiers.  Unless  this  can  be  done,  I see  little  hope  of  accomplish- 
ing anything  of  importance.  All  our  military  preparations  and 


i3 


organizations  should  now  be  pressed  forward  with  the  greatest 
vigor,  and  every  exertion  made  to  obtain  some  material  advantage 
in  this  campaign. 

As  Pickett  was  now  on  his  way  to  join  the  army,  the  first  sentence 
probably  refers  to  the  two  brigades  of  Pickett's  division,  Corse’s 
and  Micah  Jenkins’,  that  had  been  detained  by  the  War  Depart- 
ment for  the  protection  of  Richmond.  Because  of  the  importance 
of  the  campaign,  Lee  did  not  want  to  leave  a single  one  of  his 
brigades  behind.  If  he  could  not  get  Jenkins’  brigade,  he  wanted 
Cooke’s  in  its  place. 

The  Secretary  of  War’s  reply  to  this  letter  is  dated  Jupe  10. 

I concur  entirely  in  your  views  of  the  importance  of  aggressive 
movements  by  your  army.  Indeed,  in  my  present  judgment, 
such  action  is  indispensable  to  our  safety  and  independence,  and 
all  attendant  sacrifices  and  risks  must  be  incurred.  I steadily 
urge  and  sustain  this  view;  at  the  same  time,  I am  most  anxious 
to  assure  your  communications  and  supplies,  and  it  is  in  this  view 
I press  upon  your  consideration  some  of  the  dangers  to  which  our 
destitution  of  a covering  force  to  this  city  and  the  railroad  may 
expose  us.  I have  not  hesitated,  in  cooperating  with  your  plans, 
to  leave  this  city  almost  defenseless,  and  since  my  letter  of  yester- 
day, learning  that  you  had  ordered  away  the  small  brigade  left 
by  General  Pickett  [Corse’s]  at  Hanover,  I have  readily  concurred 
in  sending  Cooke’s  brigade  to  the  Junction.  The  President  has 
not  been  willing  to  order  (M.)  Jenkins’  brigade  from  North  Caro- 
lina, in  view  of  the  representations  made  by  Generals  Hill  (D.  H.) 
and  Whiting,  but  has  communicated  your  late  telegrams  to  the 
former  and  submitted  to  his  discretion  the  propriety  of  the 
removal. 

On  receipt  of  this  letter,  Lee  directed  that  Corse’s  brigade  return 
to  Hanover  Junction,  and  for  the  time  being  made  no  further  call 
for  troops. 

Cavalry  Engagement  at  Brandy  Station. — On  May  6,  Hooker 
reported  to  Halleck: 

As  the  accumulation  of  the  heavy  rebel  force  of  cavalry  at  Cul- 
peper may  mean  mischief,  I am  determined  if  practicable,  to 
break  it  up  in  its  incipiency.  I shall  send  all  my  cavalry  against 
them  stiffened  by  about  3,000  infantry.  It  will  require  until  the 
morning  of  the  9th  to  gain  their  positions,  and  at  daylight  on  that 
day  it  is  my  intention  to  attack  them  in  their  camps. 


14 

The  day  selected  was  a fortunate  one,  as  the  Confederate  cavalry 
had  been  concentrated  for  a review  by  Lee  the  day  before  and  was 
not  guarding  the  river  as  carefully  as  usual. 

In  the  fight  at  Brandy  Station  or  Fleetwood,  June  9,  the  Union 
troops  employed  were  7,000  cavalry  and  3,000  infantry;  opposed 
to  them  was  Stuart’s  cavalry  division  of  “about  8,000  men”, 
according  to  Confederate  reports.  The  Union  troops  crossed  the 
Rappahannock  River  at  Beverly  and  Kelly  fords  early  in  the 
morning  and  an  engagement  soon  began  which  lasted  all  day  with 
varying  success.  The  Union  troops  withdrew  across  the  river 
late  in  the  afternoon.  Although  the  Union  cavalry  was  aided  by 
infantry  and  could  not  claim  a real  victory,  still  the  men  did  not 
feel  that  they  had  been  defeated,  and  the  engagement  gave  them 
confidence  in  themselves  and  their  commanders,  Pleasonton, 
Buford  and  D.  McM.  Gregg. 

From  the  Rappahannock  to  the  Shenandoah  Valley  and  Manas- 
sas Junction. — At  Culpeper,  Lee  learned  from  Imboden  that  he  was 
on  his  way  to  Romney,  and  from  A.  G.  Jenkins  that  he  had 
reached  Strasburg  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  As  all  his  prepara- 
tions were  now  complete  and  the  Union  cavalry  had  been  tem- 
porarily disposed  of,  on  the  receipt  of  the  Secretary  of  War’s  mes- 
sage given  above,  Ewell  was  directed  to  advance  into  the  Shen- 
andoah Valley;  he  left  Culpeper  on  the  10th.  On  the  same  day 
Hooker  sent  the  following  message  to  President  Lincoln: 

Gen.  Pleasonton  reports  that  he  had  an  affair  with  the  rebel 
cavalry  yesterday  near  Brandy  Station,  which  resulted  in  crippling 
him  so  much  that  he  will  have  to  abandon  his  contemplated  raid 
into  Maryland,  which  was  to  have  started  this  morning. 

I am  not  so  certain  that  the  raid  will  be  abandoned  from  this 
cause.  It  may  delay  the  departure  a few  days.  I shall  leave  the 
cavalry,  which  is  all  I have  mounted,  where  they  are,  near  Beale- 
ton,  with  instructions  to  resist  the  passage  of  the  river  by  the 
enemy’s  forces.  If  to  effect  this  he  should  bring  up  a considerable 
force  of  infantry,  that  will  so  weaken  him  in  my  front  that  I have 
good  reason  to  believe  that  I can  throw  a sufficient  force  over  the 
river  to  compel  the  enemy  to  abandon  his  present  position.  If  it 
should  be  the  intention  to  send  a heavy  column  of  infantry  to 
accompany  the  cavalry  on  the  proposed  raid,  he  can  leave  nothing 
behind  to  interpose  any  serious  obstacle  to  my  rapid  advance  on 
Richmond.  I am  not  satisfied  of  his  intention  in  this  respect,  but 
from  certain  movements  in  their  corps  I cannot  regard  it  as 
altogether  improbable. 


15 


If  it  should  be  found  to  be  the  case,  will  it  not  promote  the  true 
interest  of  the  cause  for  me  to  march  to  Richmond  at  once?  From 
there  all  the  disposable  part  of  this  army  can  be  thrown  to  any 
threatened  point  north  of  the  Potomac  at  short  notice,  and,  until 
they  can  reach  their  destination,  a sufficiency  of  troops  can  be 
collected  to  check,  if  not  stop,  his  invasion.  If  left  to  operate 
from  my  own  judgment  with  my  present  information,  I do  not 
hesitate  to  say  that  I should  adopt  this  course  as  being  the  most 
speedy  and  certain  mode  of  giving  the  rebellion  a mortal  blow.  I 
desire  that  you  will  give  it  your  reflection.  At  present  the  enemy 
has  one  corps  at  Gordonsville,  with  the  advance  on  Culpeper, 
with  the  manifest  intention  of  the  other  corps  to  drift  in  that 
direction.  I now  have  two  bridges  over  the  river  below  Fredericks- 
burg, and  it  is  this,  I believe,  that  causes  the  enemy  to  hesitate 
to  move  forward. 

That  night  he  was  informed  by  the  President  and  by  Halleck, 
that — - 

Lee’s  army  and  not  Richmond  is  your  sure  objective  point. 

His  plans  for  an  offensive  movement  having  been  disapproved, 
on  the  11th,  Hooker  began  to  shift  his  force  to  the  west  to  cover 
the  crossings  of  the  upper  Rappahannock.  The  III  corps  was 
ordered  to  Bealeton  to  relieve  the  cavalry  and  guard  the  river 
crossings  above  the  V corps;  the  I corps,  to  Bealeton;  and  the  XI 
corps,  to  Catlett’s  Station.  The  I,  III  and  XI  corps  now  con- 
stituted one  wing  of  the  army  and  were  placed  under  the  orders 
of  Maj.  Gen.  John  F.  Reynolds,  to  whom  the  commanders  of  the 
V and  the  cavalry  corps  were  also  ordered  to  report  temporarily. 

It  was  not  until  the  13th,  three  days  after  Ewell  had  begun  his 
march,  that  Hooker  was  informed  that  any  Confederates  had 
moved  from  Culpeper  into  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  As  his  in- 
structions required  him  to  cover  Harpers  Ferry  and  Washington, 
he  at  once  issued  orders  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  army  from 
the  Rappahannock  River.  One  wing  under  Reynolds  was  to 
follow  the  railroad  to  Manassas  Junction,  while  the  other  wing, 
under  his  own  supervision,  was  to  follow  the  road  parallel  to  the 
Potomac  River  to  Fairfax  Station. 

On  the  16th,  Reynolds’  wing  was  concentrated  near  Manassas 
Junction  and  the  other  wing  was  at  or  near  Fairfax  Station;  on 
the  same  day  Lee’s  army  was  stretched  from  Fredericksburg  to 
Williamsport  on  the  Potomac  River. 


i6 


Itinerary  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  June  11  to  16. 


June 

I Corps 

III  Corps 

XI  Corps 

V Corps 

XII  Corps 

II  Corps 

VI  Corps 

Cavalry 

Divisions 

ii 

Falmouth 

Hartwood 

Church 

Falmouth 

Rappahannock 

River 

Stafford 
C.  H. 

Falmouth 

Falmouth 

Rappahan- 
nock River 

12 

Deep  Run 

Bealeton 

Hartwood 

Church 

Rappahannock 

River 

Stafford 
C.  H. 

Falmouth 

Falmouth 

Rappahan- 
nock River 

13 

Bealeton 

Bealeton 

Catlett’s 

Station 

Morrisville 

Toward 

Dumfries 

Falmouth 

Potomac 

Creek 

Rappahan- 
nock River 

14 

Manassas 

Junction 

Manassas 

Junction 

Manassas 

Junction 

Catlett’s 

Station 

Dumfries 

Falmouth 

Stafford 
C.  H. 

Rappahan- 
nock River 

15 

Manassas 

Junction 

Manassas 

Junction 

Center- 

ville 

Manassas 

Junction 

Fairfax 

C.  H. 

Acquia 

Dumfries 

Bristow 

Station 

16 

Manassas 

Junction 

Manassas 

Junction 

Center- 

ville 

Manassas 

Junction 

Fairfax 

C.  H. 

Wolf  Run 
Shoals 

Fairfax 

Station 

Manassas 

Junction 

On  June  15,  two  of  Ewell’s  divisions  were  near  Winchester  and 
one  at  Williamsport;  Longstreet’s  three  divisions  started  that  day 
from  Culpeper;  one  of  Hill’s  divisions  was  at  Germanna  Ford, 
and  the  other  two  were  at  Fredericksburg.  Of  Stuart’s  cavalry, 
three  brigades  were  with  Longstreet  and  two  were  still  along  the 
Rappahannock  River.  In  order  to  forestall  any  Union  movement 
through  the  Loudoun  Valley,  between  the  Bull  Run  and  Blue 
Ridge  mountains,  Longstreet,  who  marched  at  the  head  of  his 
corps  with  Hood’s  division,  turned  off  from  the  Chester  Gap  road 
at  Washington  and  kept  to  the  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge  Mountains. 

Lee  remained  at  Culpeper  until  the  16th  when  he  followed  the 
route  taken  by  Longstreet,  and  reached  Markham  on  the  Manassas 
Gap  railroad  on  the  17th.  Here  he  learned  from  Ewell,  that  Early 
was  at  Winchester,  Johnson  on  his  way  to  Shepherdstown,  and 
Rodes  at  Williamsport;  and  from  Longstreet  that,  on  account  of 
bad  roads,  he  had  crossed  the  Blue  Ridge  into  the  Valley  through 
Ashby  Gap.  He  sent  them  the  following  instructions: 

To  Ewell: — General:  I have  just  received  your  letter,  the  first 
from  you  since  your  dispatch  announcing  the  fall  of  Winchester. 
I think  the  reports  you  have  of  the  forces  at  Harpers  Ferry  must 
be  exaggerated.  I wish  you  to  move  Rodes’  division  on  as  far  as 
Hagerstown  and  operate  in  the  enemy’s  country  according  to  the 
plan  proposed.  Give  out  that  your  movement  is  for  the  purpose 


17 


of  enveloping  Harpers  Ferry.  Take  what  is  necessary  for  the 
army  and  give  citizens  of  Maryland  Confederate  money  or  certifi- 
cates. Repress  marauding.  Do  not  expose  yourself.  Keep  your 
own  scouts. 

To  Longstreet : — General:  Your  note  of  10  a.  m.  to-day  just 
received.  I have  heard  nothing  of  the  movements  of  Gen.  Hooker 
either  from  Gen.  Stuart  or  yourself,  and  therefore  can  form  no 
opinion  of  the  best  move  against  him.  If  a part  of  our  force  could 
have  operated  east  of  the  mountains,  it  would  have  served  more  to 
confuse  him,  but  as  you  have  turned  off  into  the  Valley  and  I 
understand  all  of  the  trains  have  taken  the  same  route,  I hope  it 
is  for  the  best.  At  any  rate  it  is  too  late  to  change  from  informa- 
tion I have.  You  had  better,  therefore,  push  on,  relieve  Ewell’s 
division  as  soon  as  you  can  and  let  him  advance  into  Maryland,  at 
least  as  far  as  Hagerstown.  Give  out  it  is  against  Harpers  Ferry. 

I will  send  back  for  A.  P.  Hill  to  move  by  Chester  Gap.  I wrote 
to  you  to-day  and  yesterday.  I shall  go  from  here  to  the  Valley.  / 

Ewell’s  Valley  Operations. — As  stated  in  Lee’s  report,  one  of 
the  results  of  his  plan  of  campaign  would  be  to  clear  the  Shenan- 
doah Valley  of  the  Union  troops  that  had  occupied  it  since  the 
preceding  winter.  These  Union  forces  were  the  division  of  Maj. 
Gen.  Robert  H.  Milroy,  7,500  men,  at  Winchester  and  Berry ville, 
and  a brigade  of  1,500  men  at  Martinsburg;  both  belonged  to  the 
Middle  Department. 

The  commander  of  the  Middle  Department  had  been  ordered 
to  withdraw  all  his  exposed  posts  to  Harpers  Ferry,  but  he  delayed 
issuing  positive  orders  to  Milroy,  on  the  representations  of  the 
latter  who  thought  he  would  be  exposed  only  to  cavalry  attack. 
Before  Ewell  entered  the  valley,  Milroy  had,  however,  sent  some 
of  his  supplies  back  to  Harpers  Ferry,  and  had  ordered  his  brigade 
at  Berryville  to  unite  with  the  other  two  at  Winchester.  A third 
of  his  force  being  cavalry  employed  on  patrol  duty,  Milroy  was 
informed  of  Ewell’s  advance  on  June  12,  when  Rodes,  Johnson 
and  Early  reached  Front  Royal.  Here  Jenkins  reported  to  Ewell 
and  probably  explained  the  position  of  the  Union  troops. 

The  next  morning,  Rodes,  with  Jenkins’  cavalry,  moved  on 
Berryville  with  orders  to  dispose  of  the  force  there  and  then 
push  on  to  Martinsburg.  Ewell,  with  the  divisions  of  Early  and 
Johnson,  moved  on  Winchester.  On  the  13th,  Rodes  engaged  the 
rear-guard  of  the  Union  brigade  at  Berryville,  which  retired  to 


i8 


the  railroad  in  its  rear  and  followed  the  railroad  to  Winchester. 
Had  his  orders  permitted  Rodes  to  march  on  Winchester  the  next 
day,  Milroy’s  division  would  have  been  captured.  Rodes’  orders 
however  directed  him  to  move  on  Martinsburg,  which  he  reached 
on  the  evening  of  the  14th,  where  he  captured  five  pieces  of  artil- 
lery and  some  stores,  and  Williamsport  on  the  evening  of  the  15th. 
In  the  three  days  he  had  marched  fifty  miles.  Early  and  Johnson 
drove  Milroy’s  reconnoitering  columns  back  on  Winchester  on 
the  13th,  and  caused  him  to  take  refuge  in  some  closed  works 
north  of  the  town.  Late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  14th,  Early 
captured  a position  which  made  these  works  untenable,  and  that 
night  Milroy  decided  to  retreat  on  Harpers  Ferry  along  the  rail- 
road. Anticipating  this,  Johnson  was  ordered  to  make  a night 
march  and  get  on  Milroy’s  line  of  retreat.  A part  of  Milroy’s 
division  had  already  passed  the  junction  point  when  the  head  of 
Johnson’s  division  reached  it,  and  before  Johnson  was  there  in 
force,  about  half  of  Milroy’s  division  escaped. 

Ewell  reported  the  results  of  his  valley  operations  as  follows: 

The  fruits  of  this  victory  were  23  pieces  of  artillery  (nearly  all 
rifled),  4,000  prisoners,  300  loaded  wagons,  more  than  300  horses, 
and  quite  a large  amount  of  commissary  and  quartermaster 
stores.  My  loss  was  47  killed,  219  wounded  and  3 missing;  ag- 
gregate, 269. 

June  17  to  24. — After  reaching  the  Alexandria-Gordonsville 
railroad,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  almost  stationary  for  a 
week;  Hooker  was  uncertain  of  Lee’s  intention.  Under  his  orders 
to  cover  Washington,  Hooker  could  not  cross  the  Potomac  until 
it  was  certain  that  Lee  was  crossing,  and  he  did  not  want  to  move 
westward  through  the  passes  of  the  Bull  Run  Mountains  and  give 
Lee  the  opportunity  of  reaching  Maryland  before  him.  He  sent 
the  XII  corps  to  secure  a crossing  near  Leesburg,  where  two 
bridges  were  constructed  near  Edwards  Ferry,  and  advanced 
Reynolds’  three  corps  within  supporting  distance.  The  V corps 
was  sent  to  guard  the  Aldie  Gap  and  the  II  corps  to  guard  the 
Thoroughfare  Gap,  of  the  Bull  Run  Mountains.  The  cavalry 
corps  was  sent  into  the  Loudoun  Valley  to  discover  Lee’s  position. 


19 


Itinerary  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  June  17  to  24. 


June 

I Corps 

Ill  Corps 

XI  Corps 

V Corps 

XII  Corps 

II  Corps 

VI  Corps 

Cavalry 

divisions 

IT 

Herndon 

Station 

(Leesburg  R.  R.) 

Center- 

ville 

Goose 

Creek 

Gum 

Springs 

Toward 

Dranes- 

ville 

Sangster 

Station 

Fairfax 

Station 

1.  Aldie 

2.  Aldie 

3.  Fairfax  C.H. 

18 

Herndon 

Station 

(Leesburg  R.  R.) 

Center- 

ville 

Goose 

Creek 

Gum 

Springs 

Leesburg 

Sangster 

Station 

German- 

town 

1.  / Loudoun 

2.  \ Valley 

3.  Fairfax 

19 

Guilford 

Station 

(Leesburg  R.  R.) 

Gum 

Springs 

Goose 

Creek 

Aldie 

Leesburg 

Sangster 

Station 

German- 

town 

1.  f Loudoun 

2.  1 Valley 

3.  Fairfax 

20 

Guilford 

Station 

(Leesburg  R.  R.) 

Gum 

Springs 

Goose 

Creek 

Aldie 

Leesburg 

Toward 
Thorough- 
fare Gap 

Bristow 
(1  div.) 

1.  f Loudoun 

2.  \ Valley 

3.  Fairfax 

21 

Guilford 

Station 

(Leesburg  R.  R.) 

Gum 

Springs 

Goose 

Creek 

Aldie 

Leesburg 

Thorough- 
fare Gap 

Bristow 
(1  div.) 

1.  f Loudoun 

2.  \ Valley 

3.  Buckland 

Mills 

22 

Guilford 

Station 

(Leesburg  R.  R.) 

Gum 

Springs 

Goose 

Creek 

Aldie 

Leesburg 

Thorough- 
fare Gap 

Bristow 
(1  div.) 

1.  Aldie 

2.  Aldie 

3.  Warrenton 

23 

Guilford 

Station 

(Leesburg  R.  R.) 

Gum 

Springs 

Goose 

Creek 

Aldie 

Leesburg 

Thorough- 
fare Gap 

Bristow 
(1  div.) 

1.  Aldie 

2.  Aldie 

3.  FairfaxC.H. 

24 

Guilford 

Station 

(Leesburg  R.  R.) 

Gum 

Springs 

Edwards 

Ferry 

Aldie 

Leesburg 

Thorough- 
fare Gap 

Center- 
ville 
(1  div.) 

1.  Aldie 

2.  Aldie 

3.  Fairfax  C.H. 

During  this  week,  Longstreet’ s three  divisions  were  encamped 
along  the  Shenandoah  River  from  Millwood  to  Berryville;  Hill’s 
three  divisions  marched  from  the  Rappahannock  to  Shepherds- 
town  on  the  Potomac;  of  Ewell’s  divisions,  Early  and  Johnson 
moved  from  the  vicinity  of  Winchester  to  Shepherdstown  and 
Sharpsburg,  and  Rodes  moved  through  Hagerstown  toward 
Boonsboro;  Stuart’s  cavalry  was  operating  in  the  Loudoun  Valley 
both  to  conceal  the  movements  of  Lee’s  army  and  to  discover 
those  of  Hooker’s. 

Cavalry  Engagements  in  the  Loudoun  Valley. — In  his  instruc- 
tions to  Gen.  Longstreet  on  the  17th,  Lee  says: 

I have  heard  nothing  of  the  movements  of  Gen.  Hooker,  either 
from  Gen.  Stuart  or  from  yourself. 


20 


Early  on  that  same  day,  Hooker,  who  was  at  Fairfax  Station, 
received  a message  from  Halleck,  containing  the  following  order: 

I want  you  to  push  out  your  cavalry  to  ascertain  something 
definite  about  the  enemy. 

It  would  appear  that  the  cavalry  forces  of  the  two  armies  had 
lost  touch  as  soon  as  Pleasonton  left  the  Rappahannock  River. 

On  the  17th,  Stuart,  who  had  been  with  Longstreet  with  three 
brigades,  sent  one  brigade  through  Middleburg  to  Aldie  Gap  of 
the  Bull  Run  Mountains,  one  to  reconnoiter  Thoroughfare  Gap, 
one  to  Rectortown,  and  went  himself  to  Middleburg  with  a 
small  escort.  Pleasonton,  who  had  concentrated  his  corps  near 
Manassas  for  supplies,  sent  one  regiment  via  Thoroughfare  Gap 
to  Middleburg  and  took  a division  to  Aldie.  At  Aldie,  there  was 
a cavalry  engagement  that  afternoon  between  a brigade  of  each 
army;  that  night  the  Confederate  brigade  retired.  At  Middleburg, 
Stuart  surrounded  the  Union  regiment  with  his  other  two  brigades 
and  captured  a large  part  of  it.  When  Hill’s  corps  had  passed 
beyond  Culpeper,  Stuart  united  his  five  brigades  in  the  Loudoun 
Valley  to  dispute  the  reconnaissances  being  made  by  Pleasonton. 
The  latter  united  his  corps  at  Aldie,  and  after  several  skirmishes 
on  the  18th,  19th  and  20th,  received  a division  of  the  V corps  as 
a support.  On  the  21st,  he  drove  Stuart  through  Middleburg 
and  Upperville  to  Ashby  Gap  which  was  held  by  Confederate 
infantry.  This  established  the  fact  that  Lee’s  infantry  was  moving 
through  the  Shenandoah  Valley  and  Pleasonton  returned  to 
Aldie  Gap. 

The  Advance  into  Pennsylvania. — Lee  established  his  head- 
quarters at  Berryville  on  the  19th  and  remained  there  until  the 
24th.  On  the  22d,  he  decided  that  Pleasonton’s  force,  which  he 
first  thought  might  be  the  advance-guard  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  was  only  a reconnoitering  party,  and  that  day  issued 
his  orders  for  the  advance  into  Pennsylvania. 

To  Ewell,  June  22. 

General:  Your  letter  of  6 p.  m.  yesterday  has  been  received.  If 
you  are  ready  to  move,  you  can  do  so.  I think  your  best  course 
will  be  toward  the  Susquehanna,  taking  the  routes  by  Emmitsburg, 
Chambersburg  and  McConnellsburg.  Your  trains  had  better  be, 


as  far  as  possible,  kept  on  the  center  route.  You  must  get  com- 
mand of  your  cavalry,  and  use  it  in  gathering  supplies,  obtaining 
information,  and  protecting  your  flanks.  If  necessary,  send  a 
staff  officer  to  remain  with  Gen.  Jenkins.  It  will  depend  upon 
the  quantity  of  supplies  obtained  in  that  country  whether  the 
rest  of  the  army  can  follow.  Every  exertion  should  therefore  be 
made  to  locate  and  secure  them.  Beef  we  can  drive  with  us,  but 
bread  we  cannot  carry  and  must  get  it  in  the  country. 

I send  you  copies  of  a general  order  on  this  subject,  which  I 
think  is  based  on  rectitude  and  sound  policy,  and  the  spirit  which 
I wish  you  to  see  enforced  in  your  command.  I am  much  gratified 
at  the  success  that  has  attended  your  movements  and  feel  assured, 
if  they  are  conducted  with  the  same  energy  and  circumspection, 
it  will  continue.  Your  progress  and  direction  will,  of  course, 
depend  upon  the  development  of  circumstances.  If  Harrisburg 
comes  within  your  means,  capture  it. 

General  A.  P.  Hill  arrived  yesterday  in  the  vicinity  of  Berry  - 
ville.  I shall  move  him  on  to-day  if  possible.  Saturday  [June  20], 
Longstreet  withdrew  from  the  Blue  Ridge.  Yesterday  the  enemy 
pressed  our  cavalry  so  hard  with  infantry  and  cavalry  on  the  Upper- 
ville  road  that  McLaws’  division  had  to  be  sent  back  to  hold 
Ashby  Gap.  I have  not  heard  from  there  this  morning.  General 
Stuart  could  not  ascertain  whether  it  was  intended  as  a real 
advance  toward  the  Valley,  or  to  ascertain  our  position. 

The  pontoons  will  reach  Martinsburg  to-day,  and  will  be  laid 
at  the  point  you  suggest,  4 or  5 miles  below  Williamsport,  if  found 
suitable.  I have  not  countermanded  your  order  withdrawing  the 
cavalry  from  Charlestown.  I will  write  you  again  if  I receive 
further  information  affecting  your  movements. 

The  cavalry  referred  to  in  the  last  paragraph,  was  White’s 
battalion  of  Jones’  brigade,  which  accompanied  Early’s  division 
in  the  campaign  in  Pennsylvania. 

Another  letter  was  written  to  Ewell  the  same  day. 

General:  I have  just  received  your  letter  of  this  morning  from 
opposite  Shepherdstown.  Mine  of  to-day,  authorizing  you  to 
move  toward  the  Susquehanna,  I hope  has  reached  you  ere  this. 
After  dispatching  my  letter,  learning  that  the  enemy  had  not 
renewed  his  attempts  of  yesterday  to  break  through  the  Blue 
Ridge,  I directed  General  R.  H.  Anderson’s  division  to  commence 
its  march  toward  Shepherdstown.  It  will  reach  there  to-morrow. 
I also  directed  General  Stuart,  should  the  enemy  have  so  far 
retired  from  his  front  as  to  permit  of  the  departure  of  a portion 
of  the  cavalry,  to  march  with  three  brigades  across  the  Potomac, 
and  place  himself  on  your  right  and  in  communication  with  you, 
keep  you  advised  of  the  movements  of  the  enemy,  and  assist  in 
collecting  supplies  for  the  army.  I have  not  heard  from  him  since. 


22 


I also  directed  Imboden,  if  opportunity  offered,  to  cross  the  Poto- 
mac and  perform  the  same  offices  on  your  left.  I shall  endeavor 
to  get  General  Early’s  regiments  to  him  as  soon  as  possible.  I 
do  not  know  what  has  become  of  the  infantry  of  the  Maryland 
Line.  I had  intended  that  to  guard  Winchester. 

Early  had  been  obliged  to  detach  three  regiments  from  his 
division  to  guard  Winchester  and  to  conduct  the  prisoners  made 
from  Milroy’s  command,  back  to  Staunton. 

To  Stuart  through  Long  street,  June  22: 

General: — I have  just  received  your  note  of  7:45  this  morning 
to  General  Long  street.  I judge  the  efforts  of  the  enemy  yesterday 
were  to  arrest  our  progress  and  ascertain  our  whereabouts.  Per- 
haps he  is  satisfied.  Do  you  know  where  he  is  and  what  he  is 
doing?  I fear  he  will  steal  a march  on  us  and  get  across  the 
Potomac  before  we  are  aware.  If  you  find  he  is  moving  north- 
ward and  that  two  brigades  can  guard  the  Blue  Ridge  and  take 
care  of  your  rear,  you  can  move  with  the  other  three  into  Mary- 
land and  take  position  on  General  Ewell’s  flank,  keep  him  in- 
formed of  the  enemy’s  movements  and  collect  all  the  supplies 
you  can  for  the  use  of  the  army. 

One  column  of  General  Ewell’s  will  probably  move  towards  the 
Susquehanna  by  the  Emmitsburg  route;  another  by  Chambers- 
burg.  Accounts  of  him  last  night  said  there  was  no  enemy  west 
of  Frederick.  A cavalry  force  (about  100)  guarded  the  Monocacy 
bridge  which  was  barricaded.  You  will  of  course  take  charge  of 
(A.  G.)  Jenkins’  brigade,  and  give  him  necessary  instructions. 
All  supplies  taken  in  Maryland  must  be  by  authorized  staff 
officers  for  their  respective  departments — by  no  one  else.  They 
will  be  paid  for,  or  receipts  for  the  same  given  to  the  owners.  I 
will  send  you  a general  order  on  this  subject,  which  I wish  you  to 
see  is  strictly  complied  with. 

From  Longstreet  to  Stuart  forwarding  the  above,  June  22: 

General: — General  Lee  has  inclosed  to  me  this  letter  for  you,  to 
be  forwarded  to  you,  provided  you  can  be  spared  from  my  front, 
and  provided  I think  you  can  move  across  to  Potomac  without 
disclosing  our  plans.  He  speaks  of  your  leaving  via  Hopewell  Gap 
and  passing  by  the  rear  of  the  enemy.  If  you  can  get  through  by 
that  route,  I think  it  will  be  less  likely  to  indicate  what  our  plans 
are,  than  if  you  should  cross  by  passing  to  our  rear.  I forward  the 
letter  of  instructions  with  these  suggestions. 

Please  advise  me  of  the  condition  of  affairs  before  you  leave, 
and  order  General  Hampton — whom  I suppose  you  will  leave  here 
in  command — to  report  to  me  at  Millwood,  either  by  letter  or  in 
person,  as  may  be  most  agreeable  to  him. 


23 


N.  B. — I think  that  your  passage  of  the  Potomac  by  our  rear, 
will  in  a measure  disclose  our  plan.  You  had  better  not  leave  us, 
therefore,  unless  you  can  take  the  proposed  route  in  rear  of  the 
enemy. 

In  Stuart’s  report,  submitted  in  August,  1863,  he  says: 

I submitted  to  the  commanding  general  the  plan  of  leaving  a 
brigade  or  so  in  my  present  front,  and  passing  the  enemy’s  rear, 
passing  through  Hopewell  or  some  other  gap  in  Bull  Run  Moun- 
tains, attain  the  enemy’s  rear,  passing  between  his  main  body  and 
Washington,  and  cross  into  Maryland,  joining  our  army  north  of 
the  Potomac. 

This  plan  is  said  to  have  been  submitted  by  Stuart  in  person 
at  Berryville  on  the  night  of  the  21st. 

Stuart  did  not  receive  his  final  instructions  until  the  evening 
of  the  23d,  when  he  received  the  following  letter  from  Lee,  dated 
5 p.  m.  the  23d: 

If  General  Hooker’s  army  remains  inactive,  you  can  leave  two 
brigades  to  watch  him,  and  withdraw  with  the  others,  but  should 
he  not  appear  to  be  moving  northward,  I think  you  had  better 
withdraw  this  side  of  the  mountains  to-morrow  night,  cross  at 
Shepherdstown  next  day,  and  move  over  to  Frederickstown. 

You  will,  however,  be  able  to  judge  whether  you  can  pass  around 
their  army  without  hindrance,  doing  them  all  the  damage  you 
can,  and  cross  the  river  east  of  the  mountains.  In  either  case, 
after  crossing  the  river,  you  must  move  on  and  feel  the  right  of 
Ewell’s  troops,  collecting  information,  provisions,  etc. 

Give  instructions  to  the  commanders  of  the  brigades  left  be- 
hind, to  watch  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  army,  and  (in  the  event  of 
the  enemy  leaving  their  front)  retire  from  the  mountains  west 
of  the  Shenandoah,  leaving  sufficient  pickets  to  guard  the  passes, 
and  bringing  everything  clean  along  the  Valley,  closing  up  on  the 
rear  of  the  army. 

As  regards  the  movements  of  the  two  brigades  of  the  enemy 
moving  toward  Warrenton,  the  commander  of  the  brigades  to 
be  left  in  the  mountains  must  do  what  he  can  to  counteract  them, 
but  I think  the  sooner  you  cross  into  Maryland,  after  to-morrow, 
the  better. 

As  it  was  almost  certain  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  would 
move  northward  as  soon  as  A.  P.  Hill  crossed  the  Potomac, 
Stuart  decided  to  follow  the  plan  he  had  himself  proposed.  After 
leaving  orders  with  Robertson,  who  was  to  remain  behind  with  his 
own  brigade  and  that  of  W.  E.  Jones,  to  guard  the  Shenandoah 
Valley  as  long  as  necessary  and  then  to  follow  the  army  into 


24 


Pennsylvania,  Stuart  assembled  the  brigades  of  Hampton  and 
the  two  Lees  on  the  Manassas  Gap  railroad  south  of  Rectortown. 
Before  dawn  on  the  25th,  he  started  on  his  raid  and  found  the  II 
corps  just  leaving  Thoroughfare  Gap  and  the  VI  corps  moving 
through  Centerville.  He  made  a wide  detour  around  these  places, 
passed  through  Fairfax  Station  and  Drainesville,  and  finally  crossed 
the  Potomac  on  the  night  of  the  27th  near  Great  Falls.  The 
Union  army  was  now  north  of  the  Potomac  and  shortly  thereafter 
began  to  move  toward  Hanover,  Pa.  When  he  reached  West- 
minster and  Union  Mills,  Md.,  on  the  29th,  he  found  the  roads  to 
Emmitsburg  and  Gettysburg  in  the  possession  of  the  Union  army. 
He  therefore  continued  on  to  Hanover  and  finding  the  Union 
cavalry  there,  he  turned  eastward  and  reached  Dover,  Pa.  He 
might  now  have  turned  westward  and  joined  his  army  but  he 
was  in  a hostile  country  and  could  get  no  accurate  information. 
Feeling  certain  that  Ewell  had  gone  to  Carlisle,  he  made  a detour 
through  that  point  and  rejoined  his  army  at  Gettysburg  only  on 
July  3. 

In  his  report,  Stuart  says: 

The  enemy  retained  one  corps  (Fifth)  at  Aldie,  and  kept  his 
cavalry  near  enough  to  make  attack  upon  the  latter  productive 
of  no  solid  benefits,  and  I began  to  look  for  some  other  point  at 
which  to  direct  an  effective  blow. 

It  would  seem  from  this  that  the  thought  uppermost  in  Stuart’s 
mind  was  not  to  get  information  for  his  own  army,  but  to  strike  a 
blow  at  the  enemy’s  communications  that  should  offset  his  defeat 
in  the  Loudoun  Valley. 

On  the  same  day  that  he  sent  his  final  instructions  to  Stuart, 
June  23,  Lee  reported  to  President  Davis : 

Reports  of  movements  of  the  enemy  east  of  the  Blue  Ridge 
cause  me  to  believe  that  he  is  preparing  to  cross  the  Potomac.  A 
pontoon  bridge  is  said  to  be  laid  at  Edwards  Ferry,  and  his  army 
corps  that  he  has  advanced  to  Leesburg  and  the  foot  of  the  mount- 
ains, appear  to  be  withdrawing.  Their  attempts  to  penetrate  the 
mountains  have  been  successfully  repelled  by  General  Stuart  with 
his  cavalry.  General  Stuart  last  night  was  within  a few  miles  of 
Aldie,  to  which  point  the  enemy  had  retired. 

General  Ewell’s  corps  is  in  motion  toward  the  Susquehanna. 
General  A.  P.  Hill’s  corps  is  moving  toward  the  Potomac;  his 


25 


leading  division  will  reach  Shepherdstown  to-day.  I have  with- 
drawn Long  street  west  of  the  Shenandoah,  and,  if  nothing  prevents, 
he  will  follow  to-morrow. 

Lee  still  felt  that  there  were  more  troops  under  Gens.  Elzey, 
D.  H.  Hill  and  Beauregard  than  the  critical  situation  of  the  gov- 
ernment warranted.  He  had  done  his  best  to  make  some  of  them 
more  useful  by  requesting  them  for  his  army,  but  having  failed  in 
this,  he  proposed  a new  plan  which  he  thought  might  be  acceptable 
to  those  commanders.  This  plan  was  submitted  to  President 
Davis  in  another  letter,  dated  June  23. 

Mr.  President: — The  season  is  now  so  far  advanced  as  to  render 
it  improbable  that  the  enemy  will  undertake  active  operations  on 
the  Carolina  and  Georgia  coast  before  the  return  of  frost.  This 
impression  is  confirmed  by  the  statements  contained  in  Northern 
papers,  that  part  of  General  Hunter’s  force  had  gone  to  re-enforce 
General  Banks,  and  that  Admiral  Foote,  the  successor  of  Admiral 
DuPont  in  the  command  of  the  South  Atlantic  fleet,  lies  danger- 
ously ill,  a circumstance  that  will  tend  further  to  embarrass  any 
designs  the  enemy  may  entertain  of  operating  against  the  cities 
of  the  seaboard.  Federal  papers  of  the  19th,  allude  to  the  frequent 
arrival  or  departure  of  troops  and  munitions  at  Old  Point,  and 
those  of  the  20th,  announce  the  arrival  of  General  Peck  and  staff 
in  Washington,  without  indicating  the  object  of  his  visit,  further 
than  it  may  be  connected  with  the  movements  just  referred  to. 

At  this  distance,  I can  see  no  benefit  to  be  derived  from  main- 
taining a large  force  on  the  southern  coast  during  the  unhealthy 
months  of  the  summer  and  autumn,  and  I think  that  a part,  at 
least,  of  the  troops  in  North  Carolina,  and  of  those  under  General 
Beauregard,  can  be  employed  at  this  time  to  great  advantage  in 
Virginia. 

If  an  army  could  be  organized  under  the  command  of  General 
Beauregard  and  pushed  forward  to  Culpeper  Court-House, 
threatening  Washington  from  that  direction,  it  would  not  only 
effect  a diversion  most  favorable  for  this  army,  but  would,  I think, 
relieve  us  of  any  apprehension  of  an  attack  upon  Richmond  during 
our  absence.  The  well  known  anxiety  of  the  Northern  Govern- 
ment for  the  safety  of  its  capital  would  induce  it  to  retain  a large 
force  for  its  defense,  and  thus  sensibly  relieve  the  opposition  to 
our  advance.  Last  summer,  you  will  remember,  that  troops  were 
recalled  from  Hilton  Head,  North  Carolina,  and  Western  Virginia 
for  the  protection  of  Washington,  and  there  can  be  little  doubt 
that  if  our  present  movements  northward  are  accompanied  by  a 
demonstration  on  the  south  side  of  the  Potomac,  the  coast  would 
again  be  relieved,  and  the  troops  now  on  the  Peninsula  and  south 
of  the  Potomac  be  withdrawn. 


26 


If  success  should  attend  the  operations  of  this  army,  and  what  I 
now  suggest  would  greatly  increase  the  probability  of  the  result, 
we  might  even  hope  to  compel  the  recall  of  some  of  the  enemy’s 
troops  from  the  west. 

I think  it  most  important  that,  whatever  troops  be  used  for  the 
purpose  I have  named,  General  Beauregard  be  placed  in  command, 
and  that  his  department  be  extended  over  North  Carolina  and 
Virginia.  His  presence  would  give  magnitude  to  even  a small 
demonstration,  and  tend  greatly  to  perplex  and  confound  the 
enemy.  Of  course,  the  larger  the  force  that  we  can  employ  the 
better,  but  should  you  think  it  imprudent  to  withdraw  a part  of 
General  Beauregard’s  army  for  the  purpose  indicated,  I think 
good  results  would  follow  from  sending  forward,  under  General 
Beauregard,  such  of  the  troops  about  Richmond  and  in  North 
Carolina  as  could  be  spared  for  a short  time. 

The  good  effects  of  beginning  to  assemble  an  army  at  Culpeper 
Court-House  would,  I think,  soon  become  apparent,  and  the 
movement  might  be  increased  in  importance  as  the  result  might 
appear  to  justify.  Should  you  agree  with  me,  I need  not  say  that 
it  is  desirable  that  the  execution  of  the  plan  proposed  should 
immediately  begin.  The  enemy  will  hear  of  it  soon  enough,  and  a 
proper  reticence  on  the  part  of  our  papers  will  cause  them  to 
attribute  greater  importance  to  it.  I need  not  mention  the  benefit 
that  the  troops  themselves  would  derive  from  being  transferred 
to  a more  healthy  climate. 

On  June  24,  Hill’s  corps  began  crossing  the  Potomac  at  Shep- 
herdstown  and  on  the  following  day,  Longstreet’s  corps  began  cross- 
ing at  Williamsport. 

Lee  accompanied  Longstreet’s  corps  and  wrote  to  President 
Davis  two  letters  from  that  town  on  June  25,  further  explaining 
his  plan. 

You  will  see  that  apprehension  for  the  safety  of  Washington  and 
their  own  territory  has  aroused  the  Federal  Government  and 
people  to  great  exertions,  and  it  is  encumbent  upon  us  to  call 
forth  all  our  energies.  In  addition  to  the  100,000  troops  called 
for  by  President  Lincoln  to  defend  the  frontier  of  Pennsylvania, 
you  will  see  that  he  is  concentrating  other  organized  forces  in 
Maryland.  It  is  stated  according  to  General  Buckner’s  report, 
that  Burnside  and  his  corps  are  recalled  from  Kentucky.  It  is 
reasonable  to  suppose  that  this  would  be  the  case  if  their  appre- 
hensions were  once  aroused. 

I think  this  should  liberate  troops  in  the  Carolinas  and  enable 
Generals  Buckner  and  Bragg  to  accomplish  something  in  Ohio.  It 
is  plain  that  if  all  the  Federal  Army  is  concentrated  upon  this,  it 
will  result  in  our  accomplishing  nothing,  and  being  compelled  to 


27 


return  to  Virginia.  If  the  plan  I suggested  the  other  day,  of  or- 
ganizing an  army,  even  in  effigy,  under  General  Beauregard,  at 
Culpeper  Court-House,  can  be  carried  into  effect,  much  relief 
will  be  afforded.  If  even  the  brigades  in  Virginia  and  North 
Carolina,  which  Generals  Hill  and  Elzey  think  cannot  be  spared, 
were  ordered  there  at  once,  and  General  Beauregard  were  sent 
there,  if  he  had  to  return  to  South  Carolina,  it  would  do  more  to 
protect  both  States  from  marauding  expeditions  of  the  enemy  than 
anything  else. 

I have  not  sufficient  troops  to  maintain  my  communications, 
and,  therefore,  have  to  abandon  them.  I think  that  I can  throw 
General  Hooker’s  army  across  the  Potomac  and  draw  troops  from 
the  south,  embarrassing  their  plan  of  campaign  in  a measure,  if  I 
can  do  nothing  more  and  have  to  return. 

I still  hope  that  all  things  will  end  well  at  Vicksburg.  At  any 
rate  everything  should  be  done  to  bring  about  that  result. 

And  the  same  day — 

So  strong  is  my  conviction  of  the  necessity  of  activity  on  our 
part  in  military  affairs,  that  you  will  excuse  my  adverting  to  the 
subject  again,  notwithstanding  what  I have  said  in  my  previous 
letter  to-day. 

It  seems  to  me  that  we  cannot  afford  to  keep  our  troops  awaiting 
possible  movements  of  the  enemy,  but  that  our  true  policy  is,  as 
far  as  we  can,  so  to  employ  our  own  forces  as  to  give  occupation 
to  his  at  points  of  our  selection. 

I have  observed  that  extracts  from  Northern  journals,  contained 
in  Richmond  papers  of  the  22d  instant,  state  that  the  yellow  fever 
has  appeared  at  New  Berne,  and  that,  in  consequence,  the  Federal 
troops  are  being  moved  back  to  Morehead  City.  If,  in  fact,  the 
fever  is  in  New  Berne,  it  would  tend  in  itself  to  prevent  active 
operations  from  that  point.  But  as  I have  never  heard  of  the 
disease  being  in  that  city,  and  as  it  does  not  generally  break  out  so 
early  in  the  season,  even  in  localities  subject  to  it,  I am  disposed  to 
doubt  the  truth  of  the  statement,  and  regard  it  as  a cover  for  the 
withdrawal  of  the  enemy’s  forces  for  some  other  field.  The 
attempt  to  conceal  their  movements,  as  in  the  case  of  the  with- 
drawal of  the  troops  from  Suffolk,  coupled  with  the  fact  that 
nothing  has  up  to  this  time  been  undertaken  on  the  North  Carolina 
coast,  convinces  me  that  the  enemy  contemplates  nothing  import- 
ant in  that  region,  and  that  it  is  unnecessary  to  keep  our  troops  to 
watch  him. 

If  he  has  been  waiting  until  this  time  for  reinforcements,  the 
probability  of  their  being  furnished  is  greatly  diminished  by  the 
movements  now  in  progress  on  our  part,  and  they  must  at  least 
await  the  result  of  our  operations.  The  same  course  of  reasoning 
is  applicable  to  the  question  of  the  probability  of  the  enemy  as- 
suming the  offensive  against  Richmond,  either  on  the  Peninsula 


28 


or  south  of  the  James.  I feel  sure,  therefore,  that  the  best  use  that 
can  be  made  of  the  troops  in  Carolina,  and  those  in  Virginia  now 
guarding  Richmond,  would  be  the  prompt  assembling  of  the  main 
body  of  them,  leaving  sufficient  to  prevent  raids,  together  with 
as  many  as  can  be  drawn  from  the  army  of  General  Beauregard, 
at  Culpeper  Court-House,  under  the  command  of  that  officer.  I 
do  not  think  they  could  more  effectually  prevent  aggressive 
movements  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  in  any  other  way,  while 
their  assistance  to  this  army  in  its  operations  would  be  very  great. 

If  the  report  received  from  General  Buckner  of  the  withdrawal  of 
General  Burnside  from  Kentucky  be  correct,  I think  there  is 
nothing  to  prevent  a united  movement  of  the  commands  of  Gen- 
erals Buckner  and  Sam.  Jones  into  that  State.  They  could  render 
valuable  service  by  collecting  and  bringing  out  supplies,  if  they 
did  no  more,  and  would  embarrass  the  enemy  and  prevent  troops 
now  there  from  being  sent  to  other  points.  If  they  are  too  weak 
to  attempt  this  object,  they  need  not  be  idle;  and  I think  that 
if  the  enemy’s  forces  have,  in  fact,  been  so  far  weakened  as  to 
render  present  active  operations  on  his  part  against  them  improb- 
able, they  should  go  where  they  can  be  of  immediate  service,  leav- 
ing only  a sufficient  guard  to  watch  the  lines  they  now  hold.  They 
might  be  sent  with  benefit  to  re-inforce  General  Johnston  or 
General  Bragg,  to  constitute  a part  of  the  proposed  army  of 
General  Beauregard  at  Culpeper  Court-House,  or  they  might 
accomplish  good  results  by  going  into  Northwestern  Virginia. 
It  should  never  be  forgotten  that  our  concentration  at  any  point 
compels  that  of  the  enemy,  and,  his  numbers  being  limited,  tends 
to  relieve  all  other  threatened  localities. 

I earnestly  commend  these  considerations  to  the  attention  of 
Your  Excellency,  and  trust  that  you  will  be  at  liberty,  in  your 
better  judgement,  and  with  the  superior  means  of  information 
you  possess  as  to  our  own  necessities  and  the  enemy’s  movements 
in  the  distant  regions  I have  mentioned,  to  give  effect  to  them, 
either  in  the  way  I have  suggested,  or  in  such  other  manner  as  may 
seem  to  you  more  judicious. 

No  action  was  taken  on  these  letters,  although  the  plan  seems 
to  have  been  perfectly  feasible  and  would  have  embarrassed  the 
War  Department  at  Washington.  That  Richmond  was  safe  is 
evident  from  the  following  letter  to  Halleck  from  Dix,  dated 
June  29: 

I called  to-day  a council  of  my  general  officers.  There  were 
present  Maj.  Gen.  Peck  and  Brig.  Gens.  Gordon,  Terry,  Harland 
and  Foster.  I submitted  to  them  the  proposition  whether  it 
would  be  advisable,  with  the  force  I have,  to  make  an  attack  on 
Richmond.  Their  opinion,  without  knowing  mine,  was  promptly 
and  unanimously  given  in  the  negative.  I have  deemed  it  proper 


29 


to  advise  you  of  the  result  of  my  consultation  with  them,  and 
with  my  concurrence  with  them. 

From  the  Potomac  River,  Anderson,  Pickett,  Hood  and  McLaws 
marched  to  Chambersburg,  via  Hagerstown  and  Greencastle, 
while  Heth  and  Pender  followed  the  route  taken  by  Early  to 
Greenwood  near  Fayetteville.  On  reaching  Chambersburg, 
Anderson  turned  off  to  Fayetteville  to  join  the  other  divisions  of 
Hill’s  corps,  while  Longstreet’s  divisions  encamped  near  Chambers- 
burg. Lee  reached  Chambersburg  on  the  27th  but  gave  no  orders 
for  a movement  of  the  corps  of  Longstreet  and  A.  P.  Hill  on  the 
28th,  as  he  probably  intended  to  give  the  troops  a day’s  rest  and 
wait  for  information.  From  the  position  occupied  by  his  troops, 
he  could  advance  either  to  the  north  or  to  the  east.  In  his  repoit 
he  says: 

Preparations  were  now  made  to  advance  upon  Harrisburg;  but 
on  the  night  of  the  28th,  information  was  received  from  a scout 
that  the  Federal  Army  having  crossed  the  Potomac,  was  ad- 
vancing northward,  and  that  the  head  of  the  column  had  reached 
the  South  Mountain.  As  our  communications  with  the  Potomac 
were  thus  menaced,  it  was  resolved  to  prevent  further  progress  in 
that  direction  by  concentrating  our  army  on  the  east  side  of  the 
mountains.  Accordingly  Longstreet  and  Hill  were  directed  to 
proceed  from  Chambersburg  to  Gettysburg,  to  which  point 
General  Ewell  was  also  instructed  to  march  from  Carlisle. 

After  crossing  the  mountains  to  Cashtown,  Lee  had  the  option 
of  advancing  along  the  pike  to  Gettysburg,  or  turning  southward, 
via  Fairfield,  towards  Emmitsburg.  Had  he  known  the  points 
to  which  the  Union  corps  moved  from  Frederick,  he  would  un- 
doubtedly have  selected  the  latter  route.  However,  as  it  was  not 
improbable  that  the  entire  Union  army  had  moved  up  the  east 
side  of  the  mountains  and  was  concentrated  at  Emmitsburg,  he 
chose  Gettysburg,  as  being  better  adapted  for  his  purpose.  It  is 
probable  that  on  the  27th  or  28th,  he  notified  Ewell  of  his  inten- 
tion to  advance  on  Harrisburg  if  everything  was  favorable,  and 
directed  him  to  recall  Early’s  division,  which  was  then  at  York. 
He  also  sent  couriers  to  Robertson  and  Imboden,  to  have  them 
join  the  army.  After  learning  that  the  Union  army  was  moving 
through  Frederick  westward  to  the  South  Mountains,  he  probably 
at  once  sent  a note  to  Ewell  informing  him  of  this  fact  and 


3° 


directed  him  to  return  to  Chambersburg;  later,  on  reflection  or 
from  further  information  about  the  movements  of  the  Union 
troops,  who  moved  from  the  South  Mountains  eastward  to  Fred- 
erick that  day,  he  sent  the  following  instructions  to  Ewell : 

I wrote  you  last  night,  stating  that  General  Hooker  was  reported 
to  have  crossed  the  Potomac,  and  is  advancing  by  way  of  Middle- 
town,  the  head  of  the  column  being  at  that  point  in  Frederick 
County.  I directed  you  to  move  your  forces  to  this  point.  If  you 
have  not  already  progressed  on  the  road,  and  if  you  have  no  good 
reason  against  it,  I desire  you  to  move  in  the  direction  of  Gettys- 
burg, via  Heidlersburg,  where  you  will  have  turnpike  most  of  the 
way,  and  you  can  thus  join  your  other  divisions  to  Early’s,  which 
is  east  of  the  mountains.  I think  it  preferable  to  keep  on  the  east 
side  of  the  mountains.  When  you  come  to  Heidlersburg,  you  can 
either  move  directly  on  Gettysburg  or  turn  down  on  Cashtown. 
Y our  trains  and  heavy  artillery  you  can  send  if  you  think  proper, 
on  the  road  to  Chambersburg  but  if  the  roads  which  your  troops 
take  are  good,  they  had  better  follow  you. 

In  Lee’s  letter-book  this  letter  is  marked  “copied  from  memory” 
and  is  dated  June  28,  7:30  a.  m.  From  the  reports  of  Lee  and 
Ewell,  it  was  evidently  sent  on  the  29th. 

Ewell’s  Operations  in  Pennsylvania. — The  movements  of  Ewell’s 
corps  in  Pennsylvania  is  thus  described  in  his  report: 

The  same  evening  [June  15],  General  Rodes  crossed  at  Williams- 
port with  three  brigades,  sending  Jenkins  forward  to  Chambers- 
burg, and  on  the  19th  moved  his  division  by  my  orders  to  Hagers- 
town, where  he  encamped  on  the  road  to  Boonsboro,  while  Johnson 
crossed  to  Sharpsburg,  and  Early  moved  to  Shepherdstown,  to 
threaten  Harpers  Ferry.  In  these  positions  we  waited  until  June 
21,  for  the  other  two  corps  to  close  up,  on  the  afternoon  of  which 
day  I received  orders  from  the  general  commanding  to  take 
Harrisburg,  and  next  morning  (22d)  Rodes  and  Johnson  marched 
toward  Greencastle,  Pa.  Jenkins  re-occupied  Chambersburg, 
whence  he  had  fallen  back  some  days  before,  and  Early  moved 
by  Boonsboro,  to  Cavetown,  where  the  17th  Virginia  cavalry 
(Col.  Wm.  E.  French ) reported  and  remained  with  him  till  the 
battle  of  Gettysburg.  Continuing  our  march,  we  reached  Carlisle 
on  the  27th,  halting  one  day  at  Chambersburg  to  secure  supplies. 
The  marching  was  as  rapid  as  the  weather  and  the  detours  made 
by  Maj.  Gen.  Early  and  Brig.  Gen.  Stuart  would  admit.  Early 
having  marched  parallel  with  us  as  far  as  Greenwood,  then  turned 
off  toward  Gettysburg  and  York.  At  Carlisle,  Gen.  George  H. 
Steuart,  who  had  been  detached  to  McConnellsburg  from  Green- 
castle rejoined  the  corps,  bringing  some  cattle  and  horses. 


3i 


At  Carlisle,  Chambersburg  and  Shippenburg  requisitions  were 
made  for  supplies,  and  the  shops  were  searched,  many  valuable 
stores  being  secured.  Near  3,000  head  of  cattle  were  collected,  and 
sent  back  by  my  corps,  and  my  chief  commissary  of  subsistence, 
Maj.  W.  J.  Hawks,  notified  Col.  R.  G.  Cole  of  the  location  of  5,000 
barrels  of  flour  along  the  route  traveled  by  my  corps. 

From  Carlisle  I sent  forward  my  engineer  officer,  Capt.  H.  B. 
Richardson,  with  Gen.  Jenkins’  cavalry,  to  reconnoiter  the  de- 
fenses of  Harrisburg,  and  was  starting  on  the  29th  for  that  place 
when  ordered  by  the  general  commanding  to  join  the  main  body 
of  the  army  at  Cashtown  near  Gettysburg.  On  the  night  of  June 
30,  Rodes’  division,  which  I accompanied,  was  at  Heidlersburg. 
[Here]  I received  orders  from  the  general  commanding  to  proceed 
to  Cashtown  or  Gettysburg  as  circumstances  might  dictate,  and  a 
note  from  Gen.  A.  P.  Hill,  saying  he  was  in  Cashtown.  Next 
morning  (July  1),  I moved  with  Rodes’  division  toward  Cashtown. 

Ewell  does  not  mention  it  in  his  report,  but  from  the  reports  of 
the  Union  cavalry,  it  appears  that  on  the  afternoon  of  the  30th, 
Jenkins’  cavalry  encountered  Union  cavalry  north  of  Gettysburg. 
It  was  this  discovery  that  caused  Ewell  to  leave  the  Carlisle-Gettys- 
burg  pike  at  Heidlersburg  and  move  by  a country  road  westward 
toward  Cashtown. 

Rodes  reports — - 

On  our  arrival  at  Carlisle,  Jenkins’  cavalry  advanced  towards 
Harrisburg,  and  had  on  the  29th  made  a thorough  reconnaissance 
of  the  defenses  of  that  place,  with  a view  to  our  advance  upon  it,  a 
step  which  every  man  in  the  division  contemplated  with  eagerness, 
and  which  was  to  have  been  executed  on  the  30th;  but  on  the  30th, 
having  received  orders  to  be  at  or  near  Cashtown,  we  set  out  for 
that  place,  marching  through  Petersburg  and  bivouacking  at 
Heidlersburg,  after  a march  of  22  miles. 

Johnson  reports— 

June  18,  we  crossed  the  Potomac  at  Botelers  Ford,  and  encamped 
upon  the  battlefield  of  Sharpsburg.  Thence  marched,  via  Hagers- 
town and  Chambersburg,  to  within  three  miles  of  Carlisle.  From 
Greencastle,  Steuart’s  brigade  was  ordered  to  McConnellsburg,  to 
collect  horses,  cattle,  and  other  supplies  which  the  army  needed. 
The  brigade  having  accomplished  its  mission  to  my  satisfaction, 
rejoined  the  division  at  our  camp  near  Carlisle.  On  June  29,  in 
obedience  to  orders,  I countermarched  my  division  to  Greenville, 
thence  easterly  via  Scotland  to  Gettysburg. 

Early  reports — 

At  this  point  [Greenwood,  a village  9 miles  east  of  Chambers- 
burg], my  division  remained  in  camp  on  the  25th,  and  I visited 


32 


Gen.  Ewell  at  Chambersburg,  and  received  from  him  instructions 
to  cross  the  South  Mountain  to  Gettysburg,  and  proceed  to  York, 
and  cut  the  Northern  Central  Railroad  running  from  Baltimore  to 
Harrisburg  [this  railroad  runs  northward  through  York  to  the 
Susquehanna  River  and  along  its  south  bank  to  Harrisburg],  and 
also  destroy  the  bridge  across  the  Susquehanna  at  Wrightsville 
and  Columbia  on  the  branch  road  from  York  toward  Philadelphia, 
if  I could,  and  rejoin  him  at  Carlisle  by  way  of  Dillsburg. 

Col.  E.  V.  White’s  battalion  of  cavalry  was  ordered  to  report 
to  me  for  this  expedition,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  26t,h,  I moved 
towards  Gettysburg,  and  on  reaching  the  forks  of  the  road,  1 Yi 
miles  from  Cashtown,  I sent  Gen.  Gordon  with  his  briagde  and 
White’s  battalion  of  cavalry,  on  the  pike  through  Cashtown  to- 
wards Gettysburg,  and  moved  with  the  rest  of  my  command  to 
Mummasburg.  I had  heard  on  the  road  that  there  was  probably 
a force  at  Gettysburg,  though  I could  get  no  definite  information 
as  to  its  size.  The  object  of  the  movement  was  for  Gordon  to 
amuse  and  skirmish  with  the  enemy  while  I should  get  on  his 
flank  and  rear,  so  as  to  capture  the  whole  force.  On  arriving  at 
Mummasburg,  I ascertained  that  the  force  was  small,  and  while 
waiting  here  for  the  infantry  to  come  up  (whose  march  was  con- 
siderably delayed  by  the  muddy  condition  of  the  road),  a company 
of  French’s  cavalry  that  had  been  sent  toward  Gettysburg  cap- 
tured some  prisoners,  from  whom  it  was  ascertained  that  the 
advance  of  Gordon’s  force  had  encountered  a regiment  of  militia 
[26th  Pa.],  which  fled  at  the  first  approach,  and  I immediately 
sent  forward  Col.  French  to  pursue  this  militia  force.  Hays’ 
brigade  on  arriving  was  also  dispatched  toward  Gettysburg,  and 
the  other  brigades  with  the  artillery  halted  and  encamped  around 
Mummasburg. 

I then  rode  to  Gettysburg  and  found  Gordon  just  entering  the 
town.  I ordered  Tanner’s  battery  of  Jones’  Battalion  to  report  to 
Gordon  during  the  night,  and  also  a company  of  French’s  cavalry, 
and  directed  him  to  move  with  them  and  his  brigade  on  the  turn- 
pike toward  York  at  daylight  next  morning,  and  I also  directed 
Col.  White  to  proceed  with  his  cavalry  to  Hanover  Junction,  on 
the  Northern  Central  road,  destroying  the  railroad  bridges  on  the 
way,  and  to  destroy  the  junction  and  a bridge  or  two  south  of  it, 
and  then  proceed  to  York,  burning  all  the  bridges  up  to  that  place. 
With  the  rest  of  the  command,  I moved  next  morning  (the  27th) 
and  encamped  a few  miles  beyond  Berlin;  and  I rode  over  to 
Gordon’s  camp  on  the  York  pike,  which  was  about  4 miles  distant, 
to  arrange  with  him  the  manner  of  the  approach  to  York,  if  it 
should  be  defended. 

Next  morning  (the  28th),  Gen.  Gordon  marched  into  the  town 
of  York  without  opposition.  I here  met  with  Gen.  Gordon,  and 
repeated  to  him  my  instructions  to  proceed  to  the  Susquehanna 
and  secure  the  Columbia  bridge  if  possible.  A short  time  before 


33 


night,  I rode  out  in  the  direction  of  Columbia  bridge,  to  ascertain 
the  result  of  Gordon’s  expedition  and  had  not  proceeded  far  before 
I saw  an  immense  smoke  rising  in  the  direction  of  the  Susque- 
hanna, which  I subsequently  discovered  to  be  frpm  the  burning 
of  the  bridge  in  question.  On  the  morning  of  the  29th,  I received 
through  Capt.  Elliott  Johnston,  aide  to  Gen.  Ewell,  a copy  of  a 
note  from  Gen.  Lee,  and  also  verbal  instructions,  which  required 
me  to  move  back,  so  as  to  rejoin  the  rest  of  my  corps,  on  the 
western  side  of  South  Mountain;  and,  accordingly,  at  daylight 
on  the  morning  of  the  30th,  I put  my  whole  command  in  motion 
in  the  direction  of  Heidlersburg,  from  which  I could  move  either 
to  Shippensburg  or  to  Greenwood,  as  circumstances  might  re- 
quire. At  the  same  time,  I sent  Col.  White’s  cavalry  on  the  pike 
toward  Gettysburg,  to  ascertain  whether  there  was  any  force  on 
that  road. 

At  Berlin,  a courier  from  Gen.  Ewell  met  me  with  a dispatch 
informing  me  of  the  fact  that  he  was  moving  with  Rodes’  division 
by  the  way  of  Petersburg  to  Heidlersburg,  and  directing  me  to 
march  in  that  direction.  I encamped  three  miles  from  Heidlers- 
burg, and  rode  to  see  Gen.  Ewell  at  that  point,  and  was  informed 
by  him  that  the  object  of  the  movement  was  to  concentrate  the 
corps  at  or  near  Cashtown,  and  received  directions  to  move  next 
day  to  that  point.  I was  informed  that  Rodes  would  move  by  way 
of  Middletown,  but  it  was  arranged  that  I should  go  by  way  of 
Hunterstown  and  Mummasburg.  Having  ascertained  that  the 
road  to  Hunterstown  was  a very  rough  one,  I determined  next 
morning  (July  1),  to  march  by  way  of  Heidlersburg,  and  thence 
from  that  point  to  the  Mummasburg  road. 

Early  had  camped  at  the  intersection  of  the  Carlisle-Hanover- 
Baltimore  pike  and  the  York-Heidlersburg  road.  A third  road 
runs  from  the  intersection  to  Hunterstown.  The  object  of  Early’s 
movement  from  Greenwood  to  York  is  explained  in  Lee’s  report. 

In  order  to  retain  it  [Hooker’s  army]  on  the  east  side  of  the 
mountains,  after  it  should  enter  Maryland,  and  thus  leave  open 
our  communications  with  the  Potomac  through  Hagerstown  and 
Williamsport,  Gen.  Ewell  had  been  instructed  to  send  a division 
eastward  to  cross  the  South  Mountain. 

Hooker  remained  at  Fairfax  Court-House  in  Virginia  awaiting 
developments  before  crossing  the  Potomac.  On  the  24th  he 
received  the  following  report  from  Brig.  Gen.  Gouverneur  K. 
Warren,  then  chief  engineer  of  the  army: 

In  accordance  with  your  request,  I present  the  following  reasons 
for  moving  our  army  at  once  to  the  neighborhood  of  Harpers 
Ferry: 


34 


1.  The  whole  of  Lee’s  army  is  reported  to  be  on  the  Potomac, 
above  that  place,  part  of  it  across  the  river,  and  threatening  an 
advance  upon  Harrisburg. 

2.  There  we  can  protect  Washington  as  well,  and  Baltimore 
better  than  here,  and  preserve  our  communications  and  routes  of 
supply. 

3.  It  is  the  shortest  line  to  reach  Lee’s  army;  will  enable  us  to 
operate  on  his  communications,  if  he  advances;  to  throw  over- 
whelming forces  on  either  portion  of  his  army  that  he  allows  the 
river  to  divide;  and  is  too  strong  a position  for  him  to  attack  us 
in,  even  if  we  make  heavy  detachments. 

4.  It  will  enable  us  to  pass  South  Mountain  without  fighting  for 
the  passes,  if  we  wish  to  move  upon  him,  and  will  thus  destroy 
any  advantages  these  mountains  would  give  as  a protection  to 
his  right  flank. 

5.  It  will  prevent  Lee  from  detaching  a corps  to  invade  Penn- 
sylvania with,  as  it  would  expose  the  rest  of  his  army  to  our  at- 
tack in  superior  force. 

6.  These  opinions  are  based  upon  the  idea  that  we  are  not  to 
try  and  go  around  his  army,  and  drive  it  out  of  Maryland,  as  we 
did  last  year,  but  to  paralyse  all  its  movements  by  threatening  its 
flank  and  rear  if  it  advances,  and  gain  time  to  collect  reinforce- 
ments sufficient  to  render  us  the  stronger  army  of  the  two,  if  we 
are  not  so  already. 

This  seems  to  have  been  the  basis  of  the  plan  he  adopted.  Hav- 
ing learned  from  the  signal  officer  on  the  mountains  near  Harpers 
Ferry  that  a large  force  was  crossing  the  Potomac  at  Shepherds- 
town  that  day,  he  directed  Reynolds  to  cross  the  Potomac  on 
the  25th  with  the  I,  III  and  XI  corps  and  move  to  Middletown, 
Md.,  and  seize  the  passes  of  the  South  Mountains  through  which 
the  army  had  moved  in  the  Antietam  campaign.  Stahel’s,  later 
Kilpatrick’s  cavalry  division,  accompanied  this  force.  All  the  other 
forces  south  of  the  Potomac  were  directed  to  move  on  Leesburg  and 
cross  the  river.  As  soon  as  it  crossed  the  river,  the  XII  corps  was 
to  move  in  the  direction  of  Harpers  Ferry.  It  was  after  dark  on 
the  27th  before  the  entire  army  was  on  the  north  side  of  the 
Potomac. 

Hooker  himself  crossed  the  river  on  the  26th  to  Poolesville, 
and  on  the  following  day  established  his  headquarters  at  Frederick. 
Because  his  plan  of  operations  did  not  meet  with  the  approval  of 
Halleck,  on  the  following  day  he  requested  to  be  relieved  from  the 
command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  on  the  night  of  the 
27th,  an  officer  arrived  from  the  War  Department  with  an  order 
placing  Maj.  Gen.  George  G.  Meade  in  command  of  the  army. 


35 


Itinerary  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  June  25  to  27. 


June 

I Corps 

Ill  Corps 

XI  Corps 

V Corps 

II  Corps 

III  Corps 

VT  Corps 

Cavalry 

Divisions 

25 

Barnesville,  Md. 

Across 

Potomac 

Jeffer- 
son, Md. 

Aldie 

Thorough- 
fare Gap 

Gum 

Springs 

Center- 

ville 

3d  division 

crossed 

Potomac 

26 

Jefferson,  Md. 

Point  of 

Rocks 

Middle- 
town,  Md. 

Across 

Potomac 

Across 

Potomac 

Across 

Potomac 

Draines- 

ville 

3d  division 
toward 
Frederick 

27 

Middletown, 

Md. 

Middle- 
town,  Md. 

Middle- 
town,  Md. 

Near  H 
Frederick 

Knoxville 

Barnes- 

ville 

Near 

Pooles- 

ville 

1.  Jefferson 

2.  Frederick 

3.  Frederick 

With  Meade’s  letter  of  appointment,  he  received  the  following 
instructions  from  Halleck: 

You  will  not  be  hampered  by  any  minute  instructions  from  these 
headquarters.  Your  army  is  free  to  act  as  you  may  deem  proper 
under  the  circumstances  as  they  arise.  You  will,  however,  keep 
in  view  the  important  fact  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  is  the 
covering  army  of  Washington  as  well  as  the  army  of  operation 
against  the  invading  forces  of  the  rebels.  You  will,  therefore, 
maneuver  and  fight  in  such  a manner  as  to  cover  the  capital  and 
also  Baltimore,  as  far  as  circumstances  will  admit.  Should 
General  Lee  move  upon  either  of  these  places,  it  is  expected  that 
you  will  either  anticipate  him  or  arrive  with  him  so  as  to  give 
him  battle. 

All  forces  within  the  sphere  of  your  operations  will  be  held  sub- 
ject to  your  orders. 

Harpers  Ferry  and  its  garrison  are  under  your  direct  orders. 

You  are  authorized  to  remove  from  command,  and  to  send 
from  your  army,  any  officers  or  other  persons  you  may  deem 
proper,  and  to  appoint  to  command  as  you  may  deem  expedient. 

In  fine,  general,  you  are  intrusted  with  all  the  power  and  au- 
thority which  the  President,  the  Secretary  of  War,  or  the  General 
in  Chief  can  confer  on  you,  and  you  may  rely  upon  our  full  support. 

In  compliance  with  the  desire  of  the  authorities  to  cover 
Washington  and  Baltimore,  on  the  28th,  Meade  ordered  the  I, 
III,  XI  and  XII  corps  from  the  west  of  Frederick  to  that  place 
in  preparation  for  a movement  of  the  army  in  a northeasterly 
direction. 

When  Meade  took  command  of  the  army,  he  believed  that 
Lee’s  army  was  as  large  as  his  own,  that  Early  occupied  York, 
that  Ewell  was  at  Carlisle,  that  A.  P.  Hill  and  Long  street  were 


36 


in  the  vicinity  of  Chambersburg,  and  that  Stuart  with  a part  of 
his  command  was  near  Westminster.  It  appeared  to  him  that 
Lee  was  intending  to  cross  the  Susquehanna  River  and  that  the 
Union  army  ought  to  go  to  the  relief  of  the  militia  force  which 
was  assembled  at  Harrisburg.  His  plans  are  outlined  in  the 
following  letters: 

To  Halleck,  dated  June  29,  11  a.  m.: 

Upon  assuming  command  of  the  army,  and  after  carefully 
considering  the  position  of  affairs  and  the  movements  of  the  enemy 
I have  concluded  as  follows:  to  move  to-day  towards  Westminster 
and  Emmitsburg,  and  the  army  is  now  in  motion  for  that  line. 
If  Lee  is  moving  for  Baltimore,  I expect  to  get  between  his  army 
and  that  place.  If  he  is  crossing  the  Susquehanna,  I shall  rely 
upon  Gen.  Couch,  with  his  force,  holding  him  until  I can  fall 
upon  his  rear  and  give  him  battle.  While  I move  forward  I shall 
incline  toward  the  right  toward  the  Baltimore  and  Harrisburg 
road,  to  cover  that  and  draw  supplies  from  there,  if  circumstances 
permit  it,  my  main  objective  being  of  course  Lee’s  army,  which  I 
am  satisfied  has  all  passed  on  through  Hagerstown  to  Chambers- 
burg. My  endeavor  will  be  in  my  movements  to  hold  my  force 
well  together,  with  the  hope  of  falling  upon  some  portion  of  Lee’s 
army  in  detail. 

To  Halleck,  dated  June  30,  4:30  p.  m.: 

Our  reports  seem  to  place  Ewell  in  the  vicinity  of  York  and. 
Harrisburg.  I shall  push  on  to-morrow  in  the  direction  of  Han- 
over Junction  and  Hanover  when  I hope  by  July  2,  to  open  com- 
munication with  Baltimore  by  telegraph  and  rail  to  renew  supplies. 
I fear  I shall  break  down  the  troops  by  pushing  on  much  faster, 
and  may  have  to  rest  a day.  My  movements  of  course  will  be 
governed  by  what  I learn  of  the  enemy.  The  information  seems 
to  place  Longstreet  at  Chambersburg,  and  A.  P.  Hill  moving 
between  Chambersburg  and  Y ork.  Our  cavalry  drove  a regiment 
out  of  Gettysburg  this  a.  m.  Our  cavalry  engaged  with  Stuart  at 
Hanover  this  a.  m.  Result  not  yet  known. 

To  Halleck,  July  1,  7 a.  m.,  on  being  notified  that  York  and 
Carlisle  were  being  evacuated  and  Lee  was  probably  concentrating 
his  army: 

My  positions  to-day  are,  one  corps  at  Emmitsburg,  two  at 
Gettysburg,  one  at  Taneytown,  one  at  Two  Taverns,  one  at 
Manchester,  one  at  Hanover.  These  movements  were  ordered 
yesterday  before  the  receipt  of  the  advices  of  Lee’s  movements. 
The  point  of  Lee’s  concentration  and  the  nature  of  the  country 
will  determine  whether  I will  attack  him  or  not.  Shall  advise 


37 


you  further  to-day  when  satisfied  that  the  enemy  are  fully  with- 
drawn from  the  Susquehanna. 

To  Halleck  from  Taneytown,  July  1,  12  m.: 

Ewell  is  massing  at  Heidlersburg.  A.  P.  Hill  is  massed  behind 
the  mountains  at  Cashtown.  Long  street  somewhere  between 
Chambersburg  and  the  mountains. 

The  news  proves  my  advance  has  answered  its  purpose.  I 
shall  not  advance  any,  but  prepare  to  receive  an  attack  in  case 
Lee  makes  one.  A battlefield  is  being  selected  to  the  rear  on  which 
an  army  can  be  rapidly  concentrated,  on  Pike  Creek,  between 
Middleburg  and  Manchester,  covering  my  depot  at  Westminster. 

If  I am  not  attacked,  and  I can  from  reliable  intelligence  have 
reason  to  believe  I can  attack  with  reasonable  degree  of  success, 
I will  do  so;  but  at  present,  having  relieved  the  pressure  on  the 
Susquehanna,  I am  now  looking  to  the  protection  of  Washington, 
and  fighting  my  army  to  best  advantage. 

From  these  communications  it  appears  that  Meade’s  plan  was — 

1.  To  advance  rapidly  northward  on  a broad  front  until  he 
compelled  Lee  to  abandon  all  thought  of  crossing  the  Susquehanna. 

2.  To  tempt  Lee  to  attack  the  Union  army  in  a position  selected 
in  advance  by  Meade  or  to  attack  Lee  if  he  could  do  it  to  ad- 
vantage. 

Concentration  of  the  Armies  at  Gettysburg. — The  movement  of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  towards  Gettysburg  began  on 
June  29.  Robertson,  who  had  been  left  by  Stuart  with  his  own 
brigade  and  that  of  W.  E.  Jones  in  the  passes  of  the  Blue  Ridge 
Mountains  of  Virginia,  assembled  the  cavalry  brigades  at  Berry- 
ville.  Had  he  been  better  informed  by  his  scouts,  he  might  have 
assembled  on  the  26th,  when  the  Union  cavalry  left  Aldie  and 
started  for  Maryland.  He  would  thus  have  gained  three  days  and 
been  with  his  army  the  day  it  marched  to  Gettysburg.  Imboden 
prepared  to  leave  Hancock,  Md.,  where  he  was  scouting  the  coun- 
try. He  had  also  remained  stationary  instead  of  pushing  on  to 
Chambersburg  as  Lee  intended  him  to  do.  Heth’s  division  crossed 
the  South  Mountains  to  Cashtown  and  established  outposts  in 
the  direction  of  Gettysburg  and  Fairfield.  Johnson’s  division 
started  back  from  Carlisle  with  Ewell’s  trains  and  reached  Ship- 
pensburg.  Lee’s  headquarters  remained  at  Chambersburg. 

Stuart,  who  was  moving  northward  through  Maryland  via 
Rockville  and  Cooksville,  says: 


38 


Brig.  Gen.  Fitz  Lee  reached  the  railroad  [B.  and  0.]  soon  after 
daylight  [June  29],  the  march  being  continued  during  the  night. 
The  bridge  at  Sykesville  was  burned  and  the  track  torn  up  at 
Hood’s  Mills,  where  the  main  body  crossed  it.  We  remained  in 
possession  of  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  nearly  all  day. 
The  enemy  was  ascertained  to  be  moving  through  Frederick 
northward,  and  it  was  important  for  me  to  reach  our  column  with 
as  little  delay  as  possible,  to  acquaint  the  commanding  general 
with  the  nature  of  the  enemy’s  movements  as  well  as  to  place 
with  his  column  my  cavalry  force.  The  head  of  the  column,  fol- 
lowing the  ridge  road,  reached  Westminster  about  5 p.  m.  We 
encamped  for  the  night  a few  miles  beyond  the  town  (Fitz  Lee’s 
brigade  in  advance),  halting  the  head  of  the  column  at  Union 
Mills,  midway  between  Westminster  and  Littlestown,  on  the 
Gettysburg  road.  It  was  ascertained  here  that  night  by  scouts 
that  the  enemy’s  cavalry  had  reached  Littlestown  during  the 
night,  and  encamped. 

The  movement  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  on  the  29th  was  to 
better  cover  Washington  and  Baltimore,  while  the  cavalry  ad- 
vanced to  the  front  to  locate  the  Confederate  army.  With  two 
brigades  of  his  cavalry  division,  Buford  crossed  the  South  Moun- 
tains to  Boonsboro,  skirted  the  base  of  the  mountains  as  far  north 
as  Monterey  Gap,  recrossed  the  mountains  and  took  the  road  to 
Gettysburg.  He  camped  that  night  near  Fairfield.  Buford’s 
third  brigade  was  sent  to  Mechanicstown  where  it  was  left  to 
watch  the  pass.  Kilpatrick’s  two  cavalry  brigades  moved  from 
Frederick  to  Emmitsburg  and  Taneytown  and  then  united  at 
Littlestown.  Gregg’s  cavalry  division  went  in  the  direction  of 
Westminster  as  Stuart  was  reported  in  that  direction.  The  I and 
XI  corps  went  to  Emmitsburg;  the  III  corps,  followed  by  the  XII 
corps,  to  Taneytown;  the  II  corps,  followed  by  the  V corps,  to 
Uniontown,  and  the  VI  corps  to  New  Windsor.  Meade  estab- 
lished his  headquarters  at  Middleburg,  Md. 

There  was  no  contact  between  the  opposing  armies  this  day 
nor  did  either  commanding  general  receive  any  important  in- 
formation. 

On  the  30th,  therefore,  the  movement  was  continued  without 
material  change  of  plan.  Robertson  marched  with  his  two  brigades 
to  Martinsburg;  Imboden  was  still  at  Hancock  where  he  was 
concentrating  his  command;  McLaws  and  Hood  moved  to  Green- 


39 


wood,  Pender  crossed  the  mountains  and  joined  Heth  near  Cash- 
town;  Rodes  reached  Heidlersburg;  Johnson  reached  Scotland, 
and  Early  reached  the  Carlisle-Hanover  pike  east  of  Heidlersburg. 

Stuart  reports: 

Early  next  morning  [June  30],  we  resumed  the  march  direct 
by  a cross  route  for  Hanover,  Pa.,  W.  H.  F.  Lee’s  brigade  in  ad- 
vance, Hampton  in  rear  of  the  wagon  train,  and  Fitz  Lee’s  brigade 
on  the  left  flank,  between  Littlestown  and  our  road.  About  10 
a.  m.  the  head  of  the  column  reached  Hanover,  and  found  a large 
column  of  cavalry  passing  through  going  toward  the  gap  in  the 
mountains  which  I intended  using.  The  enemy  soon  discovered 
our  approach,  and  made  a demonstration  toward  attacking  us, 
which  was  promptly  met  by  a gallant  charge  by  Chambliss’ 
leading  regiment.  If  my  command  had  been  well  closed  up  now, 
this  cavalry  column,  which  we  had  struck  near  its  rear,  would  have 
been  at  our  mercy;  but,  owing  to  the  great  elongation  of  the 
column  by  reason  of  the  200  wagons  and  hilly  roads,  Hampton 
was  a long  way  behind  and  Lee  was  not  yet  heard  from  on  our 
left.  The  delay  in  getting  up  reinforcements  enabled  the  enemy 
to  regain  possession  of  the  town. 

Our  wagon  train  was  now  a subject  of  serious  embarrassment, 
but  I thought  by  making  a detour  to  the  right  by  Jefferson,  I 
could  save  it.  I therefore  had  the  train  closed  up  in  park,  and 
Hampton  [and  Fitz  Lee]  arriving  in  the  meantime,  dislodged  the 
enemy  from  the  town.  Gen.  Fitz  Lee’s  brigade  was  put  at  the 
head  of  the  column,  and  he  was  instructed  to  push  on  with  the 
train  to  Jefferson  for  York,  Pa.,  and  communicate  as  soon  as 
practicable  with  our  forces.  We  were  not  molested  in  our  march, 
which,  on  account  of  the  very  exposed  situation  of  our  flank  and 
the  enemy’s  knowledge  of  it,  was  continued  through  the  night. 
The  night’s  march  over  a very  dark  road  was  one  of  peculiar 
hardship,  owing  to  the  loss  of  rest  to  both  man  and  horse.  After 
a series  of  exciting  combats  and  night  marches,  it  was  a severe  tax 
to  their  endurance.  Whole  regiments  slept  in  the  saddle,  their 
faithful  animals  keeping  the  road  unguided. 

The  train  that  embarrassed  Stuart  was  one  captured  on  the  28th 
at  Rockville,  Md.,  and  referred  to  in  the  following  report: 

Twenty-five  teams,  without  wagons,  sent  this  a.  m.  to  Edwards 
Ferry  to  haul  down  pontoons,  were  captured  in  addition  to  the 
150  wagons  started  for  Frederick. 

On  the  morning  of  June  30,  Buford  discovered  that  part  of 
Davis’  brigade  of  Heth’s  division,  formed  an  outpost  near  Fair- 
field;  not  wishing  to  bring  on  an  engagement  at  that  point  which 
might  disarrange  Meade’s  plans,  he  took  the  road  to  Emmitsburg 


40 


and  from  there  went  to  Gettysburg,  to  which  point  he  had  been 
ordered.  In  passing  Emmitsburg,  he  probably  informed  Reynolds 
of  his  discovery.  Kilpatrick  marched  from  Littlestown  to  Han- 
over and  as  his  rear  brigade  was  passing  through  the  town  it  was 
attacked  by  Chambliss  as  reported  by  Stuart.  By  turning  Stuart 
from  his  direct  road  and  causing  him  to  march  in  the  direction  of 
York,  Kilpatrick  prevented  him  from  uniting  with  Early,  who  was 
encamped  that  night  on  the  Hanover-Carlisle  road  ten  miles 
north  of  Hanover.  Gregg’s  division  moved  from  New  Windsor 
to  Manchester.  The  I corps  moved  to  Marsh  Creek,  where  the 
Emmitsburg-Gettysburg  and  the  Fairfield-Bridgeport  roads 
intersect;  the  XI  corps  remained  at  Emmitsburg;  one  division  of 
the  III  corps  moved  to  Emmitsburg  and  the  other  to  Bridgeport; 
the  XII  corps  moved  to  Littlestown;  the  V corps,  to  Hanover; 
and  the  VI  corps,  to  Manchester.  As  the  main  body  of  the  Con- 
federate army  was  believed  by  Meade  to  be  in  the  vicinity  of 
Chambersburg,  and  after  crossing  the  mountains  could  move  either 
on  Emmitsburg  or  on  Gettysburg,  he  placed  the  I,  XI  and  III 
corps  under  the  orders  of  Reynolds  to  whom  Buford  was  also  to 
report.  Meade  established  his  headquarters  at  Taney  town,  Md. 

From  Gettysburg,  on  June  30,  Buford  sent  the  following 
messages : 

I entered  this  place  to-day  at  11  a.  m.  Found  everybody  in  a 
terrible  state  of  excitement  on  account  of  the  enemy’s  advance 
upon  this  place.  He  had  approached  to  within  half  a mile  of  the 
town  when  the  head  of  my  column  entered.  His  force  was  terribly 
exaggerated  by  reasonable  and  truthful  but  inexperienced  men. 
On  pushing  him  back  toward  Cashtown,  I learned  from  reliable 
men  that  ( R . H .)  Anderson’s  division  was  marching  from  Cham- 
bersburg by  Mummasburg,  Hunterstown,  Abbottstown,  on  to- 
ward York.  I have  sent  parties  to  the  two  first-named  places, 
toward  Cashtown,  and  a strong  force  toward  Littlestown.  Col. 
Gamble  has  just  sent  me  word  that  Lee  signed  a pass  for  a citizen 
this  morning  at  Chambersburg.  I can’t  do  much  just  now.  My 
men  and  horses  are  fagged  out.  The  troops  that  are  coming  here 
were  the  same  I found  early  this  morning  at  Fairfield.  Gen. 
Reynolds  has  been  informed  of  all  I know. 

The  hour  of  the  above  message  is  not  given,  but  it  was  prob- 
ably early  in  the  afternoon.  It  is  addressed  to  Pleasonton. 


41 


The  enemy  has  increased  his  forces  considerably.  His  strong 
position  is  just  behind  Cashtown.  My  party  toward  Mummas- 
burg met  a superior  force  strongly  posted.  Another  party  that 
went  up  the  road  due  north,  three  miles  out,  met  a strong  picket; 
had  a skirmish  and  captured  one  [man]  of  Rodes’  division.  Another 
party  that  went  toward  Littlestown  heard  that  Gregg  or  Kilpatrick 
had  a fight  with  Stuart,  and  drove  him  to  Hanover. 

The  above  message  to  Pleasonton  is  marked  5:30  a.  m.,  but 
must  be  p.  m. 

I am  satisfied  that  A.  P.  Hill’s  corps  is  massed  just  back  of 
Cashtown,  about  nine  miles  from  this  place.  Pender’s  division, 
of  this  ( Hill’s ) corps,  came  up  to-day — of  which  I advised  you, 
saying,  “The  enemy  in  my  front  is  increased.”  The  enemy’s 
pickets  (infantry  and  artillery),  are  within  four  miles  of  this  place 
on  the  Cashtown  road.  My  parties  have  returned  that  went 
north,  northwest  and  northeast,  after  crossing  the  road  from 
Cashtown  to  Oxford  [via  Mummasburg]  in  several  places.  They 
heard  nothing  of  any  force  having  passed  over  it  lately.  The 
road,  however,  is  terribly  infested  with  prowling  cavalry  parties. 
Near  Heidlersburg,  to-day,  one  of  my  parties  captured  a courier 
of  Lee’s.  Nothing  was  found  on  him.  He  says  Ewell’s  corps  is 
crossing  the  mountains  from  Carlisle,  Rodes’  division  being  at 
Petersburg  in  advance.  Longstreet,  from  all  I can  learn,  is  still 
behind  Hill.  I have  many  rumors  and  reports  of  the  enemy 
advancing  on  me  from  York.  I have  to  pay  attention  to  some  of 
them  which  causes  me  to  overwork  my  horses  and  men.  I can 
get  no  forage  nor  rations;  and  am  out  of  both.  The  people  give 
and  sell  the  men  something  to  eat,  but  I can’t  stand  that  way  of 
subsisting;  it  causes  dreadful  straggling.  Should  I have  to  fall 
back,  advise  me  by  what  route. 

The  above  is  addressed  to  Reynolds  and  dated  10:30  p.  m., 
June  30. 

I have  the  honor  to  state  the  following  facts:  A.  P.  Hill’s  corps, 
composed  of  Anderson,  Heth  and  Pender,  is  massed  back  of  Cash- 
town,  nine  miles  from  this  place  [Gettysburg].  His  pickets,  com- 
posed of  infantry  and  artillery,  are  in  sight  of  mine.  There  is  a 
road  from  Cashtown  running  through  Mummasburg  and  Hunters- 
town  to  the  York  pike,  which  is  terribly  infested  with  roving 
detachments  of  cavalry.  Rumor  says  Ewell  is  coming  over  the 
mountains  from  Carlisle.  One  of  his  escort  was  captured  to-day 
near  Heidlersburg.  He  says  Rodes,  commanding  a division  of 
Ewell’s,  has  already  crossed  the  mountains  from  Carlisle.  When 
will  the  reserve  [brigade  at  Mechanicstown]  be  relieved  and  where 
are  my  wagons?  I have  no  need  of  them  as  I can  find  no  forage. 
I have  kept  Gen.  Reynolds  informed  of  all  that  has  transpired. 


42 


The  above  is  to  Pleasonton  and  is  dated  10:40  p.  m.,  June  30. 

It  is  apparent  from  the  above  communications  that  Buford  had 
done  his  duty  thoroughly;  and  at  midnight,  army  headquarters, 
which  was  at  Taneytown  only  thirteen  miles  from  Gettysburg, 
should  have  had  a clear  idea  of  the  military  situation.  That  the 
orders  for  July  1 were  not  modified  to  conform  to  this  informa- 
tion was  due  to  the  fact  that  Meade  did  not  see  either  of  the  last 
messages  until  “pretty  late  on  the  morning  of  the  1st  of  July,” 
as  he  stated  in  his  testimony  before  the  Joint  Committee  on  the 
Conduct  of  the  War.  The  courier  service  of  the  army  was  not 
very  efficient  as  is  indicated  by  the  time  required  to  deliver  this 
and  other  messages  and  orders  in  this  campaign. 

It  is  useless  to  speculate  upon  what  Meade  would  have  done 
had  Buford’s  information  been  received  by  him  about  midnight 
June  30,  but  it  is  quite  certain  that  the  orders  for  July  1 would 
have  been  modified.  These  orders  were  based  on  the  information 
received  before  Meade’s  letter  to  Halleck,  sent  at  4:30  p.  m. 
June  30  (p.  36). 

A circular,  of  which  the  following  is  an  extract,  was  sent  by 
Meade  to  the  corps  commanders  on  the  morning  of  June  30: 

The  commanding  general  has  received  information  that  the 
enemy  is  advancing,  probably  in  strong  force,  on  Gettysburg.  It  is 
the  intention  to  hold  this  army  pretty  nearly  in  the  position  it 
now  occupies  until  the  plans  of  the  enemy  have  been  more  fully 
developed. 

Three  corps,  I,  III  and  XI,  are  under  the  command  of  Maj. 
Gen.  Reynolds  in  the  vicinity  of  Emmitsburg,  the  III  corps  being 
ordered  up  to  that  point.  The  XII  corps  is  at  Littlestown.  Gen. 
Gregg’s  division  of  cavalry  is  believed  to  be  now  engaged  with  the 
cavalry  of  the  enemy  near  Hanover  Junction. 

The  order  for  July  1,  of  which  the  following  are  extracts,  con- 
forms to  the  idea  expressed  in  the  circular: 

III  corps  to  Emmitsburg;  II  corps  to  Taneytown;  V corps  to 
Hanover;  XII  corps  to  Two  Taverns;  I corps  to  Gettysburg;  XI 
corps  to  Gettysburg  (or  supporting  distance);  VI  corps  to  Man- 
chester. 

Cavalry  to  the  front  and  flanks,  well  out  in  all  directions,  giving 
timely  notice  of  positions  and  movements  of  the  enemy. 

The  commanding  general  desires  you  to  be  informed,  from 
present  information,  that  Longstreet  and  Hill  are  at  Chambers- 


43 


burg,  partly  toward  Gettysburg;  Ewell  at  Carlisle  and  York. 
Movements  indicate  a disposition  to  advance  from  Chambersburg 
to  Gettysburg. 

For  the  I,  II,  XI  and  XII  corps  this  order  contemplated  an 
advance  of  only  five  miles;  for  the  III  and  VI  corps,  only  the  clos- 
ing up  of  the  corps,  as  their  advance  units  were  already  at  Emmits- 
burg  and  Manchester;  for  the  V corps,  an  advance  of  ten  miles 
to  reach  the  railroad. 

July  1 . — On  the  morning  of  July  1,  A.  P.  Hill,  with  the  divisions 
of  Heth  and  Pender,  was  near  Cashtown  eight  miles  from  Gettys- 
burg. In  explaining  his  movement  that  day,  Hill  says  in  his 
report: 

On  the  morning  of  June  29,  the  Third  corps,  composed  of  the 
divisions  of  Maj.  Gens.  Anderson,  Heth  and  Pender  and  five 
bat  alions  of  artillery  under  command  of  Col.  R.  L.  Walker  was 
encamped  on  the  road  from  Chambersburg  to  Gettysburg,  near 
the  village  of  Fayetteville.  I was  directed  to  move  on  this  road 
in  the  direction  of  York,  and  to  cross  the  Susquehanna,  menacing 
the  communications  of  Harrisburg  with  Philadelphia  and  to  co- 
operate with  Gen.  Ewell,  acting  as  circumstances  might  require. 

Accordingly  on  the  29th,  I moved  Gen.  Heth’s  division  to  Cash- 
town  some  eight  miles  from  Gettysburg,  following  on  the  morning 
of  the  30th  with  the  division  of  Gen.  Pender,  and  directing  Gen. 
Anderson  to  move  in  the  same  direction  on  the  morning  of  July  1. 
On  arriving  at  Cashtown  Gen.  Heth,  who  had  sent  forward  Pet- 
tigrew’s brigade  to  Gettysburg,  reported  that  Pettigrew  had  en- 
countered the  enemy  at  Gettysburg  (principally  cavalry) but  in 
in  what  force  he  could  not  determine.  A courier  was  despatched 
with  this  information  to  the  general  commanding,  and  with  orders 
to  start  Anderson  early;  also  to  Gen.  Ewell  informing  him,  and 
that  I intended  to  advance  the  next  morning  to  discover  what 
was  in  my  front. 

On  July  1,  at  5 a.  m.,  Heth  took  up  the  line  of  march  with 
Pegram’s  battalion  of  artillery,  followed  by  Pender  with  McIntosh’s 
battalion  of  artillery,  Col.  Walker  with  the  remainder  of  the  artil- 
lery being  with  Gen.  Anderson. 

Gen.  Ewell,  who  was  marching  with  Rodes’  division  that  morn- 
ing from  Heidlersburg  toward  Cashtown,  says  in  his  report: 

Before  reaching  Middletown,  I received  notice  from  Gen.  Hill 
that  he  was  advancing  on  Gettysburg,  and  turned  the  head  of 
Rodes’  column  toward  that  place  by  the  Middletown  road,  sending 
word  to  Early  to  advance  directly  by  the  Heidlersburg  road. 


44 


Longstreet  says  in  his  report: 

On  the  next  day  [June  30],  the  troops  set  out  for  Gettysburg, 
except  Pickett’s  division,  not  yet  relieved  from  duty  at  Chambers- 
burg,  and  Law’s  brigade  left  by  Hood  on  picket  at  New  Guilford. 

It  is  evident  from  all  the  Confederate  reports  that  no  specific 
orders  were  given  for  a concentration  either  at  Cashtown  or  at 
Gettysburg,  and  the  alternative  was  left  to  Hill  and  Ewell  to 
unite  at  either  place.  Ewell,  finding  that  there  was  an  unknown 
force  of  Union  troops  at  Gettysburg,  naturally  turned  his  two 
divisions  toward  Cashtown.  Hill,  however,  knowing  that  Long- 
street  was  following  Anderson  through  the  mountains  and  that 
his  own  force  must  clear  the  way,  naturally  continued  his  march 
toward  Gettysburg  where  Ewell  could  unite  with  him.  There 
was  nothing  to  indicate  that  Gettysburg  was  occupied  by  any- 
thing but  a cavalry  force. 

All  the  Union  troops  made  the  short  marches  indicated  by  the 
orders  for  the  day  and  went  into  camp.  While  there,  some  of 
them  received  a copy  of  a circular  sent  from  Taneytown  that 
morning,  of  which  the  following  is  an  extract: 

Taneytown  July  1,  1863. 

From  information  received,  the  commanding  general  is  satisfied 
that  the  object  of  the  movement  of  the  army  in  this  direction  has 
been  accomplished,  viz.,  the  relief  of  Harrisburg  and  the  preven- 
tion of  the  enemy’s  intended  invasion  of  Philadelphia,  etc.,  beyond 
the  Susquehanna.  It  is  no  longer  his  intention  to  assume  the 
offensive,  until  the  enemy’s  movements  or  position  should  render 
such  an  operation  certain  of  success. 

If  the  enemy  assume  the  offensive  and  attack,  it  is  his  intention 
after  holding  them  in  check  sufficiently  long  to  withdraw  the  trains 
and  other  impedimenta,  to  withdraw  the  army  from  its  present 
position  and  form  line  of  battle  with  the  left  resting  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  Middleburg,  and  the  right  at  Manchester,  the  general 
direction  being  that  of  Pipe  Creek. 

The  remainder  of  the  circular  covers  the  instructions  to  the 
various  corps  commanders  as  to  the  manner  of  carrying  out  the 
concentration  on  the  Pipe  Creek  line. 

The  situation  at  Gettysburg  this  day  caused  a complete  change 
in  the  plans  of  Meade;  during  the  day  every  corps  commander, 
who  was  not  already  there,  received  orders  to  march  to  Gettysburg 
at  once. 


45 


Itinerary  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  June  28  to  July  1. 


June 

I Corps 

III  Corps 

XI  Corps 

V Corps 

XII  Corps 

II  Corps 

VI  Corps 

Cavalry 

divisions 

28 

Frederick 

Woodbury 

Near 

Frederick 

Near 

Frederick 

Frederick 

Monocacy 

Junction 

Hyatts- 

town 

1 Middletown 

2 Ridgeville 

3 Frederick 

29 

Emmits- 

burg 

Taneytown 

Emmits- 

burg 

Liberty 

Bruce- 

ville 

Union- 

town 

New 

Windsor 

1 Near  Fairfield 

2 New  Windsor 

3 Littlestown 

30 

Marsh 

Run 

Taneytown 

Bridge- 

port 

Union 

Mills 

Littles- 

town 

Union- 

town 

Manches- 

ter 

1 Gettysburg 

2 Manchester 

3 Hanover 

July 

1 

Gettys- 

burg 

Gettys- 

burg 

Gettys- 

burg 

Hanover 

and  road 
to  Gettys- 
burg 

Two  Tav- 
erns and 
Gettys- 
burg 

Taney- 
town and 

road  to 
Gettys- 
burg 

Manches- 
ter and 

road  to 
Gettys- 
burg 

1 Taneytown 

2 Hanover 

Junction 

3 Abbottstown 

Topography  of  the  Battlefield. — The  town  of  Gettysburg  lies 
in  the  northern  part  of  the  basin  of  the  Monocacy  River,  of  which 
Marsh  and  Rock  creeks  are  the  principal  tributaries  in  Pennsyl- 
vania. The  country  about  Gettysburg  is  a diversified  farming 
country  with  woods  and  fields  easily  traversed  by  troops.  It 
has  no  unfordable  streams  and  the  only  features  of  military  value 
were  its  ridges  and  its  woods.  The  ridges,  which  separate  the 
drainage  areas  of  the  battlefield,  played  an  important  part  in  the 
battle  as  they  were  the  positions  occupied  by  the  opposing  lines 
to  secure  command  and  a view  over  the  foreground,  as  well  as 
to  conceal  the  reserves  and  trains  in  their  rear.  The  topography 
is  made  complicated  by  the  fact  that  the  ridges  intersect  and  are 
cut  through  by  the  streams. 

The  principal  ridges  which  traverse  the  field  are: 

1.  Herr  Ridge  limits  the  valley  of  Willoughby  Run  on  the  west 
and  has  about  the  same  elevation  as  Seminary  Ridge.  From 
its  southern  end  there  is  an  unobstructed  view  of  Big  Round  Top 
and  the  Emmitsburg  road  near  Marsh  Creek.  A cross-road,  con- 
necting the  Cashtown  and  Fairfield  roads,  runs  along  this  ridge. 

2.  Seminary  Ridge  separates  the  basins  of  Willoughby  Run  and 
Rock  Creek  and  conceals  the  valley  of  Rock  Creek  from  observers 
on  Herr  Ridge.  North  of  the  Mummasburg  road  this  ridge  is 


46 


called  Oak  Ridge  of  which  the  southern  end  is  called  Oak  Hill. 
Doubleday  Avenue  now  follows  the  crest  of  Seminary  Ridge 
between  the  Mummasburg  road  and  the  railroad  and  West  Con- 
federate Avenue  follows  its  crest  south  of  the  Fairfield  road. 

3.  Snyder  Ridge  limits  the  valley  of  Willoughby  Run  on  the 
east,  south  of  Seminary  Ridge;  its  extension  intersects  Herr 
Ridge  near  the  Cashtown  road.  It  conceales  the  valley  of  Wil- 
loughby Run  from  observers  on  the  Round  Tops.  West  Con- 
federate Avenue  now  follows  its  crest. 

4.  A ridge  runs  from  Rock  Creek  via  Culp  Hill,  Cemetery  Hill, 
Little  Round  Top  and  Big  Round  Top  to  Plum  Run;  south  of 
Cemetery  Hill  it  is  called  Cemetery  Ridge.  This  is  the  highest 
of  the  ridges  and  commands  both  Seminary  and  Snyder  ridges. 
Big  Round  Top  commands  Snyder  Ridge  by  200  feet  and  Little 
Round  Top  commands  it  by  nearly  100  feet.  Cemetery  Hill 
commands  Seminary  Ridge  by  about  75  feet. 

A number  of  minor  ridges  also  figured  in  the  battle. 

1.  A short  ridge  overlooking  Willoughby  Run  near  the  Cash- 
town  road  and  now  the  site  of  Stone  Avenue. 

2.  A ridge  midway  between  Willoughby  Run  and  Seminary 
Ridge  which  forms  the  divide  between  Willoughby  Run  and 
Pitzer  Run.  It  is  now  the  site  of  Reynolds  Avenue. 

3.  A ridge  followed  by  the  Emmitsburg  road  for  a short  dis- 
tance north  of  the  Peach  Orchard.  It  separates  the  basins  of 
Plum  and  Pitzer  runs. 

The  principal  woods  mentioned  in  the  accounts  of  the  battle 
are  McPherson’s  woods,  a small  grove  which  extended  from 
Willoughby  Run  to  Reynolds  Avenue  about  400  yards  south  of 
the  Cashtown  road,  and  Spangler’s  woods  near  the  south  end  of 
Seminary  Ridge.  Nearly  all  the  ridges  were  more  or  less  covered 
by  woods,  and  of  the  hills,  Culp  Hill,  Wolf  Hill  and  Big  Round 
Top  were  almost  completely  covered.  These  hills  were  also 
covered  with  boulders. 

Engagement  at  Gettysburg,  July  1,  a.  m. — The  troops  that 
took  part  in  this  preliminary  engagement  were: 


Confederate  Brigades. 
Archer,  Heth’s  division 
Davis,  Heth’s  division 
Artillery  battalion,  16  guns 


Union  Brigades. 

Gamble,  Buford’s  cavalry  division 
Cutler,  Wadsworth’s  division,  I corps 
Meredith,  Wadsworth’s  division,  I corps 
2 batteries,  12  guns 


47 


When  Buford  reached  Gettysburg  on  June  30,  he  assigned  to 
Gamble’s  brigade  the  task  of  watching  the  Fairfield  and  Cash- 
town  roads,  and  to  Devin  he  assigned  the  roads  running  to 
Mummasburg,  Middletown,  Heidlersburg,  etc.  Gamble  posted 
his  pickets  well  out  on  the  two  roads  assigned  him  where  they 
could  overlook  the  valley  of  Marsh  Creek;  his  main  body  was 
encamped  east  of  Willoughby  Run. 

At  5 a.  m.  July  1,  Heth’s  division  moved  from  Cashtown  with 
Archer’s  brigade  in  advance.  When  Heth  reached  Herr  Ridge, 
between  10  and  10:30  a.  m.,  he  saw  a part  of  Gamble’s  brigade, 
dismounted,  along  what  is  now  Stone  Avenue,  with  two  guns  of 
the  horse  artillery  on  either  side  of  the  Cashtown  road.  The  rest 
of  Gamble’s  brigade,  with  two  guns,  was  south  of  McPherson’s 
woods  and  not  visible  from  the  vicinity  of  Herr’s  Tavern.  The 
Union  force  in  his  front  did  not  seem  formidable  and  after  a few 
shots  by  the  leading  artillery  platoon,  Archer  and  Davis  were 
directed  to  deploy  their  brigades  and  move  to  the  attack. 

The  report  of  Archer’s  brigade,  which  was  south  of  the  Cash- 
town  road,  says: 

We  had  advanced  abou  three  miles  when  we  came  upon  the 
enemy’s  pickets,  who  gradually  fell  back  before  us  for  about  three 
miles,  which  brought  us  in  sight  of  the  enemy  upon  a slight 
eminence  [Stone  Avenue  ridge],  in  our  front  and  to  the  right  of 
the  road.  Gen.  Archer  halted  for  a short  time  while  a section  of  a 
battery  opened  fire  on  them.  He  then  deployed  the  brigade  in 
line,  and  advanced  directly  upon  the  enemy  through  an  open 
field.  At  the  extreme  side  of  the  field  there  was  a small  creek 
[Willoughby  Run],  with  a fence  and  undergrowth,  which  was 
some  disadvantage  to  our  line  in  crossing,  but  the  brigade  rushed 
across  with  a cheer,  and  met  the  enemy  just  beyond. 

We  had  encountered  the  enemy  but  a short  time,  when  he  made 
his  appearance  suddenly  upon  our  right  flank  with  a heavy  force 
and  opened  upon  us  a crossfire.  Our  position  was  at  once  rendered 
untenable,  and  the  right  of  our  line  was  forced  back.  He  made 
also  a demonstration  upon  our  left,  and  our  lines  commenced 
falling  back,  but  owing  to  the  obstructions  in  our  rear  (the  creek, 
etc.)  some  75  of  the  brigade  were  unable  to  make  their  escape, 
Gen.  Archer  among  the  rest. 

The  report  of  Davis’  brigade  says: 

When  within  about  two  miles  from  town,  our  artillery  was  put 
in  position  [on  Herr  Ridge]  and  opened  fire.  I was  ordered  to 
take  position  on  the  left  [north]  of  the  turnpike,  and,  with  the 


48 


right  resting  on  it,  press  forward  toward  the  town.  About  10:30 
a line  of  battle  was  formed,  skirmishers  thrown  forward  and  the 
brigade  moved  forward  to  the  attack.  Between  us  and  the  town, 
and  very  near  it,  was  a commanding  hill  in  wood  [Seminary 
Ridge],  the  intervening  space  being  inclosed  fields  of  grass  and 
grain,  and  was  very  broken.  On  our  right  was  the  turnpike 
and  a railroad,  with  deep  cuts  and  heavy  embankments,  diverging 
from  the  turnpike  as  it  approached  the  town.  On  the  high  hill 
the  enemy  had  artillery,  with  infantry  supports. 

The  line  of  skirmishers  advanced,  and  the  brigade  moved 
forward  about  a mile,  driving  the  enemy’s  skirmishers,  and  came 
within  range  of  his  main  line  of  battle  which  was  drawn  up  on  a 
high  hill  [Reynolds  Avenue  ridge]  in  a field  a short  distance  in 
front  of  the  railroad  cut.  The  engagement  soon  became  very 
warm.  The  enemy  made  a stubborn  resistance,  and  after  desperate 
fighting,  with  heavy  losses  on  both  sides,  he  fled  in  great  disorder 
toward  the  town.  After  a short  interval,  he  again  returned  in 
great  numbers  and  our  men  gave  way  under  the  first  shock  of  his 
attack,  many  of  the  officers  and  men  having  been  killed  or  wounded 
and  all  much  exhausted  by  the  excessive  heat;  but  the  line  was 
promptly  formed  and  while  there  engaged,  a heavy  force  was 
observed  moving  rapidly  toward  our  right,  and  soon  after  opened 
fire  on  our  right  flank  and  rear. 

In  this  critical  condition,  I gave  the  order  to  retire,  which  was 
done  in  good  order,  leaving  some  officers  and  men  in  the  railroad 
cut,  who  were  captured,  although  every  effort  was  made  to  with- 
draw all  the  commands. 

Buford,  who  was  notified  of  the  advance  of  the  Confederate 
forces,  sent  the  following  message  to  Meade: 

Gettysburg,  July  1,  1863,  10:10  a.  m. 

The  enemy’s  force  (A.  P.  Hill’s ) are  advancing  on  me  at  this 
point,  and  driving  my  pickets  and  skirmishers  very  rapidly.  There 
is  also  a large  force  at  Heidlersburg  that  is  driving  my  pickets  at 
that  point  from  that  direction.  Gen.  Reynolds  is  advancing  and 
is  within  three  miles  of  this  point  with  his  leading  division.  I am 
positive  that  the  whole  of  A.  P.  Hill’s  force  is  advancing. 

Thus,  while  the  brigades  of  Archer  and  Davis  were  deploying 
and  preparing  to  advance  on  Gamble’s  brigade,  Wadsworth’s 
division,  Cutler  and  Meredith,  was  marching  on  Gettysburg  by 
the  Emmitsburg  road.  When  a mile  from  Gettysburg,  Reynolds 
heard  the  sound  of  Buford’s  guns  and  the  column  turned  off  the 
road  and  started  across  the  fields  for  the  battlefield.  When 
Cutler’s  brigade  arrived,  it  was  put  in  position  by  Reynolds;  two 
regiments  were  deployed  along  Stone  Avenue  to  check  Archer, 


49 


who  was  coming  up  the  slope  and  through  McPherson’s  woods, 
and  three  regiments  were  sent  across  the  railroad  to  hold  Davis. 
The  battery  which  accompanied  this  division  was  placed  just 
north  of  the  Cashtown  road  on  the  pi'olongation  of  Stone  Avenue. 
All  these  troops  became  engaged  as  soon  as  they  reached  their 
positions.  It  was  while  Archer’s  brigade  was  engaged  with  Cut- 
ler’s left  regiments  that  Meredith’s  brigade  came  up  and  struck 
its  left  flank,  as  described  in  the  report  of  Archer’s  brigade,  and 
caused  it  to  retreat. 

Davis  attacked  the  three  regiments  of  Cutler’s  right  wing  and 
was  forcing  them  back  on  Seminary  Ridge  when  the  two  regiments 
of  Cutler’s  left  wing  were  released  by  Archer’s  retreat.  These 
regiments  with  a reserve  regiment  of  Meredith’s  brigade  now 
attacked  Davis  in  flank,  captured  half  a regiment  in  the  railroad 
cut  at  Reynolds  Avenue,  and  compelled  him  to  retreat.  It  was 
noon  when  Davis  began  to  retire. 

Reynolds  was  killed  in  McPherson’s  woods  shortly  after  the 
battle  began  and  Doubleday  assumed  command  of  the  corps. 
Buford  withdrew  Gamble  from  Stone  Avenue  on  the  arrival  of 
Wadsworth’s  division,  and  Gamble  moved  toward  the  Fairfield 
road  to  protect  that  flank  of  the  line. 

At  the  end  of  this  engagement,  Heth  says: 

The  enemy  had  now  been  felt,  and  found  in  heavy  force  in  and 
around  Gettysburg.  The  division  was  now  formed  in  line  of 
battle  on  the  right  of  the  road;  Archer’s  brigade  on  the  right, 
Pettigrew’s  in  the  center,  and  Brockenbrough’ s on  the  left.  Davis’ 
brigade  was  kept  on  the  left  of  the  road,  that  it  might  collect  its 
stragglers,  and  from  its  shattered  condition  it  was  not  deemed 
advisable  to  bring  it  again  into  action  that  day. 

In  this  preliminary  action,  the  Confederates  were  defeated 
because  they  expected  to  attack  only  a brigade  of  dismounted 
cavalry  and  found  themselves  suddenly  confronted  by  two  bri- 
gades of  infantry.  Each  Confederate  brigade  was  attacked  by 
superior  numbers,  and  each  was  defeated  by  an  attack  on  its  left 
flank. 


50 


Engagement  at  Gettysburg,  July  1,  p.  m. — The  troops  that  took 
part  in  this  engagement  were: 

Infantry. 

Union  Divisions. 
Wadsworth  2 brigades  infantry 
Robinson  2 brigades  infantry 
Doubleday  2 brigades  infantry 
Barlow  2 brigades  infantry 

Schurz  2 brigades  infantry 

Steinwehr  2 brigades  infantry 

Total,  12 

The  strength  of  these  brigades  was  sufficiently  uniform  to  give  a fair  estimate 
of  the  relative  strength  of  the  infantry  engaged. 

Artillery. 

4 battalions  64  guns  2 artillery  brigades  60  guns 

Cavalry. 

2 cavalry  brigades  with  6 guns 

When  Reynolds  left  Marsh  Creek  about  8 a.  m.  with  Wads- 
worth’s division,  orders  were  left  for  the  other  two  divisions  of 
the  I corps  and  for  the  XI  corps  to  follow  as  soon  as  possible.  In 
executing  this  march,  two  divisions  of  the  XI  corps  took  a branch 
road  to  the  Taneytown  road  and  came  into  Gettysburg  over 
Cemetery  Hill. 

When  Doubleday’s  division  reached  Gettysburg  about  noon, 
the  morning  engagement  was  over.  Meredith’s  brigade  was  in 
and  south  of  McPherson’s  woods  and  Cutler’s  brigade  was 
united  along  Reynolds  Avenue  north  of  the  railroad.  Stone’s 
brigade  was  therefore  sent  to  close  the  gap  between  Meredith  and 
Cutler  and  Rowley’s  brigade  was  sent  to  extend  Meredith’s  line 
southward  towards  the  Fairfield  road.  Robinson’s  division  which 
arrived  next  was  placed  in  reserve  in  a grove  just  west  of  the 
Lutheran  Seminary. 

About  1 p.  m.  the  divisions  of  Schurz  and  Barlow  of  the  XI 
corps  reached  Gettysburg  and  were  sent  to  the  plain  north  of  the 
town;  Steinwehr’s  division  which  arrived  an  hour  later  was  re- 
tained as  a reserve  on  Cemetery  Hill.  The  XI  corps  was  posted 
by  Howard  who  reached  Gettysburg  just  after  the  death  of 
Reynolds  and  assumed  command  of  the  two  corps. 

In  his  report  Howard  states,  that  after  inspecting  the  field: 


Confederate  Divisions. 
Heth  4 brigades  infantry 

Pender  4 brigades  infantry 

Rodes  5 brigades  infantry 

Early  4 brigades  infantry 

Total,  17 


5i 


I at  once  established  my  headquarters  near  the  cemetery,  and 
on  the  highest  point  north  of  the  Baltimore  pike.  Here  Gen. 
Schurz  joined  me  before  12  m.,  when  I instructed  him  to  make 
the  following  dispositions  of  the  XI  corps.  Learning  from  Gen. 
Doubleday,  commanding  the  I corps,  that  his  right  was  hard 
pressed  [by  Davis]  and  receiving  continued  assurance  that  his 
left  was  safe  and  pushing  the  enemy  [ Archer ] back,  I ordered  the 
1st  and  3d  divisions  of  the  XI  corps  to  seize  and  hold  a prominent 
height  on  the  right  of  the  Cashtown  road  and  on  the  prolongation 
of  Seminary  Ridge  [Oak  Hill],  each  division  to  have  a battery  of 
artillery,  the  other  three  batteries  supported  by  Steinwehr’s 
division,  to  be  put  in  position  near  me  on  Cemetery  Hill. 

About  12:30  Gen.  Buford  sent  me  word  that  the  enemy  was 
massing  between  the  York  and  Harrisburg  roads,  to  the  north  of 
Gettysburg,  some  three  or  four  miles  from  the  town.  The  news 
of  Ewell’s  advance  from  York  was  confirmed.  I therefore  ordered 
Gen.  Schurz  to  halt  his  command  to  prevent  his  right  flank  being 
turned,  but  to  push  forward  a thick  line  of  skirmishers  to  seize 
the  point  first  indicated. 

At  2:45  p.  m.  the  enemy  showed  himself  in  force  in  front  of  the 
XI  corps.  His  batteries  could  be  distinctly  seen  on  a prominent 
slope  between  the  Mummasburg  and  Harrisburg  roads  [Oak 
Hill]. 

At  this  time  Devin’s  cavalry  brigade  formed  a thin  line  between 
Oak  Hill  and  Rock  Creek. 

The  afternoon  engagement  was  begun  by  Rodes’  division.  That 
morning  Ewell  was  marching  with  Rodes’  division  from  Heidlers- 
burg  to  Cashtown  via  Middletown,  now  Biglerville.  His  report 
states : 

Before  reaching  Middletown,  I received  notice  from  Gen.  Hill 
that  he  was  advancing  upon  Gettysburg  and  turned  the  head  of 
Rodes’  column  toward  that  place  by  the  Middletown  road,  send- 
ing word  to  Early  to  advance  directly  on  the  Heidlersburg  road. 
I notified  the  general  commanding  of  my  movements  and  was 
informed  by  him  that  in  case  we  found  the  enemy’s  force  very 
large  he  did  not  want  a general  engagement  brought  on  till  the 
rest  of  the  army  came  up. 

By  the  time  this  message  reached  me,  Gen.  A.  P.  Hill  had 
already  been  warmly  engaged  with  a large  body  of  the  enemy  in 
his  front,  and  Carter’s  artillery  battalion,  of  Rodes’  division,  had 
opened  with  fine  effect  on  the  flank  of  the  same  body  which  was 
rapidly  preparing  to  attack  me,  while  fresh  masses  were  moving 
into  position  in  my  front.  It  was  too  late  to  avoid  an  engagement 
without  abandoning  the  position  already  taken  up,  and  I deter- 
mined to  push  the  attack  vigorously. 


52 


It  was  Cutler’s  brigade  deployed  in  the  open  along  Reynolds 
Avenue,  north  of  the  railroad,  which  was  made  the  target  of 
Rodes’  artillery;  Cutler  withdrew  into  the  woods  in  his  rear. 

Rodes’  report  says: 

On  arriving  on  the  field,  I found  that  by  keeping  along  the 
wooded  ridge  [Oak  Ridge],  on  the  left  side  of  which  the  town  of 
Gettysburg  is  situated,  I could  strike  the  force  of  the  enemy,  with 
which  Gen.  Hill’s  troops  were  engaged,  upon  the  flank,  and  that, 
besides  moving  under  cover,  whenever  we  struck  the  enemy  we 
could  engage  him  with  the  advantage  in  ground. 

The  division  was  therefore  moved  along  the  summit  of  the 
ridge,  with  only  one  brigade  deployed  at  first,  and  finally,  as  the 
enemy’s  cavalry  had  discovered  us,  and  the  ground  was  of  such  a 
character  as  to  admit  of  cover  for  a large  opposing  force,  with 
three  brigades  deployed;  Doles  on  the  left,  O’Neal  in  the  center 
and  Iverson  on  the  right;  the  artillery  and  the  other  brigades 
moved  up  closely  to  the  line  of  battle.  The  division  had  moved 
nearly  a mile  before  coming  in  view  of  the  enemy’s  forces,  except- 
ing a few  mounted  men,  and  finally  arrived  at  a point,  a prominent 
hill  on  the  ridge  [Oak  Hill],  whence  the  whole  of  the  force  opposing 
Gen.  Hill’s  troops  could  be  seen.  To  get  at  these  troops  properly, 
which  were  still  over  half  a mile  from  us,  it  was  necessary  to 
move  the  whole  of  my  command  by  the  right  flank,  and  to  change 
direction  to  the  right. 

While  this  was  being  done,  Carter’s  [artillery]  battalion  was 
ordered  forward,  and  soon  opened  fire  upon  the  enemy  who  at 
this  moment,  as  far  as  I could  see,  had  no  troops  facing  me  at  all. 
He  had  apparently  been  surprised ; only  a desultory  fire  of  artillery 
was  going  on  between  his  troops  and  Gen.  Hill’s;  but  before  my 
dispositions  were  made,  the  enemy  began  to  show  large  bodies  of 
men  in  front  of  the  town,  most  of  which  were  directed  upon  the 
position  I held,  and  almost  at  the  same  time  a portion  of  the  force 
opposed  to  Gen.  Hill  changed  position  so  as  to  occupy  the  woods 
on  the  summit  of  the  same  ridge  I occupied  (I  refer  to  the  forest 
touching  the  railroad  and  extending  along  the  summit  of  the  ridge 
to  my  position  as  far  as  the  Mummasburg  road,  which  crossed  the 
ridge  at  the  base  of  the  hill  I held).  Either  these  last  troops,  or 
others  which  had  hitherto  been  unobserved  behind  the  same  body 
of  woods,  soon  made  their  appearance  directly  opposite  my  center. 

Being  thus  threatened  from  two  directions,  I determined  to 
attack  with  my  center  and  right,  holding  at  bay  still  another 
force  then  emerging  from  the  town  (apparently  with  the  intention 
of  turning  my  left)  with  Doles’  brigade,  which  was  moved  some- 
what to  the  left  for  this  purpose,  and  trusting  to  this  gallant 
brigade  thus  holding  them  until  Gen.  Early’s  division  arrived, 
which  I knew  would  be  soon  and  would  strike  this  portion  of  the 
enemy’s  force  on  the  flank  before  it  could  overpower  Doles. 


53 


At  this  moment  Doles’  brigade  occupied  the  open  plain  between 
the  Middletown  road  and  the  foot  of  the  ridge.  The  Alabama 
brigade  [O’Neal’s]  with  a wide  interval  between  it  and  Doles 
extended  from  this  plain  up  the  slope  of  the  ridge;  Daniel’s  brigade 
supported  Iverson’s  and  extended  some  distance  to  the  right  of  it; 
Ramseur  was  in  reserve. 

Cutler’s  brigade  which  had  been  facing  Hill  now  turned  its 
attention  to  Rodes.  Cutler’s  force  being  deemed  too  weak  to 
meet  this  new  attack,  Baxter’s  brigade  of  Robinson’s  division 
in  reserve  at  the  Seminary  was  sent  to  the  Mummasburg  road 
and  faced  O’Neal.  This  is  the  body  of  troops  referred  to  as  hav- 
ing been  “hitherto  unobserved”.  The  troops  in  front  of  the 
town  were  Barlow’s  and  Schurz’  divisions  of  the  XI  corps. 

When  A.  P.  Hill  observed  Rodes’  preparations  for  the  attack, 
he  moved  Pender’s  division,  which  had  come  on  the  field  while 
Archer  and  Davis  were  engaged  and  had  been  deployed  a mile  in 
rear  of  Heth,  within  close  supporting  distance  of  the  latter. 

The  afternoon  engagement  really  consisted  of  three  distinct 
encounters. 

1.  South  of  the  Cashtown  road,  A.  P.  Hill,  with  the  divisions 
of  Heth  and  Pender  attacked  the  left  wing  of  the  I corps  consisting 
of  the  brigades  of  Rowley  and  Meredith  which  were  deployed 
along  Reynolds  Avenue  and  through  McPherson’s  woods  and  a 
part  of  Stone’s  brigade  which  was  deployed  along  Stone  Avenue. 
The  Union  brigades  were  under  the  personal  supervision  of 
Doubleday  and  were  assisted  by  Gamble’s  brigade  of  cavalry 
which  was  on  the  left  flank  of  the  line. 

2.  North  of  the  Cashtown  Road,  the  brigades  of  O’  Neal,  Iver- 
son, Daniel  and  Ramseur  of  Rodes’  division  attacked  the  brigades 
of  Cutler,  Baxter  and  Paul,  and  also  a part  of  Stone’s  brigade 
of  the  I corps.  The  right  wing  of  the  I corps  was  under  the 
personal  supervision  of  Wadsworth. 

3.  In  the  valley  north  of  the  town,  Early’s  division  and  Doles’ 
brigade  of  Rodes’  division  attacked  the  divisions  of  Barlow  and 
Schurz  of  the  XI  corps.  The  Union  forces  were  under  the  personal 
supervision  of  Schurz. 

The  first  attacks  were  those  of  O’Neal,  Iverson  and  Daniel,  which 
occurred  before  Heth  advanced  across  Willoughby  Run  or  Early 
appeared  on  the  field. 


54 


Three  regiments  of  O’Neal’s  brigade  advanced  along  the  east 
slope  of  Oak  Hill  to  attack  a part  of  Baxter’s  brigade,  which  had 
reached  the  Mummasburg  road,  while  Iverson’s  brigade  made  a 
wheel  to  the  left  to  attack  the  remaining  regiments  of  Baxter’s 
brigade  which  were  behind  a stone  wall  that  ran  along  the  crest 
of  the  ridge. 

According  to  Rodes’  report: 

The  three  regiments  [O’Neal’s],  moved  with  alacrity  (but  not 
in  accordance  with  my  orders  as  to  direction)  and  in  confusion 
into  the  action.  The  result  was  that  the  brigade  was  repulsed 
quickly  and  with  loss.  Iverson’s  left  being  thus  exposed,  heavy 
loss  was  inflicted  on  his  brigade.  His  dead  lay  in  a distinctly 
marked  line  of  battle.  His  left  was  overpowered  and  many  of  his 
men,  being  surrounded,  were  captured. 

Daniel’s  gallant  brigade,  by  a slight  change  in  the  direction  of 
Iverson’s  attack,  had  been  left  too  far  to  his  right  to  assist  him 
directly  and  had  already  become  engaged.  The  right  of  this 
brigade,  coming  upon  the  enemy  strongly  posted  in  a railroad  cut, 
was  thrown  back  skilfully  and  the  position  of  the  whole  brigade 
was  altered  so  as  to  enable  him  to  throw  a portion  of  his  force 
across  the  railroad,  enfilade  it,  and  attack  to  advantage. 

Stone,  who  was  between  Meredith  and  the  Cashtown  road, 
seeing  his  brigade  threatened  both  from  the  direction  of  Willough- 
by Run  and  from  the  north,  deployed  one  regiment  along  Stone 
Avenue  and  the  other  two  along  the  Cashtown  road.  One  of  the 
latter  regiments  advanced  to  the  railroad  cut  and  broke  up 
Daniel’s  first  attack. 

When  Daniel  made  his  second  attack,  the  divisions  of  Heth  and 
Pender  were  also  ordered  to  attack.  Heth’s  line  was  formed  of 
the  brigades  of  Brockenbrough,  Pettigrew  and  Archer,  and  extended 
southward  from  the  Cashtown  road.  Archer’s  brigade  was  not 
actually  engaged  in  the  afternoon,  as  it  took  up  a position  near 
the  Fairfield  road  to  protect  the  remainder  of  the  division  from  a 
threatened  flank  attack  by  Gamble’s  cavalry  brigade. 

The  attack  of  Hill’s  two  divisions  is  described  in  the  report  of 
Pender’s  division: 

About  3 o’clock,  the  troops  of  the  corps  of  Lieut.  Gen.  Ewell 
appearing  on  the  left,  and  the  enemy  making  a strong  demonstra- 
tion on  the  right  with  infantry  and  cavalry,  the  brigade  of  Gen. 
Lane  was  ordered  to  the  extreme  right  of  the  division,  and  Gen. 


55 


Thomas  was  directed  to  close  upon  the  left  of  Gen.  Scales.  Simul- 
taneous with  the  appearance  of  Lieut.  Gen.  Ewell  on  the  left,  a 
general  advance  was  ordered  on  the  right.  Gen.  Heth  moved 
quickly  forward  and  soon  became  vigorously  engaged  with  the 
enemy.  Pender’s  division  moved  forward  to  his  support,  with  the 
exception  of  the  brigade  of  Gen.  Thomas,  which  was  retained  by 
Lieut.  Gen.  Hill  to  meet  a threatened  advance  from  the  left. 
The  division  continued  to  move  forward  until  it  came  close  upon 
the  command  of  Gen.  Heth,  pressing  the  enemy  successfully  within 
a short  distance  in  front.  Gen.  Pender  sent  his  assistant  adjutant 
general  forward  to  Gen.  Heth  to  know  if  that  officer  was  in  need 
of  assistance.  On  being  informed  that  he  was  pressing  the  enemy 
from  one  position  to  another,  the  division  advanced  slowly,  keep- 
ing within  close  supporting  distance  of  the  troops  in  front. 

About  4 o’clock,  Gen.  Pender  ordered  an  advance  of  the  three 
brigades  with  instructions  to  pass  Gen.  Heth’s  division,  if  found 
at  a halt,  and  charge  the  enemy’s  position,  which  was  on  a promi- 
nent ridge  [Seminary  Ridge]  between  a quarter  and  a half  mile 
from  Gettysburg.  The  division  moved  rapidly  forward  and  passed 
the  division  of  Gen.  Heth,  then  under  the  command  of  Gen. 
Pettigrew,  which  seemed  much  exhausted  and  greatly  reduced  by 
several  hours’  hard  and  successful  fighting. 

Gen.  Lane,  on  the  extreme  right,  being  annoyed  by  a heavy 
force  of  dismounted  cavalry  on  his  right  flank,  which  kept  up  a 
severe  enfilade  fire,  was  so  much  delayed  thereby,  that  he  was 
unable  to  attack  the  enemy  in  front. 

Gen.  Scales  on  the  left,  with  his  left  resting  on  the  turnpike, 
after  passing  the  troops  of  Gen.  Heth,  advanced  at  a charge  which 
soon  caused  the  enemy  to  fall  back.  The  brigade  continued  to 
advance  rapidly,  and  as  it  commenced  to  descend  the  hill  [Reynolds 
Avenue  ridge]  opposite  the  ridge  upon  which  the  enemy  was 
posted  [Seminary  Ridge],  it  encountered  a most  terrific  fire  of 
grape  and  shell  on  the  left  flank  and  grape  and  musketry  in 
front,  but  it  still  pressed  on  at  a double-quick  until  the  bottom 
was  reached,  a distance  of  75  yards  from  the  enemy’s  fortified 
position.  Here  the  fire  was  most  severe.  The  brigade  halted 
to  return  the  fire  of  the  enemy,  throwing  the  line  somewhat  in 
confusion.  Maj.  Gen.  Pender,  with  portions  of  his  staff  and 
Gen.  Scales  succeeded  in  rallying  the  brigade  which  immediately 
pushed  forward  again  and  joined  in  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy, 
driving  him  through  Gettysburg. 

Col.  Perrin  [McGowan’s  brigade],  after  passing  Gen.  Heth’s 
division,  moved  rapidly  forward  preserving  an  alignment  with 
Gen.  Scales.  Upon  ascending  a hill  in  front  [Reynolds  Avenue 
ridge],  the  brigade  was  met  by  a furious  storm  of  musketry  and 
shell  from  infantry  posted  behind  temporary  breastworks,  and 
artillery  from  batteries  to  the  left  of  the  road  near  Gettysburg.  The 
brigade  advanced  steadily  at  a charge,  reserving  its  fire  as  ordered, 


56 


easily  dislodging  the  enemy  from  several  positions,  and  meeting 
with  but  little  opposition  until  it  came  within  200  yards  of  his 
last  position,  the  ridge  upon  which  is  situated  the  theological 
college.  The  brigade,  in  crossing  a line  of  fencing,  received  a most 
withering  and  destructive  fire,  but  continued  to  charge  without 
returning  the  fire  of  the  enemy,  until  reaching  the  edge  of  the 
grove  which  crowns  the  crest  of  the  ridge.  Col.  Perrin,  here 
finding  himself  alone,  attacked  the  enemy  determinedly  in  his 
immediate  front  with  success,  suffering  greatly  from  enfilade  fire 
on  both  flanks,  and  then  dividing  his  command  by  ordering  two 
regiments  to  change  front  to  the  right  and  two  to  change  front  to 
the  left,  he  attacked  the  enemy  posted  on  the  right  behind  a stone 
wall  and  on  the  left  behind  a breastwork  of  rails,  in  flank,  easily 
routing  them  and  driving  them  through  the  town  on  Cemetery 
Hill.  This  caused  the  artillery  on  the  left,  which  had  continued  to 
keep  up  a constant  and  destructive  fire  upon  the  advancing  lines 
of  the  division,  to  limber  up  and  move  to  the  rear. 

In  this  engagement,  the  brigades  of  Meredith  and  Rowley 
sustained  a desperate  attack  from  the  brigades  of  Pettigrew  and 
Brockenbrough,  but  were  finally  compelled  to  withdraw  to  the 
Seminary  when  McGowan’s  and  Scales’  brigades  entered  the  en- 
gagement. Stone’s  brigade  between  McPherson’s  woods  and  the 
turnpike  was  engaged  with  the  right  regiments  of  Daniel’s  brigade 
reinforced  by  some  of  Davis’  troops,  when  Scales  advanced  to  the 
attack  and  compelled  the  Union  brigade  to  fall  back  to  Seminary 
Ridge. 

After  the  repulse  of  the  brigades  of  O’Neal  and  Iverson,  Paul’s 
brigade  of  the  I corps  replaced  Baxter’s  and  the  latter  moved  to 
the  left  of  Cutler’s  brigade,  between  Cutler  and  the  railroad. 

When  Pender’s  division  moved  to  the  attack,  the  brigades  of 
Daniel  and  Ramseur  of  Rodes’  division  with  a part  of  O’  Neal’s 
brigade  participated  in  the  advance  and  attacked  the  brigades 
of  Paul,  Cutler  and  Baxter  along  Seminary  Ridge  north  of  the 
railroad.  By  this  time,  however,  Wadsworth  had  begun  to  draw 
back  these  troops  toward  Cemetery  Hill  and  the  Confederates 
took  possession  of  the  ridge  without  much  opposition.  Ramseur 
followed  the  Union  troops  into  the  town;  Daniel  remained  in 
the  suburbs. 

Early  describes  the  operations  in  the  valley  north  of  Gettys- 
burg after  his  arrival: 


57 


On  arriving  in  sight  of  that  place  [Gettysburg],  on  the  direct 
road  from  Heidlersburg,  I discovered  that  Gen.  Rodes’  division 
was  engaged  with  the  enemy  to  the  right  of  me,  the  enemy  oc- 
cupying a position  in  front  of  Gettysburg,  and  the  troops  con- 
stituting his  right  being  engaged  in  an  effort  to  drive  back  the  left 
of  Gen.  Rodes’  line. 

I immediately  ordered  my  troops  to  the  front,  and  formed  my 
line  across  the  Heidlersburg  road,  with  Gordon’s  brigade  on  the 
right,  Hoke’s  brigade  under  Col.  Avery  on  the  left,  Hay’s  brigade 
in  the  center  and  Smith’s  brigade  in  the  rear  of  Hoke’s.  Jones’ 
battalion  of  artillery  was  posted  in  a field  on  the  left  of  the  Heid- 
lersburg road,  immediately  in  front  of  Hoke’s  brigade,  so  as  to 
fire  on  the  enemy’s  flank,  and,  as  soon  as  these  dispositions  could 
be  made,  a fire  was  opened  upon  the  enemy’s  infantry  and  artillery 
by  my  artillery  with  considerable  effect. 

Gordon’s  brigade  was  then  ordered  forward  to  the  support  of 
Dole’s  brigade,  which  was  on  Rodes’  left,  and  was  being  pressed 
by  a considerable  force  of  the  enemy,  which  had  advanced  from 
the  direction  of  the  town  to  a wooded 'hill  [Barlow  Knoll]  on  the 
west  side  of  Rock  Creek,  the  stream  which  runs  northeast  of  the 
town,  and  as  soon  as  Gordon  was  fairly  engaged  with  this  force, 
Hay’s  and  Hoke’s  brigades  were  ordered  forward  in  line,  and  the 
artillery,  supported  by  Smith’s  brigade,  was  ordered  to  follow. 

After  a short  but  hot  contest,  Gordon  succeeded  in  routing  the 
force  opposed  to  him,  consisting  of  a division  of  the  XI  corps, 
commanded  by  Brig.  Gen.  Barlow,  and  drove  it  back  with  great 
slaughter,  capturing  among  a number  of  prisoners  Gen.  Barlow 
himself,  who  was  severely  wounded.  Gordon  advanced  across 
the  creek,  over  the  hill  on  which  Barlow  had  been  posted,  and 
across  the  fields  toward  the  town,  until  he  came  to  a low  ridge, 
behind  which  the  enemy  had  another  line  of  battle,  extending 
beyond  his  left.  I directed  him  to  halt  here,  and  then  ordered 
Hays  and  Avery,  who  had  been  halted  on  the  east  side  of  Rock 
Creek  while  I rode  forward  to  where  Gordon  had  been  engaged,  to 
advance  toward  the  town,  on  Gordon’s  left,  which  they  did  in  fine 
style,  encountering  and  driving  back  into  the  town  in  great  con- 
fusion the  second  line  of  the  enemy. 

Hays’  brigade  entered  the  town,  fighting  its  way,  and  Avery 
moved  to  the  left  of  it  across  the  railroad,  and  took  his  position 
in  the  fields  on  the  left  and  facing  Cemetery  Hill,  which  here 
presented  a very  rugged  ascent. 

This  movement  was  made  under  the  fire  of  artillery  from  this 
hill,  which  had  previously  opened  when  my  artillery  had  first 
opened  its  fire,  but  Avery  succeeded  in  placing  his  men  under  the 
cover  of  a low  ridge  which  here  runs  through  the  fields  from  the 
town.  - Hays’  brigade  was  formed  in  line  in  the  street  running 
through  the  middle  of  the  town. 


58 


A very  large  number  of  prisoners  were  captured  in  the  town, 
and  before  reaching  it,  their  number  being  so  great  as  really  to 
embarrass  us.  Two  pieces  of  artillery  [Napoleons]  were  also  cap- 
tured outside  of  the  town,  the  capture  being  claimed  by  both 
brigades. 

While  these  operations  were  going  on  with  my  division,  I saw, 
farther  to  the  right,  the  enemy’s  force  on  that  part  of  the  line 
falling  back  and  moving  in  comparatively  good  order  on  the  right 
of  the  town  toward  the  range  of  hills  in  the  rear,  and  I sent  back 
for  a battery  of  artillery  to  be  brought  up  to  open  on  this  force 
and  the  town,  from  which  a fire  was  opened  on  my  brigades,  but 
before  it  got  up,  my  men  had  entered  the  town,  and  the  force  on 
the  right  had  retired  beyond  reach. 

The  pursuit  was  not  carried  beyond  the  town,  for  the  following 
reasons  given  by  Ewell  and  A.  P.  Hill: 

The  enemy  had  fallen  back  to  a commanding  position  known  as 
Cemetery  Hill,  south  of  Gettysburg,  and  quickly  showed  a formid- 
able front  there.  On  entering  the  town,  I received  a message 
from  the  commanding  general  to  attack  this  hill,  if  I could  do  so 
to  advantage.  I could  not  bring  artillery  to  bear  on  it,  and  all 
the  troops  with  me  were  jaded  by  twelve  hours’  marching  and 
fighting,  and  I was  notified  that  Gen.  Johnson’s  division  (the  only 
one  of  my  corps  that  had  not  been  engaged)  was  close  to  town. 

Cemetery  Hill  was  not  assailable  from  the  town,  and  I deter- 
mined with  Johnson’s  division  to  take  possession  of  a wooded 
hill  [Culp  Hill]  to  my  left,  on  a line  with  and  commanding  Ceme- 
tery Hill.  Before  Johnson  got  up,  the  enemy  was  reported  moving 
to  outflank  our  extreme  left.  Before  this  report  could  be  investi- 
gated and  Johnson  placed  in  position  the  night  was  far  advanced. — 
Ewell’s  report. 

Under  the  impression  that  the  enemy  were  entirely  routed,  my 
own  two  divisions  exhausted  by  some  six  hours’  hard  fighting, 
prudence  led  me  to  be  content  with  what  had  been  gained,  and 
not  push  forward  troops  exhausted  and  necessarily  disordered, 
probably  to  encounter  fresh  troops  of  the  enemy. — Hill’s  report. 

It  is  uncertain  at  what  time  the  Union  troops  began  to  retreat 
to  Cemetery  Hill,  where  Howard  had  established  his  reserves,  but 
it  is  evident  that  the  retreat  began  on  the  right  of  the  XI  corps, 
and  was  taken  up  in  order  by  the  troops  toward  the  left,  the  last 
to  fall  back  being  those  near  the  Seminary.  To  check  the  advance 
of  the  brigades  of  Hoke  and  Hays,  Howard  dispatched  one  of  his 
reserve  brigades,  Coster’s,  to  the  edge  of  the  town  on  the  Heidiers- 
burg  road.  The  battle  was  over  about  4:30  p.  m.,  three  hours 
before  sunset. 


59 


Col.  Freemantle,  of  the  British  army  who  was  a guest  of  Gen. 
Longstreet,  in  his  “ Three  Months  in  the  Southern  States”,  says: 

At  4:30  p.  m.  we  came  in  sight  of  Gettysburg  and  joined  Gen. 
Lee  and  Gen.  Hill,  who  were  on  top  of  one  of  those  ridges  which 
form  the  peculiar  feature  of  the  country  around  Gettysburg.  We 
could  see  the  enemy  retreating  up  one  of  the  opposite  ridges, 
pursued  by  the  Confederates  with  loud  yells.  The  position  into 
which  the  enemy  had  been  driven  was  evidently  a strong  one. 
His  right  appeared  to  rest  upon  a cemetery,  on  the  top  of  a high 
ridge  to  the  right  of  Gettysburg  as  we  looked  at  it. 

Lee  had  left  Fayetteville  that  morning,  after  the  divisions  of 
Anderson  and  Johnson  had  started  through  the  mountains.  He 
probably  reached  Seminary  Ridge  about  the  time  the  Confederate 
troops  occupied  it  and  sent  word  to  Ewell  to  attack  Cemetery 
Hill,  if  he  could  do  so  with  advantage.  He  was  evidently  im- 
pressed by  Hill’s  reasons  for  not  following  up  the  attack,  since 
in  his  report  it  is  stated: 

The  attack  was  not  pressed  that  afternoon,  the  enemy’s  force 
being  unknown  and  it  being  considered  advisable  to  await  the 
arrival  of  the  rest  of  our  troops.  Orders  were  sent  back  to  hasten 
their  march,  and,  in  the  meantime,  every  effort  was  made  to  as- 
certain the  numbers  and  position  of  the  enemy  and  find  the  most 
favorable  point  of  attack. 

The  engagement  on  the  afternoon  of  July  1 resulted  from  the 
message  sent  by  Hill  to  Ewell  that  the  former  intended  to  advance 
to  Gettysburg.  It  is  not  probable  that  Hill  would  have  renewed 
the  engagement  until  Lee  arrived  had  he  not  felt  it  necessary  to 
support  Ewell’s  attack.  Ewell’s  sudden  appearance  on  the  field 
was  perhaps  more  of  a surprise  to  Hill  than  to  Howard  who  had 
been  informed  by  Buford  of  the  approach  of  a large  body  of  Con- 
federates from  the  north.  Had  Hill  known  that  Ewell  was  com- 
ing, it  is  probable  that  he  would  have  ridden  over  to  Oak  Hill  to 
consult  with  him  after  the  morning  engagement  was  over.  The 
failure  to  consult,  made  the  results  of  the  afternoon  engagement, 
in  which  the  Confederates  had  the  advantage  both  of  numbers 
and  position,  much  less  decisive  than  they  should  have  been. 

Though  the  Union  forces  had  been  defeated,  the  honors  of  the 
day  belonged  to  the  I corps,  which  had  been  attacked  by  double 
its  numbers  and  had  severely  punished  the  brigades  of  Archer, 


Co 


Davis,  Pettigrew,  Brockenbrough  and  Scales  of  Hill’s  corps,  and 
the  brigades  of  O’  Neal  and  Iverson  of  Rodes’  division.  The  artil- 
lery of  the  I corps  ably  supported  the  infantry  in  its  engagements, 
particularly  with  Hill’s  corps.  Gamble’s  brigade  of  cavalry  also 
played  an  important  part,  especially  in  the  afternoon,  when  it 
prevented  the  advance  of  the  brigades  of  Archer  and  Lane.  The 
casualties  of  the  I corps  were  naturally  heavy,  and  numbered  about 
one-third  of  the  command. 

During  the  afternoon,  the  III  and  XII  corps  marched  toward 
Gettysburg  at  the  request  of  Howard,  whose  adjutant  general 
sent  the  following  message  to  Sickles  and  Slocum,  when  he  learned 
that  Ewell  was  approaching  the  field: 

July  1,  1863,  1 p.  m. 

The  general  commanding  [Howard]  directs  me  to  inform  you 
that  Ewell’s  corps  is  approaching  from  York.  The  left  wing  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  is  engaged  with  A.  P.  Hill’s  corps. 

The  head  of  the  XII  corps  reached  Rock  Creek  about  the  time 
Early  appeared,  and  in  order  to  protect  the  right  flank  of  the  XI 
corps  started  up  the  east  side  of  Rock  Creek  to  seize  Wolf  Hill 
and  reach  the  Hanover  road.  Its  advance-guard  had  barely 
driven  Jenkins’  cavalry  from  the  hill,  when  the  order  was  sus- 
pended, as  the  XI  corps  was  falling  back  on  Cemetery  Hill.  It 
was  this  movement  of  the  XII  corps  that  was  reported  to  Ewell  as 
an  attempt  to  turn  his  left  flank.  Williams’  division  encamped 
that  night  near  Rock  Creek,  on  the  Baltimore  pike;  Geary’s 
division  was  sent  by  the  Schoolhouse  road  to  the  vicinity  of 
Little  Round  Top,  to  guard  the  right  flank  of  the  line  on  Cemetery 
Ridge.  Slocum  reached  Cemetery  Hill  about  6 p.  m.,  and  assumed 
command  of  the  I and  XI  corps. 

In  addition  to  the  message  given  above,  a staff  officer  was  sent 
by  Howard  to  Sickles  at  Emmitsburg  requesting  him  to  move  at 
once  to  Gettysburg;  this  message  was  not  received  until  after 
3 p.  m.  Knowing  the  importance  attached  to  Emmitsburg  by 
Reynolds,  Sickles  left  two  brigades  at  that  point  and  ordered  the 
other  four  to  Gettysburg. 

Birney’s  two  brigades  took  the  direct  road  and  reached  the 
field  about  dark. 


The  command  arrived  at  Gettysburg  about  dark  by  a forced 
march  over  horrible  roads,  and  bivouacked  for  the  night. — Ward’s 
report. 

Humphrey’s  two  brigades  took  the  road  from  Emmitsburg  to 
Black  Horse  Tavern  and  did  not  reach  the  corps  encampment 
until  after  midnight. 

Meade  spent  the  day  at  Taney  town,  where  late  in  the  morning 
he  saw  Buford’s  message  of  the  night  before.  His  chief  of  staff 
at  once  sent  the  following  message  to  Sedgwick,  who  was  at 
Manchester: 

I am  directed  by  the  commanding  general  to  state  that  it  would 
appear  from  reports  just  received  that  the  enemy  is  moving  in 
heavy  force  on  Gettysburg  (Ewell,  from  Heidlersburg  and  Hill 
from  Cashtown  Pass),  and  it  is  not  improbable  he  will  reach  that 
place  before  the  command  under  Maj.  Gen.  Reynolds  (the  I and 
XI  corps)  now  on  the  way  can  arrive  there. 

Should  such  be  the  case,  and  Gen.  Reynolds  find  himself  in  the 
presence  of  a superior  force,  he  is  instructed  to  hold  the  enemy  in 
check  and  fall  slowly  back.  If  he  is  able  to  do  this,  the  line  in- 
dicated in  the  circular  to-day  (Pipe  Creek)  will  be  occupied  to- 
night. Should  circumstances  render  it  necessary  for  the  command- 
ing general  to  fight  to-day  the  troops  are  posted  as  follows  for  the 
support  of  Reynolds’  command,  viz.:  on  the  right  at  Two  Taverns, 
the  XII  corps;  at  Hanover,  the  V corps;  the  II  corps  is  on  the 
road  between  Taney  town  and  Gettysburg;  the  III  corps  is  at 
Emmitsburg. 

This  information  is  conveyed  to  you  that  you  may  have  your 
corps  in  readiness  to  move  in  such  direction  as  may  be  required 
at  a moment’s  notice. 

About  this  time  Hancock  reached  Taney  town  at  the  head  of 
the  II  corps  and  on  reporting  to  Meade,  the  latter  explained  to 
him  his  general  plan  of  operations  both  for  attack  and  defense. 
Shortly  thereafter  Meade  was  informed  that  Reynolds  had  been 
either  killed  or  severely  wounded,  and  as  Howard,  who  was 
senior  to  Hancock,  was  not  conversant  with  his  plans,  he  issued 
the  following  order  to  the  latter: 

The  major  general  commanding  has  just  been  informed  that 
Gen.  Reynolds  has  been  killed  or  badly  wounded.  He  directs 
that  you  turn  over  the  command  of  your  corps  to  Gen.  Gibbon; 
that  you  proceed  to  the  front,  and,  by  virtue  of  this  order,  in  case 
of  the  truth  of  Gen.  Reynolds’  death,  you  assume  command  of 
the  corps  there  assembled,  viz.:  the  XI,  I and  III  at  Emmitsburg. 


62 


If  you  think  the  ground  and  position  there  a better  one  to  fight  a 
battle  under  the  existing  circumstances,  you  will  so  advise  the 
general,  and  he  will  order  all  the  troops  up.  You  know  the  gen- 
eral’s views,  and  Gen.  Warren,  who  is  fully  aware  of  them,  has 
gone  out  to  see  Gen.  Reynolds.  1:10  p.  m. 

Later  1:15  p.  m. — Reynolds  has  possession  of  Gettysburg,  and 
the  enemy  are  reported  as  falling  back  from  the  front  of  Gettys- 
burg. Hold  your  column  ready  to  move. 

The  II  corps  under  Gibbon  proceeded  on  toward  Gettysburg 
and  encamped  that  night  just  south  of  Big  Round  Top.  Hancock 
went  straight  through  to  Cemetery  Hill,  and  reached  it  as  the 
Union  troops  were  falling  back.  With  the  aid  of  Howard,  Warren 
and  Buford  the  troops  were  put  in  position.  Hancock  then  sent 
the  following  report: 

5:25  p.  m. — When  I arrived  here  an  hour  since,  I found  that 
our  troops  had  given  up  the  front  of  Gettysburg  and  the  town. 
We  have  now  taken  up  a position  in  the  cemetery,  and  cannot 
well  be  taken.  It  is  a position,  however,  easily  turned.  Slocum 
is  now  coming  on  the  ground,  and  is  taking  position  on  the  right 
which  will  protect  the  right.  But  we  have  as  yet  no  troops 
on  the  left,  the  III  corps  not  having  yet  reported;  but  I suppose 
that  it  is  marching  up.  If  so,  its  flank  march  will  in  a degree 
protect  our  left  flank.  In  the  meantime  Gibbon  had  better 
march  on  so  as  to  take  position  on  our  right  or  left,  to  our  rear,  as 
may  be  necessary,  in  some  commanding  position.  Gen.  G.  will 
see  this  dispatch.  The  battle  is  quiet  now.  I think  we  will 
be  all  right  until  night.  I have  sent  all  the  trains  back.  When 
night  comes,  it  can  be  told  better  what  had  best  be  done.  I think 
we  can  retire;  if  not  we  can  fight  here,  as  the  ground  appears  not 
unfavorable  with  good  troops.  I will  communicate  in  a few 
moments  with  Gen.  Slocum  and  transfer  the  command  to  him. 

Howard  says  that  Doubleday’s  command  gave  way. 

Gen.  Warren  is  here. 

At  4:30  p.  m.  a message  was  sent  to  Sedgwick  to  bring  the  VI 
corps  to  Taney  town. 

Upon  the  receipt  of  Hancock’s  message,  Meade  decided  to 
concentrate  his  army  at  Gettysburg,  and  at  7 :30  p.  m.  sent  orders 
to  the  commanders  of  the  V and  VI  corps  and  of  the  two  brigades 
at  Emmitsburg,  to  proceed  to  Gettysburg  at  once. 

The  Confederate  forces  had  been  marching  on  Gettysburg  all 
day  through  the  pass  in  the  South  Mountains.  Anderson’s 
division  arrived  about  the  middle  of  the  afternoon.  He  states: 


63 


Upon  approaching  Gettysburg,  I was  directed  to  occupy  the 
position  in  line  of  battle  which  had  just  been  vacated  by  Pender’s 
division  [Herr  Ridge]. 

Johnson  was  next  to  arrive  having  made  a march  of  25  miles 
that  day.  He  says: 

Late  on  the  night  of  July  1,  I moved  along  the  Gettysburg  and 
York  Railroad  to  the  northeast  of  the  town.  Pickets  were  thrown 
well  to  the  front  and  the  troops  slept  on  their  arms. 

McLaws  and  Hood  probably  encamped  near  Marsh  Run  along 
the  Cashtown  road.  Pickett  remained  at  Chambersburg. 

Battle  of  July  2. — In  his  report  of  the  battle,  Lee  says: 

It  had  not  been  intended  to  fight  a general  battle  at  such  a 
distance  from  our  base,  unless  attacked  by  the  enemy,  but  finding 
ourselves  unexpectedly  confronted  by  the  Federal  Army,  it  be- 
came a matter  of  difficulty  to  withdraw  through  the  mountains 
with  our  large  trains.  At  the  same  time  the  country  was  unfavor- 
able for  collecting  supplies  while  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy’s 
main  body,  as  he  was  enabled  to  restrain  our  foraging  parties  by 
occupying  the  passes  of  the  mountains  with  regular  and  local 
troops.  A battle  thus  became,  in  a measure,  unavoidable.  En- 
couraged by  the  successful  issue  of  the  engagement  of  the  first  day 
and  in  view  of  the  valuable  results  that  would  ensue  from  the 
defeat  of  the  army  of  Gen.  Meade,  it  was  thought  advisable  to 
renew  the  attack.  The  remainder  of  Ewell’s  and  Hill’s  corps 
having  arrived  and  two  divisions  of  Longstreet’s,  our  preparations 
were  made  accordingly. 

On  the  night  of  July  1,  Lee  and  his  three  corps  commanders 
had  been  on  the  field  for  several  hours.  Eight  of  the  nine  infantry 
divisions  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  were  either  on  the 
field  or  close  to  it.  As  the  I and  XI  corps  had  received  no  assist- 
ance during  the  day,  it  was  evident  to  Lee  that  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  was  not  yet  concentrated.  That  these  two  corps  boldly 
took  up  a position  on  Cemetery  Hill  after  their  defeat,  indicated 
that  help  was  not  far  off  and  that  the  other  corps  were  march- 
ing to  their  support.  If  Lee  intended  to  take  the  offensive,  these 
circumstances  seemed  to  demand  an  early  morning  attack  utiliz- 
ing as  many  of  his  troops  as  possible  at  the  point  of  attack. 
No  doubt  this  was  Lee’s  desire,  but  the  attack  was  not  made 
for  various  reasons,  which  are  indicated  in  the  reports  of  Ewell 
and  Longstreet. 


64 


Ewell  states  in  his  report: 

I received  orders  soon  after  dark  [probably  at  Lee’s  headquarters 
on  Herr  Ridge]  to  draw  my  corps  to  the  right,  in  case  it  could  not 
be  used  to  advantage  where  it  was;  that  the  commanding  general 
thought  from  the  nature  of  the  ground  that  the  position  for 
attack  was  a good  one  on  that  side.  I represented  to  the  com- 
manding general  that  the  hill  above  referred  to  [Culp  Hill]  was 
unoccupied  by  the  enemy,  as  reported  by  Lieuts.  Turner  and 
Early,  who  had  gone  upon  it,  and  that  it  commanded  their  posi- 
tion and  made  it  untenable,  so  far  as  I could  judge.  He  decided 
to  let  me  remain,  and  on  my  return  to  my  headquarters,  after 
12  o’clock  at  night,  I sent  orders  to  Johnson  by  Lieut.  T.  T. 
Turner,  aide-de-camp,  to  take  possession  of  this  hill  if  he  had  not 
already  done  so.  Gen.  Johnson  stated  [to  Lieut.  Turner]  in  reply 
to  this  order,  that  after  forming  his  line  of  battle  this  side  of  the 
wooded  hill  in  question  he  had  sent  a reconnoitering  party  to  the 
hill- with  orders  to  report  as  to  the  position  of  the  enemy  in 
reference  to  it.  This  party,  on  nearing  the  summit,  was  met  by  a 
superior  force  of  the  enemy  which  succeeded  in  capturing  a portion 
of  the  reconnoitering  party,  the  rest  of  it  making  its  escape. 
During  this  conversation  with  Gen.  Johnson,  a man  arrived 
bringing  a despatch  dated  12  midnight,  and  taken  from  a Federal 
courier  making  his  way  from  Gen.  Sykes  to  Gen.  Slocum,  in  which 
the  former  stated  that  his  corps  was  then  halted  four  miles  from 
Gettysburg  and  he  would  resume  his  march  at  4 a.  m.  Lieut. 
Turner  brought  this  despatch  to  my  headquarters,  and  at  the 
same  time  stated  that  Gen.  Johnson  would  refrain  from  attacking 
the  position  until  I had  received  notice  of  the  fact  that  the  enemy 
were  in  possession  of  the  hill  and  had  sent  him  further  orders.  Day 
was  now  breaking,  and  it  was  too  late  for  any  change  of  place. 

It  was  a regiment  of  Cutler’s  brigade  of  Wadsworth’s  division 
which  was  encountered  on  Culp  Hill.  Its  commander  reports: 

On  the  afternoon  of  July  1,  I joined  the  brigade  at  Gettysburg, 
having  been  previously  detached  at  Emmitsburg  by  order  of  Gen. 
Reynolds.  By  command  of  Gen.  Wadsworth  we  took  up  a posi- 
tion on  a hill  east  of  Gettysburg,  forming  at  that  time  the  extreme 
right  of  our  line.  We  immediately  commenced  the  construction 
of  a temporary  breastwork.  During  the  succeeding  night  a force 
of  the  enemy  attempted  to  penetrate  our  lines,  but  were  easily 
driven  off,  supposing  themselves  confronted  by  a heavy  force. 

When  Slocum  moved  to  Gettysburg  on  the  afternoon  of  July  1, 
he  sent  an  order  to  Sykes  at  Hanover,  who  had  been  placed  under 
his  orders  that  day,  to  move  to  that  place.  The  V corps  halted 
about  midnight  at  Bonneauville  on  the  Hanover-Gettysburg 
road.  The  courier  was  sent  by  Sykes  at  that  time. 


Longstreet  says  in  his  report: 

On  the  next  day  [July  1],  the  troops  set  out  for  Gettysburg, 
excepting  Pickett's  division,  not  yet  relieved  from  duty  at  Cham- 
bersburg,  and  Law’s  brigade  left  by  Hood  on  picket  duty  at  New 
Guilford  [on  the  road  leading  to  Emmitsburg].  Our  march  was 
greatly  delayed  on  this  day  by  Johnson’s  division  of  the  Second 
corps,  which  came  into  the  road  from  Shippensburg  and  the  long 
wagon  trains  that  followed  him.  McLaws’  division  however 
reached  Marsh  Creek  four  miles  from  Gettysburg  a little  after 
dark  and  Hood’s  division  got  within  nearly  the  same  distance  of 
the  town  about  12  o’clock  at  night.  Law’s  brigade  was  ordered 
forward  to  its  division  during  the  day  and  joined  about  noon  on 
the  2d.  Previous  to  his  joining,  I received  instructions  from  the 
commanding  general  to  move  with  the  portion  of  my  command 
that  was  up,  around  to  gain  the  Emmitsburg  road,  on  the 
enemy’s  left. 

Fearing  that  my  force  was  too  weak  to  venture  to  make  an 
attack,  I delayed  until  Gen.  Law’s  brigade  joined  its  division. 
As  soon  after  his  arrival  as  we  could  make  our  preparations,  the 
movement  was  begun. 

Not  anticipating  a battle  so  soon,  Pickett’s  entire  division  was 
left  at  Chambersburg  to  guard  the  trains  until  Imboden,  who  was 
slow  in  moving  up  from  Hancock,  should  relieve  him.  Had  Lee 
known  that  a battle  was  imminent,  he  would  probably  have  left 
but  a brigade.  Law’s  brigade  also  might  have  joined  Longstreet 
before  he  crossed  the  mountains  had  Lee  known  that  it  would  be 
needed  on  the  following  day. 

Ewell’s  report  indicates  that  Lee  intended  to  employ  Ewell’s 
corps  in  making  the  attack  on  the  Union  left  on  July  2,  but  that 
he  yielded  to  Ewell’s  representations  that  he  could  easily  capture 
Culp  Hill.  That  the  Union  commander  would  ’eave  Culp  Hill 
unoccupied  must  have  seemed  improbable  to  Lee,  and  it  is  difficult 
to  understand  why  he  yielded  to  Ewell,  since  he  had  inspected 
the  line  Cemetery  Hill-Culp  Hill  that  evening  and  decided  that 
it  was  a difficult  one  to  attack. 

This  left  the  attack,  on  the  Confederate  right,  to  be  made  by 
the  divisions  of  Anderson  of  Hill’s  corps  and  those  of  McLaws 
and  Hood  of  Longstreet’ s corps.  Had  Ewell  participated  in  this 
attack,  Longstreet  would  not  have  hesitated  to  enter  it  without 
Law’s  brigade;  however,  when  the  main  attack  was  to  be  made 
by  his  own  two  divisions,  he  did  not  care  to  enter  the  fight  without 


66 


this  brigade.  Thus  the  force,  that  might  possibly  have  struck  a 
crushing  blow,  was  reduced  to  one-half  its  strength,  and  the  attack 
that  might  have  been  made  early  in  the  day  was  delayed  until 
the  afternoon,  giving  time  for  Meade  to  bring  up  most  of  his 
troops. 

Meade  broke  up  his  headquarters  at  Taneytown  at  10:00  p.  m. 
on  the  1st  and  established  them  near  Gettysburg  on  the  Taney- 
town road,  a half-mile  from  its  junction  with  the  Emmitsburg 
road.  When  the  morning  light  revealed  the  position  of  the  Con- 
federate troops  to  Meade,  he  saw  only  the  divisions  of  Pender, 
Rodes,  Early  and  Johnson.  Pender  was  on  Seminary  Ridge  with 
his  left  on  the  Fairfield  road  and  his  right  in  a grove  due  west  of 
Cemetery  Hill;  Rodes  was  between  Seminary  Ridge  and  the  town 
square;  Early  was  between  the  town  square  and  Rock  Creek; 
Johnson  was  behind  the  Hanover  road,  his  line  extended  from 
Rock  Creek  eastward  out  of  view.  Early  in  the  morning  Meade 
examined  his  own  lines  and  gave  orders  to  his  corps  commanders 
as  to  the  disposition  of  the  I,  II,  III,  XI  and  XII  corps  which 
were  on  the  ground. 

The  XI  corps,  which  was  on  Cemetery  Hill  facing  Seminary 
Ridge,  the  town,  and  Rock  Creek,  was  left  in  position.  The 
division  facing  Rock  Creek  was  at  the  foot  of  the  slope  along  a 
stone  wall.  The  two  divisions  of  the  I corps  that  had  prolonged 
the  line  of  the  XI  corps  along  Cemetery  Ridge  on  the  evening 
of  the  1st  were  moved  from  this  position  and  placed  in  reserve 
behind  the  XI  corps.  The  1st  division  of  the  I corps  that  was 
on  Culp  Hill  facing  the  town  was  left  in  position.  Both  of  these 
corps  were  much  reduced  in  strength. 

The  II  corps  came  up  on  the  field  early  in  the  morning.  It  was 
posted  facing  west  with  the  right  resting  on  the  XI  corps  near 
the  Taneytown  road  and  the  left  on  Cemetery  Ridge  near  its 
intersection  with  the  Schoolhouse  road  prolonged. 

The  commander  of  the  III  corps,  whose  divisions  were  massed 
by  brigades  on  the  east  side  of  Plum  Run  between  the  II  corps 
and  the  Wheatfield  road,  was  directed  to  prolong  the  line  of  the 
II  corps  to  the  Round  Tops. 


67 


The  XII  corps  was  directed  to  connect  with  the  I corps  on 
Culp  Hill  and  prolong  the  line  along  the  crest  overlooking  Rock 
Creek  as  far  south  as  the  Baltimore  pike. 

Two  divisions  of  the  V corps  reached  the  vicinity  of  Wolf  Hill 
on  the  Hanover  road  in  the  morning  and  formed  line  of  battle. 
As  it  was  isolated  from  the  rest  of  the  army,  when  the  third 
division  came  up,  it  moved  along  a road  east  of  Wolf  Hill  to  the 
Baltimore  pike  and  about  noon  took  position  near  the  junction 
of  the  Baltimore  pike  and  Schoolhouse  road.  As  the  infantry  of 
the  six  corps  now  on  the  field  was  the  equivalent  of  the  infantry  of 
Lee’s  nine  divisions,  Meade  was  now  stronger  than  Lee  in  infantry 
as  well  as  in  artillery  and  cavalry. 

The  VI  corps  was  marching  on  the  Baltimore  pike  for  Gettys- 
burg but  would  not  reach  Rock  Creek  until  the  afternoon. 

As  Meade  looked  westward  across  the  valley  to  Seminary  Ridge, 
the  Confederates  on  that  side  gave  him  little  concern;  the  Con- 
federate right  flank  was  opposite  the  XI  corps,  while  the  II  and 
III  corps  had  troops  enough  to  extend  the  Union  lines  to  the 
Round  Tops.  There  seemed  to  be  little  probability  of  an  attack  by 
the  Confederate  right  wing.  Furthermore,  Buford’s  cavalry  was  on 
that  flank  to  give  warning  of  any  Confederate  movement.  Look- 
ing northeast  from  Cemetery  Hill,  however,  the  Confederates  out- 
flanked the  Union  line  and  threatened  Meade’s  communications 
with  his  base  at  Westminster.  The  situation  on  his  right  there- 
fore gave  him  much  concern,  and  he  directed  his  chief  engineer 
and  the  commander  of  the  XII  corps  to  make  plans  for  an  attack 
on  this  flank  of  the  Confederate  line  as  soon  as  the  V and  VI 
corps  became  available. 

Gen.  Slocum  reports  as  follows: 

10:30  a.  m. — Your  note  of  9:30  a.  m.  is  received.  I have 
already  made  a better  examination  of  the  position  in  my  front 
than  I am  able  to  now  that  we  have  taken  up  a new  line.  If  it  is 
true  that  the  enemy  are  massing  troops  on  our  right,  I do  not 
think  that  we  could  detach  enough  troops  for  an  attack  to  insure 
success.  I do  not  think  the  ground  in  my  front,  held  by  the 
enemy,  possesses  any  peculiar  advantages  for  him. 

About  the  same  time  Pleasonton  sent  this  order  to  Gregg,  who 
was  marching  from  Hanover  that  morning  on  the  Hanover- 
Gettysburg  road: 


68 


Y ou  will  hold  your  force  well  in  hand  in  your  present  position, 
with  pickets  and  scouts  well  out.  The  enemy  are  in  heavy  force 
on  the  road  from  Heidlersburg  to  Gettysburg  and  toward  Berlin. 
You  will  see  that  our  flank  and  rear  are  not  turned  without  giving 
timely  information. 

It  is  probable  that  the  following  message  had  given  Meade 
some  concern: 

Littlestown,  June  30,  1863,  6 p.  m. — A messenger  has  just  come 
in  from  Kilpatrick,  asking  for  re-enforcements.  I sent  him  every 
cavalryman  that  I could  get  hold  of.  I also  informed  him  of  the 
infantry  at  this  place.  I think  there  is  no  doubt  but  there  is  a 
heavy  infantry  force  at  Berlin  and  Gettysburg.  Kilpatrick  has 
information  that  Lee’s  headquarters  are  at  Berlin.  The  enemy 
struck  the  rear  of  his  column  just  as  it  entered  Hanover,  creating 
some  confusion  in  one  regiment.  A charge  was,  however,  im- 
mediately made,  which  resulted  in  the  repulse  of  the  enemy  and 
the  capture  of  about  fifty  prisoners,  one  lieutenant  colonel  among 
them.  As  soon  as  my  horse  rests  a little  I will  come  to  head- 
quarters.— A.  J.  Alexander,  Ass’t  Adj.  Gen. 

As  far  as  could  be  seen  from  Cemetery  Hill  the  only  movements 
in  the  Confederate  lines  during  the  morning  were  in  Johnson’s 
division  east  of  Rock  Creek.  It  was  the  left  of  the  Confederate 
line  therefore  that  riveted  the  attention  of  Meade  all  the  morning, 
and  he  sent  messenger  after  messenger  along  the  Baltimore  pike 
to  request  Sedgwick  to  bring  up  the  VI  corps  as  rapidly  as  possible 
to  strengthen  it. 

As  previously  stated,  Lee  had  made  up  his  mind  to  attack  the 
Union  left  on  the  2d  with  the  corps  of  Ewell  and  Longstreet,  and 
when  Longstreet  returned  to  his  headquarters  at  Cashtown  on  the 
night  of  the  1st  he  gave  orders  to  Me  Laws  and  Hood  to  move  up 
to  the  field  at  daylight.  During  the  night,  Lee  changed  his  mind 
with  respect  to  Ewell  and  at  a conference  the  next  morning,  it 
was  decided  to  employ  Longstreet’ s two  divisions  assisted  by 
Anderson’s  division  of  Hill’s  corps  for  the  attack  on  the  Union 
left;  at  the  same  time  Ewell  was  to  attack  the  Union  right 
with  his  corps. 

Col.  Freemantle  describes  this  conference  which  took  place  at 
Lee’s  headquarters  on  Herr  Ridge  near  the  Cashtown  road: 

I arrived  at  5 a.  m.  on  the  same  commanding  position  we  were 
on  yesterday,  and  I climbed  up  a tree  with  Capt.  Shreibert  of  the 


69 


Prussian  army.  Just  below  us  were  seated  Gens.  Lee,  Hill,  Long- 
street  and  Hood  in  consultation,  the  two  latter  assisting  their 
deliberations  by  the  truly  American  custom  of  whittling  sticks. 
Gen.  Heth  was  also  present;  he  was  wounded  in  the  head  yesterday, 
and  although  not  allowed  to  command  his  brigade  [division],  he 
insists  upon  coming  to  the  field. 

Longstreet  mentions  McLaws  at  this  conference  and  it  is  probable 
that  both  McLaws  and  Anderson  were  there  but  are  not  mentioned 
by  Freemantle  as  he  did  not  know  them. 

At  this  time,  Heth’s  division  was  encamped  in  the  woods  along 
the  east  slope  of  Herr  Ridge,  Anderson’s  division  was  behind 
Heth  with  its  left  on  the  Cashtown  road  and  one  brigade  with  a 
battery  at  the  southern  extremity  of  the  ridge  at  the  Fairfield 
road.  McLaws’  division  was  moving  up  from  the  Marsh  Creek 
bridge  on  the  Cashtown  road  to  take  position  on  Herr  Ridge  on 
the  right  of  Anderson.  Hood’s  division  was  moving  up  on  the 
Cashtown  road  to  take  position  behind  Herr  Ridge  in  rear  of 
McLaws. 

At  the  conference,  which  probably  lasted  an  hour  or  more,  it 
was  decided  to  deploy  Anderson’s  division  on  Seminary  Ridge 
to  the  right  of  Pender,  and  the  divisions  of  McLaws  and  Hood 
to  the  right  of  Anderson.  An  attack  was  to  be  made  by  these 
three  divisions  on  the  Union  left  and  a simultaneous  attack  by 
Ewell  on  the  Union  right.  Heth’s  division  was  not  to  be  em- 
ployed that  day  and  Pender’s  only  as  a support. 

Anderson’s  report  says: 

We  continued  in  this  position  [on  Herr  Ridge]  until  the  morn- 
ing of  the  2d,  when  I received  orders  to  take  up  a new  line  of  battle 
on  the  right  of  Pender’s  division  about  a mile  and  a half  further 
forward.  In  taking  up  the  new  position,  Wilcox’s  brigade  had  a 
sharp  skirmish  with  a body  of  the  enemy  who  had  occupied  a 
wooded  hill  on  the  extreme  right  of  my  line. 

The  wooded  hill  referred  to  was  the  northern  end  of  Snyder 
Ridge,  overlooking  Pitzer  Run.  This  encounter  was  reported 
from  the  Round  Top  signal  station: 

11:45  a.  m.,  enemy’s  skirmishers  are  advancing  from  the  west, 
one  mile  from  here. 

11:55  a.  m.,  the  rebels  are  in  force  and  our  skirmishers  give  way. 
One  mile  west  of  Round  Top  signal  station,  the  woods  are  full  of 
them. 


?o 


It  is  evident  from  these  quotations  that  Anderson  was  not  in 
position  much  before  noon.  It  was  a very  hot  July  day  and,  as 
the  column  was  so  marched  and  deployed  through  the  fields  of  the 
valley  of  Willoughby  Run  as  to  keep  out  of  sight  of  the  Union 
position,  it  may  have  taken  several  hours  to  move  from  Herr 
Ridge  and  deploy  along  Seminary  Ridge.  Wilcox,  being  on  the 
extreme  right,  was  probably  the  last  of  Anderson’s  brigades  to 
move  into  position. 

From  the  reports,  it  does  not  appear  that  Lee  authorized  Long- 
street  to  wait  for  the  arrival  of  Law’s  brigade.  It  is  probable  that 
he  expected  Longstreet  to  move  at  the  same  time  that  Anderson 
did,  by  a different  route.  Had  Longstreet  done  so,  he  might 
have  gotten  into  position  on  Snyder  Ridge  shortly  after  Anderson 
reached  Seminary  Ridge. 

Col.  Freemantle  says: 

At  7 a.  m.  I rode  over  part  of  the  ground  with  Gen.  Longstreet 
and  saw  him  disposing  McLaws’  division  for  to-day’s  fight,  etc. 

As  the  whole  morning  was  evidently  to  be  occupied  in  disposing 
the  troops  for  attack,  I rode  to  the  extreme  right,  etc. 

It  is  evident  that  at  7 a.  m.  no  battle  was  expected  to  take  place 
before  noon.  McLaws’  division  was  at  this  time  on  Herr  Ridge. 

During  the  morning  various  staff  officers  had  been  examining 
the  country  over  which  the  movement  was  to  be  made. 

From  the  farthest  occupied  point  on  the  right  and  front  [of 
Pender’s  division],  in  company  with  Cols.  Long  and  Walker  and 
Capt.  Johnston  (engineer),  soon  after  sunrise  I surveyed  the 
enemy’s  position  toward  some  estimate  of  the  ground  and  the 
best  mode  of  attack.  So  far  as  judgment  could  be  formed,  from 
such  a view,  assault  on  the  enemy’s  left  by  our  extreme  right 
might  succeed,  should  the  mountain  there  offer  no  insuperable 
obstacle.  To  attack  on  that  side,  if  practicable,  I understood  to 
be  the  purpose  of  the  commanding  general.  Returning  from  this 
position  more  to  the  right  and  rear,  for  the  sake  of  tracing  more 
exactly  the  mode  of  approach,  I proceeded  some  distance  along 
the  ravine  road  noticed  the  previous  evening  [along  Willoughby 
Run],  and  was  made  aware  of  having  entered  the  enemy’s  lines 
by  meeting  two  armed  dismounted  cavalrymen.  Apparently 
surprised,  they  immediately  surrendered  and  were  disarmed  and 
sent  to  the  rear  with  two  of  three  members  of  my  staff  present. 

Having  satisfied  myself  of  the  course  and  character  of  this  road, 
I returned  to  an  elevated  point  on  the  Fairfield  road  [Herr  Ridge], 


7i 


which  furnished  a very  extensive  view  and  despatched  messengers 
to  Gen.  Longstreet  and  the  commanding  general.  Between  this 
point  and  the  Emmitsburg  road,  the  enemy’s  cavalry  were  seen 
in  considerable  force  and  moving  up  along  that  road  towards  the 
enemy’s  main  position,  bodies  of  infantry  and  artillery,  accom- 
panied by  their  trains  [the  brigades  of  the  III  corps  coming  from 
Emmitsburg]. 

This  front  was  after  some  time  examined  by  Col.  Smith  and 
Capt.  Johnston  (engineers),  and  about  midday  Gen.  Longstreet 
arrived  and  viewed  the  ground. 

He  desired  Col.  Alexander  to  obtain  the  best  view  he  then  could 
from  the  front.  I therefore  conducted  the  Colonel  to  the  advanced 
point  of  observation  previously  visited.  Its  approach  was  now 
more  hazardous  from  the  fire  of  the  enemy’s  sharpshooters,  so 
that  special  caution  was  necessary  in  making  the  desired  observa- 
tion. Just  then  a sharp  contest  occurred  in  the  woods  to  the  right 
and  rear  of  this  forward  point.  Anderson’s  division,  Third  corps, 
had  moved  up  and  was  driving  the  enemy  from  these  woods 
[Snyder  Ridge].  These  woods  having  been  thus  cleared  of  the 
enemy,  some  view  of  the  ground  beyond  them  and  much  further 
to  the  right  than  had  yet  been  examined  seemed  practicable.  I 
therefore  rode  in  that  direction  and  when  about  to  enter  the  woods 
met  the  commanding  general,  en  route  himself  for  a survey  of  the 
ground. 

There  being  here  still  a good  deal  of  sharpshooting,  the  front 
had  to  be  examined  with  caution.  Gen.  Wilcox,  commanding  on 
the  right  of  Anderson’s  division,  had  already  seen  beyond  the 
farther  edge  of  the  woods,  and  under  his  guidance  I accompanied 
Col.  Long  to  the  farmhouse  at  the  summit,  where  the  crossroad 
from  Fairfield,  etc.  [Pitzer’s  schoolhouse]  emerges.  Having 
noticed  the  field  and  the  enemy’s  batteries,  etc.,  I returned  to 
Gen.  Longstreet  for  the  purpose  of  conducting  his  column  to  this 
point,  and  supervising  as  might  be  necessary  the  disposition  of 
his  artillery.  He  was  advancing  by  the  ravine  road  (as  most  out 
of  view),  time  having  been  already  lost  in  attempting  another 
which  proved  objectionable  because  exposed  to  observation.  On 
learning  the  state  of  facts  ahead,  the  general  halted  and  sent  back 
to  hasten  his  artillery.  Members  of  my  staff  were  also  dispatched 
to  remedy  as  far  as  practicable  the  delay.  Cabell’s,  Alexander’s 
and  Henry’s  [artillery]  battalions  at  length  arrived,  and  the  whole 
column  moved  toward  the  enemy’s  left.  Col.  Alexander,  by  Gen. 
Longstreet’ s direction,  proceeded  to  explore  the  ground  still  farther 
to  the  right  and  Henry’s  battalion,  accompanying  Hood’s  division, 
was  thrown  in  that  direction.  Upon  these  as  soon  as  observed 
the  enemy  opened  a furious  cannonade,  the  course  of  which 
rendered  necessary  a change  in  the  main  artillery  column.  The 
fire  on  the  crossroad  through  the  woods  having  after  a time 


72 


slackened,  I reconnoitered  that  front  again.  As  before,  the  enemy 
was  only  a few  hundred  yards  off  awaiting  attack. — Report  of 
W.  N.  Pendleton,  chief  of  artillery. 

About  noon  Law’s  brigade  of  McLaws’  division  joined  its 
division  and  Longstreet  prepared  to  move  into  position  to  the 
right  of  Anderson.  In  his  report,  Longstreet  says: 

As  soon  after  his  arrival  [Law]  as  we  could  make  our  prepara- 
tions the  movement  was  begun.  Engineers,  sent  out  by  the 
commanding  general  and  myself,  guided  us  by  a road  which  would 
have  completely  disclosed  the  move.  Some  delay  ensued  in 
seeking  a more  concealed  route. 

The  engineers  mentioned  had  selected  the  road  that  ran  from 
Black  Horse  Tavern  southeasterly  to  Willoughby  Run.  This 
road  runs  over  the  end  of  Herr  Ridge  from  which  point  Big  Round 
Top  is  clearly  visible  and  it  was  desired  to  make  the  movement 
out  of  sight  of  this  prominent  peak  in  the  Union  position. 

Kershaw  of  McLaws’  division  reports: 

Arriving  at  the  hill  [Herr  Ridge]  beyond  the  hotel  at  the  stone 
bridge  on  the  Fairfield  road  [Black  Horse  Tavern],  the  column 
was  halted  while  Gens.  Longstreet  and  McLaws  reconnoitered 
the  route.  After  some  little  delay  the  major  general  command- 
ing returned,  and  directed  a countermarch  and  the  command  was 
marched  to  the  left  [along"Herr  Ridge]  beyond  the  point  at  which 
we  had  before  halted,  and  thence  under  cover  of  the  woods  [to 
and  along  Willoughby  Run]  to  the  right  of  our  line  of  battle. 
Arriving  at  the  schoolhouse  [Pitzer’s]  on  the  road  leading  across 
the  Emmitsburg  road  by  the  peach  orchard,  then  in  possession 
of  the  enemy,  the  lieutenant  general  commanding  directed  me 
to  advance  my  brigade  and  attack  the  enemy  at  that  point,  turn 
his  flank,  and  extend  along  the  crossroad  [Wheatfield  road],  with 
my  left  resting  toward  the  Emmitsburg  road. 

The  approach  of  Longstreet’ s troops  to  the  new  position  is 
described  in  Pendleton’s  report  given  above.  McLaws’  division 
was  deployed  in  two  lines  astride  the  Pitzer  schoolhouse  road, 
and  Hood’s  division,  in  two  lines  astride  the  Emmitsburg  road. 
Of  Longstreet’ s artillery  there  were  62  guns  on  the  ground;  18 
with  each  division  and  26  [Alexander’s  battalion]  in  reserve. 

As  has  been  previously  stated,  Meade’s  attention  had  been 
riveted  on  his  right  wing  and  he  had  given  little  attention  to  the 
wing  that  was  about  to  be  attacked.  Probably  because  his  horses 
and  men  were  worn  out  by  previous  scouting  and  because  he  ex- 


73 


pected  to  be  relieved  that  day,  Buford  had  not  pushed  to  the 
front  that  morning  with  his  accustomed  energy  and  had  not  dis- 
covered the  large  Confederate  force  that  was  threatening  Meade’s 
left  wing.  Through  some  misunderstanding,  just  as  R.  H. 
Anderson’s  division  deployed  and  Long  street  began  to  move  from 
Herr  Ridge,  Buford  was  sent  to  Taneytown  en  route  to  Win- 
chester for  supplies,  etc.  Meade  discovered  this  too  late  to  have 
him  recalled;  it  left  the  III  corps  on  that  flank  without  cavalry. 

In  his  testimony  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the 
War,  Meade  says: 

I had  sent  instructions  in  the  morning  to  Gen.  Sickles,  directing 
him  to  form  his  corps  in  line  of  battle  on  the  left  of  the  II  corps, 
and  I had  indicated  to  him  in  general  terms  that  his  right  was  to 
rest  upon  Gen.  Hancock’s  left  and  his  left  was  to  extend  to  the 
Round  Top  Mountain,  plainly  visible,  if  it  was  practicable  to 
occupy  it.  During  the  morning  I sent  a staff  officer  to  Gen. 
Sickles  to  inquire  whether  he  was  in  position.  The  reply  was  re- 
turned to  me  that  Gen.  Sickles  said  there  was  no  position  there. 
I then  sent  back  to  him  my  general  instructions,  which  had  been 
previously  given.  A short  time  afterwards  Gen.  Sickles  came  to 
my  headquarters  and  I told  him  what  my  general  views  were,  and 
intimated  that  he  was  to  occupy  the  position  that  I understood 
Gen.  Hancock  had  put  Gen.  Geary  in  the  night  previous.  Gen. 
Sickles  replied  that  Gen.  Geary  had  no  position,  as  far  as  he  could 
understand.  He  then  said  to  me  that  there  was  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  where  his  corps  was  some  very  good  ground  for  artillery, 
and  he  should  like  to  have  some  staff  officer  of  mine  go  out  there 
and  see  as  to  the  posting  of  the  artillery.  He  also  asked  me  whether 
he  was  not  authorized  to  post  his  corps  in  such  manner  as  in  his 
judgment  he  should  deem  the  most  suitable.  I answered  Gen. 
Sickles,  “Certainly,  within  the  limits  of  the  general  instructions  I 
have  given  you;  any  ground  within  those  limits  you  choose  to 
occupy  I leave  to  you’’.  And  I directed  Gen.  Hunt,  my  chief  of 
artillery,  to  accompany  Gen.  Sickles  and  examine  and  inspect 
such  positions  as  Gen.  Sickles  thought  good  for  artillery,  and  to 
give  Gen.  Sickles  the  benefit  of  his  judgment. 

It  was  about  11  a.  m.  when  Gen.  Sickles  visited  Meade,  at  which 
time  no  Confederates  had  appeared  in  force  on  Seminary  Ridge 
south  of  Pender’s  division.  Two  things  are  apparent  from  Meade’s 
testimony,  viz.:  Meade  was  not  expecting  an  attack  to  be  made 
on  Sickles’  corps,  and  Sickles  felt  himself  incompetent  to  post 
his  troops  properly  on  the  line  that  had  been  indicated  to  him 
by  Meade’s  orders. 


74 


As  Sickles’  corps  was  only  a mile  from  Meade’s  headquarters, 
Meade  would  certainly  have  gone  over  there  himself  or  would 
have  sent  his  chief  engineer  to  mark  the  line,  had  he  thought  the 
matter  of  great  importance.  Hunt  was  only  to  advise  Sickles  as 
to  the  disposition  of  his  artillery  and  had  no  authority  beyond 
that.  Furthermore,  since  Meade  had  fixed  the  flanks  of  Sickles’ 
line  he  did  not  think  that  Sickles  had  much  of  a problem,  espe- 
cially as  the  commander  of  his  2d  division  was  an  accomplished 
engineer  in  whom  Meade  had  great  confidence. 

Birney’s  division  of  Sickles’  corps  encamped  in  the  open  ground 
between  two  branches  of  Plum  Run,  north  of  the  Wheatfield 
road  on  the  evening  of  the  1st,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  2d, 
this  division  was  deployed  on  this  ground. 

Birney  reports: 

At  7:00  a.  m.,  under  orders  from  Maj.  Gen.  Sickles,  I relieved 
Geary’s  division  and  formed  a line,  resting  its  left  on  the  Sugar 
Loaf  Mountain  and  the  right  thrown  in  a direct  line  toward  the 
cemetery,  connecting  on  the  right  with  the  2d  division  of  this 
corps.  My  picket  line  was  in  the  Emmitsburg  road,  with  sharp- 
shooters some  300  yards  in  advance. 

The  chief  of  artillery  of  the  III  corps  says  of  this  position: 

Early  in  the  morning  of  July  2,  Randolph’s  and  Clark’s  batteries 
were  placed  in  position  on  the  line  held  by  Gen.  Birney’s  division, 
running  from  near  the  left  of  the  II  corps  to  the  base  of  Signal  or 
Round  Top  Mountain.  The  positions  of  both  were  low,  unpro- 
tected and  commanded  by  the  ridge  along  which  runs  the  road 
from  Emmitsburg  to  Gettysburg.  Seeley’s  battery  remained  in 
the  field  where  it  had  encamped  and  as  there  were  no  desirable 
positions  on  our  part  of  the  line,  Smith’s  and  Winslow’s  batteries 
on  their  arrival  from  Emmitsburg  [with  the  brigades  of 
de  Trobriand  and  Burling  at  9 a.  m.]  were  parked  near  Seeley’s 
until  some  better  disposition  could  be  made. 

Humphreys  reports: 

At  an  early  hour  of  the  morning,  my  division  was  massed  in 
the  vicinity  of  its  bivouac,  facing  the  Emmitsburg  road  near 
the  crest  of  the  ridge  running  from  the  cemetery  of  Gettysburg 
in  a southerly  direction  to  a rugged  conical-shaped  hill,  which 
I find  goes  by  the  name  of  Round  Top,  about  two  miles  from 
Gettysburg. 

At  9:00  a.  m.,  the  3rd  brigade  with  Smith’s  battery  joined  the 
division,  having  been  ordered  up  by  Maj.  Gen.  Meade,  com- 
manding the  army. 


75 


Had  Sickles  been  experienced  in  the  art  of  intrenching  a posi- 
tion, he  would  have  moved  Birney’s  division  back  to  the  ridge 
occupied  by  Humphreys,  thus  connecting  the  II  corps  with 
Little  Round  Top,  and  would  have  organized  his  position  as 
Slocum  did  the  more  difficult  one  of  the  XII  corps.  A brigade 
could  have  been  assigned  to  Big  Round  Top. 

As  soon  as  the  corps  was  established  on  its  new  line,  a strong 
force  was  detailed  for  the  construction  of  breastworks  and  abatis, 
which  subsequently  proved  of  great  value. — Slocum’s  report. 

In  looking  for  good  positions  for  his  artillery,  Sickles  ascended 
the  western  slope  of  Plum  Run  valley,  and  found  himself  on  the 
Emmitsburg  road,  where  he  had  an  outpost  line.  It  was  this  line 
that  he  later  showed  to  Hunt.  Hunt  pointed  out  some  of  its 
defects  but  did  not  advise  him  to  remain  behind  Plum  Run.  He 
seems  to  have  left  Sickles  under  the  impression  that  the  line  had 
its  good  points,  but  that  Hunt  could  not  authorize  him  to  occupy  it; 
Sickles  must  wait  for  orders  from  Meade.  In  the  meantime,  at 
Hunt’s  suggestion,  Sickles  sent  forward  a detachment  to  recon- 
noiter  the  woods  on  Snyder  Ridge. 

The  commander  of  the  reconnoitering  detachment  reports: 

I moved  down  the  Emmitsburg  road  some  distance  beyond 
our  extreme  left  and  deployed  in  a line  running  nearly  east  and 
west,  and  moved  forward  in  a northerly  direction  parallel  with 
the  Emmitsburg  road.  We  soon  came  upon  the  enemy  and  drove 
them  sufficiently  to  discover  three  columns  in  motion  in  rear  of 
the  woods,  changing  direction,  as  it  were,  by  the  right  flank. 
We  attacked  them  vigorously  on  the  flank,  and  from  our  having 
come  upon  them  very  unexpectedly  and  getting  close  upon  them, 
we  were  enabled  to  do  great  execution  and  threw  them  for  a time 
into  confusion.  They  [Wilcox’s  brigade]  soon  rallied  however 
and  attacked  us,  when  having  accomplished  the  object  of  the 
reconnaissance,  I withdrew  under  cover  of  the  woods  [on  Snyder 
Ridge]  and  reported  to  Maj.  Gen.  Birney  the  result  of  our  opera- 
tions. 

When  Birney  reported  to  Sickles  that  Confederate  troops 
were  in  Spangler’s  woods  and  were  moving  into  the  woods  on 
Snyder  Ridge,  the  latter  decided  that  the  position  he  then  oc- 
cupied in  the  low  ground  near  Plum  Run  was  wholly  untenable. 
The  enemy  might  at  any  moment  drive  the  outposts  off  the  Emmits- 
burg road  and  establish  his  guns  there.  Having  failed  to  dis- 


76 


cover  and  intrench  the  line  that  Meade  had  intended  him  to 
occupy  farther  to  the  rear,  Sickles  saw  no  other  way  out  of  his 
dilemma  than  to  move  forward  to  within  supporting  distance  of 
his  outpost  line  on  the  Emmitsburg  road,  and  protect  his  left 
flank  by  occupying  the  wood  along  the  west  branch  of  Plum 
Run,  between  Devil’s  Den  and  what  is  now  the  Loop. 

Birney  reports: 

Communicating  this  important  information  to  Maj.  Gen. 
Sickles,  I was  ordered  by  that  officer  to  change  my  front  to  meet 
the  attack.  I did  this  by  advancing  my  left  500  yards  and  swing- 
ing around  the  right  so  as  to  rest  on  the  Emmitsburg  road  at 
the  peach  orchard.  My  line  was  formed  with  Ward  on  the  left, 
de  Trobriand  in  the  center  and  Graham  on  my  right,  in  the 
peach  orchard,  with  his  right  on  the  Emmitsburg  road. 

Humphreys  reports: 

Shortly  after  midday  I was  ordered  to  form  my  division  in 
line  of  battle,  my  left  joining  the  right  of  the  1st  division  of  the 
III  corps,  and  my  right  resting  opposite  the  left  of  Gen.  Caldwell’s 
division  of  the  II  corps,  which  was  massed  on  the  crest  near  my 
place  of  bivouac.  The  line  I was  directed  to  occupy  was  near 
the  foot  of  the  westerly  slope  of  the  ridge  I have  already  mentioned, 
from  which  foot-slope  the  ground  rose  to  the  Emmitsburg  road 
which  runs  on  the  crest  of  a ridge  nearly  parallel  to  the  Round 
Top  ridge.  This  second  ridge  declines  again  immediately  west 
of  the  road  at  the  distance  of  200  or  300  yards  from  which  the 
edge  of  a wood  runs  parallel  to  it.  This  wood  (Spangler’s)  was 
occupied  by  the  enemy,  whose  pickets  were  exchanging  shots 
from  an  early  hour  in  the  morning  with  our  pickets  thrown  out 
beyond  the  road  on  the  westerly  slope. 

The  front  allotted  to  me  admitted  my  forming  the  1st  brigade 
in  line  of  battle;  the  2d  brigade  was  formed  in  line  of  battalions 
in  mass,  200  yards  in  rear  of  the  first;  the  3d  was  massed  200 
yards  in  rear  of  the  second,  opposite  the  center.  Seeley’s  bat- 
tery, 4th  U.  S.  Art’y,  was  placed  at  my  disposal. 

Shortly  after  these  dispositions  were  made,  I was  directed  to 
move  my  3d  brigade  to  the  rear  of  the  right  of  Gen.  Birney’s 
division,  and  make  it  subject  to  his  order  for  support,  which 
was  accordingly  done. 

It  will  be  observed  that  Humphreys’  division  was  not  as  far 
advanced  as  Graham’s  brigade  at  the  Peach  Orchard. 

The  chief  of  artillery  of  the  III  corps  reports: 

Between  1 and  2 p.  m.,  Maj.  Gen.  Sickles  notified  me  that  he 
was  about  to  change  his  line,  throwing  his  right  forward  to  the 
high  ground,  running  his  line  from  Round  Top  Mountain  on 


77 


his  left,  to  a peach  orchard  on  the  Emmitsburg  road  and  thence 
along  the  road  toward  Gettysburg  to  a second  orchard. 

I placed  Smith’s  battery  near  the  extreme  left  on  a rocky  hill 
[Devil’s  Den]  commanding  a long  valley  running  toward  Emmits- 
burg. On  the  right  of  Smith’s,  after  passing  a belt  of  woods,  was 
an  opening  [the  Wheatfield]  in  which  I placed  Winslow’s  bat- 
tery. This  position  was  surrounded  by  woods,  but  in  my  opinion, 
the  line  was  materially  strengthened  by  this  battery  of  short 
range  guns.  In  the  open  field  with  his  left  resting  near  the  woods, 
I placed  Biglow’s  battery  from  the  Artillery  Reserve;  on  his  right, 
Clark’s,  and  next,  in  the  peach  orchard,  Ames  of  the  Artillery 
Reserve.  These  three  batteries  fronted  toward  Emmitsburg, 
or  in  the  direction  from  which  the  attack  of  the  enemy  was  ex- 
pected and  afterward  received.  Randolph’s  battery  was  placed 
on  the  Emmitsburg  road  fronting  nearly  perpendicular  to  those 
before  mentioned;  and  still  farther  to  the  right  and  near  the  ex- 
treme right  of  the  line  held  by  the  corps,  was  Seeley’s. 

The  defects  of  the  position  were: — its  length  was  too  great  for 
the  number  of  troops  in  the  III  corps;  both  flanks  were  in  the  air; 
there  was  a gap  of  a quarter  of  a mile  of  open  ground  between  the 
brigades  along  the  Emmitsburg  road  and  those  in  the  woods 
facing  the  west  branch  of  Plum  Run;  and  Snyder  Ridge  offered 
an  excellent  position  for  the  development  of  an  artillery  line  for 
attacking  the  brigade  in  the  Peach  Orchard,  since  it  was  but  600 
yards  from  it. 

It  was  perhaps  3 p.  m.,  and  while  he  was  still  adjusting  his  line, 
that  Sickles  was  called  to  a conference  of  the  corps  commanders 
at  Meade’s  headquarters.  Just  as  he  arrived  there,  guns  were 
heard  on  his  front.  This  was  probably  an  artillery  duel  between 
one  of  Anderson’s  and  one  of  Sickles’  batteries.  The  conference 
was  adjourned,  Sickles  returned  to  his  corps,  and  Sykes,  who  had 
been  ordered  to  move  the  V corps  from  Rock  Creek  to  the  rear 
of  Sickles  to  make  room  for  the  VI  corps,  joined  his  corps  and 
started  with  his  1st  division. 

It  was  now  that  Meade,  for  the  first  time,  rode  out  to  Sickles’ 
position  and  discovered  that  he  was  far  in  front  of  the  line  he 
was  directed  to  occupy.  Although  it  was  more  than  an  hour 
before  the  actual  battle  began,  the  artillery  was  already  engaged ; 
Meade  therefore  decided  that  it  would  be  better  to  attempt  to 
hold  the  new  position  of  Sickles’  corps  than  to  attempt  to  with- 


78 


draw  it  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy.  He  notified  Sickles  that 
he  would  direct  Sykes  to  support  him  with  the  entire  V corps 
as  soon  as  it  arrived,  and  that  Hancock  would  be  directed  to 
send  Caldwell’s  division  to  report  to  Sykes. 

It  was  probably  about  this  time  that  Humphreys  was  directed 
to  send  his  3d  brigade  to  reinforce  Birney;  a little  later,  about  4 
p.  m.,  Humphreys  was  directed  to  advance  his  division  to  the 
Emmitsburg  road. 

In  his  inspection  of  Sickles’  position,  Meade  was  accompanied 
by  Hunt,  his  chief  of  artillery,  and  by  Warren,  his  chief  engineer. 
When  Meade  left  to  confer  with  his  other  corps  commanders, 
these  remained. 

Hunt  inspected  the  line  with  the  chief  of  artillery  of  the  III 
corps,  and  sent  1o  the  Reserve  Artillery  for  a brigade  to  assist 
the  batteries  of  that  corps. 

Warren  rode  up  on  Little  Round  Top,  and  looking  across  the 
valley  of  Plum  Run  saw  the  fringe  of  trees  on  Snyder  Ridge.  He 
sent  an  orderly  down  to  the  battery  on  Devil’s  Den  and  requested 
that  some  shots  be  fired  into  the  woods.  This  caused  a commotion 
in  Hood’s  division  and  disclosed  its  presence.  As  there  were  no 
Union  troops  on  Little  Round  Top,  save  some  signal  troops, 
Warren  sent  one  of  his  staff  officers  to  ask  Sickles  for  a brigade 
for  this  point.  Sickles  had  none  to  send;  about  this  time,  how- 
ever, Sykes  reached  the  Wheatfield  with  Barnes’  division  and 
upon  learning  of  Warren’s  request  sent  the  officer  to  Barnes  with 
instructions  to  send  Warren  a brigade.  Barnes  was  inspecting 
the  front  and  could  not  be  found,  but  Vincent,  who  happened 
to  be  the  senior  officer  present,  at  once  started  with  his  brigade 
for  Little  Round  Top  and  passing  around  its  eastern  slope  reached 
its  west  end. 

Finding  de  Trobriand’s  position  the  weakest  part  of  Sickles’ 
line,  Sykes  placed  the  other  two  brigades  of  Barnes’  division  in 
the  woods  near  the  Loop.  While  these  changes  were  being 
effected,  Long  street’s  two  divisions  were  coming  into  position 
on  Snyder  Ridge,  the  Union  batteries  were  firing  on  any  target 
which  presented  itself  and  the  Confederate  batteries  replied  as 


79 


they  got  into  position.  Hood’s  division  was  in  position  long 
enough  to  send  patrols  to  the  top  of  Big  Round  Top  before  the 
battle  began. 

Attack  of  the  Confederate  Right. — The  general  orders  given  to 
Longstreet  for  his  attack,  were  to  make  a wheel  with  his  corps 
from  Snyder  Ridge  to  the  Wheatfield  road,  and  sweep  up  the 
valley  of  Plum  Run.  Anderson  was  o join  in  the  attack  when  the 
fight  reached  him.  The  Confederate  infantry  attack  naturally 
developed  into  a number  of  more  or  less  separate  engagements, 
as  different  brigades  took  different  objectives. 

The  extreme  right  of  Hood’s  division  struck  Little  Round 
Top;  Hood’s  center  and  left  and  McLaws’  right  and  center  were 
engaged  in  the  woods  that  connect  Devil’s  Den  with  the  Peach 
Orchard;  McLaws’  left  attacked  Graham’s  brigade  at  the  Peach 
Orchard. 

Hood’s  division,  on  the  extreme  right  of  the  Confederate  line, 
was  first  to  move;  part  of  the  division  marched  for  the  signal 
station  on  Little  Round  Top  and  part  for  the  Union  battery  on 
Devil’s  Den,  both  of  which  were  conspicuous  objects.  In  crossing 
the  valley  and  through  the  woods,  the  brigades  of  Law  and  Robert- 
son combined  in  such  a manner  that  one-half  of  Robertson’s 
brigade  inclosed  by  halves  of  Law’s  brigade  advanced  on  Little 
Round  Top,  while  the  other  half  of  Robertson’s  brigade  attacked 
Ward’s  brigade  in  the  woods  to  the  front  and  west  of  Devil’s 
Den.  Hood  was  wounded  early  in  the  battle  and  the  command 
of  the  division  fell  to  Law. 

The  Confederates  approached  Little  Round  Top  from  the  south 
and  southeast  and  were  met  by  Vincent’s  brigade,  which  Vincent 
had  skilfully  posted  near  the  base  of  the  knoll.  Being  repulsed 
by  Vincent  in  a first  assault,  the  Confederates  withdrew  and  pre- 
pared to  outflank  Vincent’s  brigade.  Warren  had  remained  on 
Little  Round  Top,  but  his  attention  being  attracted  to  other 
points  of  the  field,  he  was  not  aware  that  Vincent  was  engaged. 
When  the  Confederates  made  their  second  attack  and  he  saw 
them  making  their  way  along  the  west  slope  of  Little  Round  Top, 
he  rode  away  in  search  of  troops  and  found  his  old  brigade 
(Weed’s),  of  the  2d  division  of  the  V corps,  just  passing  westward 


8o 


across  the  ridge  north  of  Little  Round  Top.  He  requested  one  of 
the  colonels  to  bring  his  regiment  up  at  once.  With  the  assistance 
of  this  regiment,  Vincent’s  brigade  warded  off  the  last  attack 
made  on  Little  Round  Top.  About  the  same  time  Hazlett’s 
battery  of  the  V corps  was  brought  up  on  the  knoll,  and  later  in 
the  day  the  rest  of  Weed’s  brigade.  Little  Round  Top  was, 
however,  a conspicuous  point  for  Confederate  sharpshooters 
around  Devil’s  Den,  and  both  Weed  and  Hazlett  were  killed  there. 
Vincent  was  mortally  wounded  in  the  fighting  of  his  brigade. 

When  Hood’s  division  moved  to  the  attack  some  time  after 
4 p.  m.,  the  Union  line  from  Devil’s  Den  to  the  Loop  consisted 
of  Ward’s  brigade  with  part  of  de  Trobriand’s,  behind  a stone  wall 
in  the  woods  along  the  west  branch  of  Plum  Run,  and  Barnes’ 
two  brigades  near  the  Loop  with  the  remainder  of  de  Trobriand’s 
brigade  in  support. 

A part  of  Robertson’s  brigade  with  the  brigades  of  Benning  and 
Anderson  advanced  on  Devil’s  Den,  encountering  Ward.  After 
making  a stubborn  resistance,  Ward  was  driven  back  up  the  slope 
and  the  guns  on  Devil’s  Den  were  captured  by  the  Confederates. 
Caldwell’s  division  of  the  II  corps  had  now  reached  the  Wheat- 
field,  and  Ayres’  division  of  the  V corps  was  just  west  of  Plum 
Run  on  the  Wheatfield  road.  The  three  brigades  of  Hood’s 
division  were  therefore  checked  by  Caldwell  and  Ayres,  while 
Barnes  attacked  their  left  flank. 

At  this  stage  of  the  battle,  Kershaw’s  brigade  attacked  Barnes 
and  was  repulsed.  He  was  then  reinforced  by  Semmes  and  later 
by  Wofford,  while  Barnes  received  support  from  Caldwell  and 
de  Trobriand. 

The  Union  troops  in  this  part  of  the  field  did  not  retire  from 
the  woods  near  the  Loop  nor  from  the  Wheatfield,  until  all  the 
Union  troops  north  of  the  Wheatfield  road  were  falling  back  to 
the  ridge  east  of  Plum  Run. 

Graham’s  brigade  on  the  Emmitsburg  road  was  posted  on  open 
ground  and  was  exposed  to  the  fire  of  36  pieces  of  artillery  from 
front  and  flanks.  After  suffering  from  this  fire  for  a long  time,  it 
gave  way  about  6 p.  m.  when  assaulted  by  Barksdale’ s brigade  of 
McLaws’  division  supported  by  Wofford’s  brigade,  and  could  not  be 


8i 


reformed.  There  was  now  a gap  in  the  Union  line  between  Barnes’ 
division  of  the  V corps  and  Humphreys’  division  of  the  III  corps, 
which  widened  as  Humphreys  swung  back  his  left  flank.  While 
Barksdale  was  pressing  on  through  this  gap,  the  brigades  of 
Wilcox,  Perry  and  Wright  attacked  Humphreys’  front. 

All  of  the  Union  troops  south  of  the  gap  now  began  to  fall  back 
behind  Plum  Run,  pursued  by  the  brigades  of  Wofford,  Kershaw, 
Semmes,  G.  T.  Anderson,  Benning  and  Robertson;  the  3d  division 
of  the  V corps  had  in  the  meantime  come  up  and  the  pursuit  was 
stopped  at  Plum  Run. 

About  this  time  Sickles  was  seriously  wounded  and  Meade, 
who  was  on  the  field,  directed  Hancock  to  assume  command  of 
the  III  corps  in  addition  to  his  own,  and  check  the  retreat.  Han- 
cock moved  the  reserve  brigades  of  the  divisions  of  Gibbon  and 
Hays  to  the  left  and  Newton  sent  him  Doubleday’s  division. 
With  these  troops  Hancock  checked  the  advance  of  the  Confed- 
erate brigades  of  Barksdale,  Wilcox,  Perry  and  Wright,  while 
Sykes  checked  the  advance  of  the  divisions  of  Hood  and  McLaws. 
Brigades  of  the  VI  and  XII  corps  also  reached  the  field  towards 
the  close  of  the  engagement. 

Most  of  the  Confederate  brigades  got  no  farther  than  Plum 
Run,  but  Wright’s  brigade  actually  reached  the  batteries  of  the 
line  of  the  II  corps;  it  was  driven  back  by  Doubleday.  In  re- 
pelling the  attack  on  his  front,  Hancock  was  wounded. 

The  battle  on  the  Union  left  closed  about  dark  and  during  the 
night  the  Union  line  was  intrenched  and  extended  to  the  top  of 
Big  Round  Top.  The  Confederates  remained  west  of  Plum  Run 
except  at  Big  Round  Top  where  they  intrenched  along  its  western 
slope. 

In  this  engagement,  the  infantry  force  actually  engaged  in 
making  the  attack  and  the  infantry  force  employed  in  defending 
the  line  of  the  III  corps,  were  about  equal.  The  other  Union 
forces  came  to  the  aid  of  the  defenders,  only  when  the  latter 
reached  Plum  Run. 

The  Attack  by  Ewell’s  Corps.— In  his  report,  Ewell  says — 

Early  in  the  morning  I received  a communication  from  the 
commanding  general,  the  tenor  of  which  was  that  he  intended  the 


82 


main  attack  to  be  made  by  the  First  corps  on  our  right,  and 
wished  me  as  soon  as  our  guns  opened  to  make  a diversion  in  their 
favor;  to  be  converted  into  a real  attack,  if  opportunity  offered. 

As  the  three  divisions  of  Ewell’s  corps  were  separated  from  each 
other  by  the  town  and  by  Rock  Creek,  each  division  selected  a dif- 
ferent objective.  Johnson’s  division  selected  Culp  Hill,  Early’s 
division  selected  east  Cemetery  Hill,  and  Rodes’  division  selected 
west  Cemetery  Hill. 

Johnson  reports: 

Early  next  morning,  skirmishers  from  Walker’s  and  Jones’ 
brigades  were  advanced  for  the  purpose  of  feeling  the  enemy,  and 
desultory  firing  was  maintained  with  their  skirmishers  until 
4 p.  m.,  at  which  hour  I ordered  Major  Latimer  to  open  fire  with 
all  his  pieces  from  the  only  eligible  hill  within  range,  Jones’ 
brigade  being  properly  disposed  as  a support.  The  hill  [Benner 
Hill]  was  directly  in  front  of  the  wooded  mountain  [Culp  Hill]  and 
a little  to  the  left  of  the  Cemetery  Hill;  consequently  exposed  to 
the  concentrated  fire  from  both,  and  also  to  an  enfilade  fire  from 
a battery  near  the  Baltimore  road.  The  unequal  contest  was 
maintained  for  two  hours  with  considerable  damage  to  the  enemy, 
as  will  appear  from  the  accompanying  report  of  Lieut.  Col. 
Andrews.  Maj.  Latimer  having  reported  to  me  that  the  exhausted 
condition  of  his  horses  and  men,  together  with  the  terrible  fire  of 
the  enemy’s  artillery,  rendered  his  position  untenable,  he  was 
ordered  to  cease  firing  and  withdraw  all  of  his  pieces  except  four, 
which  were  left  in  position  to  cover  the  advance  of  my  infantry. 

In  obedience  to  an  order  from  the  lieutenant-general  com- 
manding, I then  advanced  my  infantry  to  the  assault  of  the  enemy’s 
strong  position — a lugged  and  rocky  mountain,  heavily  timbered 
and  difficult  of  ascent;  a natural  fortification,  rendered  more 
formidable  by  deep  intrenchments  and  thick  abatis — Jones’ 
brigade  in  advance,  followed  by  Nicholls’  and  Steuart’s.  Gen. 
Walker  was  directed  to  follow,  but  reporting  to  me  that  the 
enemy  [Gregg’s  cavalry  division]  were  advancing  upon  him  from 
their  right,  he  was  ordered  to  repulse  them  and  follow  on  as  soon 
as  possible. 

The  opposing  force  was  larger  and  the  time  consumed  longer 
than  was  anticipated,  in  consequence  of  which  General  Walker 
did  not  arrive  in  time  to  participate  in  the  assault  that  night. 

By  the  time  my  other  brigades  had  crossed  Rock  Creek  and 
reached  the  base  of  the  mountain,  it  was  dark.  His  skirmishers 
were  driven  in  and  the  attack  made  with  great  vigor  and  spirit. 
It  was  as  successful  as  could  have  been  expected,  considering  the 
superiority  of  the  enemy’s  force  and  position.  Steuart’s  brigade, 
on  the  left,  carried  a line  of  breastworks  which  ran  perpendicular 


83 


to  the  enemy’s  main  line,  captured  a number  of  prisoners  and  a 
stand  of  colors,  and  the  whole  line  advanced  to  within  short  range, 
and  kept  up  a heavy  fire  until  late  in  the  night.  Brig.  Gen.  Jones 
and  Col.  Higginbotham,  Twenty-Fifth  Virginia,  were  wounded 
in  this  assault  and  the  command  of  Jones'  brigade  devolved  upon 
Lieut.  Col.  Dungan. 

The  defense  of  Culp  Hill  is  given  in  the  report  of  Brig.  Gen. 
George  S.  Greene,  the  commander  of  the  3d  brigade,  2d  division, 
XII  corps. 

On  the  2d,  we  took  position  at  about  6 a.  m.  on  the  right  of  the 
I corps  on  the  crest  of  the  steep  and  rocky  hill  [Culp  Hill]  being 
thrown  back  nearly  at  right  angles  with  the  line  of  the  I corps, 
Rock  Creek  running  past  our  front  at  the  distance  of  200  to  400 
yards.  Our  position  and  the  front  were  coverd  with  a heavy 
growth  of  timber,  free  from  undergrowth,  with  large  ledges  of 
rock  projecting  above  the  surface.  These  rocks  and  trees  offered 
good  cover  for  marksmen.  The  surface  was  very  steep  on  our 
left,  diminishing  to  a gentle  slope  on  our  right.  The  2d  brigade  was 
on  our  right,  thrown  forward  at  a right  angle  to  conform  to  the 
crest  of  the  hill.  On  the  right  of  this  brigade  was  the  1st  (Williams) 
division,  his  right  resting  on  an  impassable  mill-pond  on  Rock 
Creek.  As  soon  as  we  were  in  position,  we  began  to  intrench  our- 
selves, and  throw  up  breastworks  of  the  covering  height,  of  logs, 
cord-wood,  stones  and  earth.  The  same  was  done  by  the  troops 
on  my  right. 

By  12  o’clock  we  had  a good  cover  for  the  men.  The  value  of 
this  defnse  was  shown  in  our  subsequent  operations  by  our  small 
loss  compared  with  that  of  the  enemy  during  the  continuous 
attacks  by  a vastly  superior  force.  Our  skirmishers  were  thrown 
out  immediately  on  taking  position,  and  moved  toward  the  creek 
in  our  front,  when  they  came  to  the  enemy’s  pickets. 

We  remained  in  this  position,  with  occasional  firing  of  the 
pickets  until  6.30  p.  m.,  when  the  1st  (Williams)  division  and  the 
1st  and  2d  brigades  of  the  2d  division  were  ordered  from  my  right, 
leaving  the  intrenchments  unoccupied  on  the  withdrawal  of  the 
troops. 

I received  orders  to  occupy  the  whole  of  the  intrenchments 
previously  occupied  by  the  XII  Army  Corps  with  my  brigade. 
This  movement  was  commenced,  and  the  137th  N.  Y.  regiment,  on 
my  right,  was  moved  into  the  position  occupied  by  the  2d  brigade. 
Before  any  further  movements  could  be  made,  we  were  attacked 
on  the  whole  of  our  front  by  a large  force  a few  minutes  before 
7 p.  m.  The  enemy  made  four  distinct  charges  between  7 and 
9.30  p.  m.,  which  were  effectually  resisted. 

As  soon  as  the  attack  commenced  I sent  to  Gen.  Wadsworth, 
commanding  the  division  of  the  I corps  on  our  left,  and  to  Gen. 


84 


Howard,  commanding  the  XI  corps,  posted  on  the  left  of  the  I 
corps,  for  assistance,  to  which  they  promptly  responded  by  send- 
ing to  my  support  about  355  men  from  the  I corps  and  about 
400  men  from  the  XI  corps. 

These  regiments  rendered  good  service,  being  sent  into  the 
trenches  to  relieve  our  regiments,  as  their  ammunition  was  ex- 
hausted and  their  muskets  required  cleaning.  At  the  close  of 
this  night  attack,  we  occupied  all  the  trenches  of  the  3d  brigade. 

About  10  o’clock  [p.  m.]  I was  informed  that  [Col.  Cobham]  with 
the  2d  brigade  was  returning  to  his  position,  and  immediately 
sent  a staff  officer  to  advise  him  that  the  enemy  were  in  his  in- 
trenchments,  and  to  bring  him  round  by  the  rear  to  my  right. 

Early  reports: 

Having  been  informed  that  a large  portion  of  the  rest  of  our 
army  would  come  up  during  the  night  [July  1-2],  and  that  the 
enemy’s  position  would  be  attacked  on  the  right  and  left  flanks  very 
early  next  morning,  I gave  orders  to  Gen.  Hays  to  move  his  bri- 
gade under  cover  of  night  from  the  town  into  the  field  in  front  of  the 
left  of  the  town,  to  a place  where  he  would  not  be  exposed  to  the 
enemy’s  fire,  and  would  be  in  position  to  advance  upon  Cemetery 
Hill  when  a favorable  opportunity  should  occur.  This  movement 
was  made,  and  Hays  formed  his  brigade  on  the  right  of  Avery 
and  just  behind  the  extension  of  the  low  ridge  on  which  the  town  is 
located.  The  attack  did  not  begin  in  the  morning,  as  was  expected, 
and  in  the  course  of  the*  morning  I rode  with  Gen.  Ewell  to  ex- 
amine a position  for  the  artillery  on  the  left. 

The  fire  from  the  artillery  having  opened  on  the  right  and  left 
at  4 o’clock,  and  continued  for  some  time,  I was  ordered  by  Gen. 
Ewell  to  advance  upon  Cemetery  Hill  with  my  two  brigades  that 
were  in  position  as  soon  as  Gen.  Johnson’s  division,  which  was  on 
my  left,  should  become  engaged  at  the  wooded  hill  on  the  left, 
which  it  was  about  to  attack,  information  being  given  me  that 
the  advance  would  be  general,  and  made  also  by  Rodes’  division 
and  Hill’s  divisions  on  my  right. 

Accordingly,  as  soon  as  Johnson  became  warmly  engaged, 
which  was  a little  before  dusk,  I ordered  Hays  and  Avery  to  ad- 
vance and  carry  the  works  on  the  heights  in  front.  These  troops 
advanced  in  gallant  style  to  the  attack,  passing  over  the  ridge  in 
ront  of  them  under  a heavy  artillery  fire  and  then  crossing  a hol- 
low between  that  and  Cemetery  Hill,  and  moving  up  this  hill  in 
the  face  of  at  least  two  lines  of  infantry  posted  behind  plank  and 
stone  fences;  but  these  they  drove  back,  and,  passing  over  all 
obstacles,  they  reached  the  crest  of  the  hill,  and  entered  the 
enemy’s  breastworks  crowning  it,  getting  possession,  of  one  or  two 
batteries.  But  no  attack  was  made  on  the  immediate  right,  as 
was  expected,  and  not  meeting  with  support  from  that  quarter, 
these  brigades  could  not  hold  the  position  they  had  attained,  be- 


85 


cause  a very  heavy  force  of  the  enemy  was  turned  against  them 
from  that  part  of  the  line  which  the  divisions  on  the  right  were  to 
have  attacked,  and  these  two  brigades  had,  therefore,  to  fall  back, 
which  they  did  with  comparatively  slight  loss,  considering  the 
nature  of  the  ground  over  which  they  had  to  pass  and  the  im- 
mense odds  opposed  to  them,  and  Hays’  brigade  brought  off  four 
stand  of  captured  colors. 

Howard  reports: 

On  the  morning  of  July  2,  about  3 a.  m.,  the  commanding  gen- 
eral, who  had  previously  arrived,  met  me  at  the  cemetery  gate, 
questioned  me  about  the  preceding  day,  and  rode  with  me  over 
the  position  then  held  by  our  troops.  The  XI  corps  was  disposed 
with  its  center  near  the  Baltimore  Pike — the  1st  division,  Gen. 
Ames,  on  the  right;  3d  division,  Gen.  Schurz,  in  the  center,  and  the 
2d  division,  Gen.  Steinwehr,  on  the  left.  The  batteries  of  the  I and 
XI  corps  were  united,  being  put  in  position  with  regard  to  the 
kind  of  gun.  Colonel  Wainwright,  chief  of  artillery  I corps,  took 
charge  of  all  batteries  to  the  right  of  the  pike,  Major  Osborn,  of 
the  XI,  all  batteries  n the  cemetery  grounds  to  the  left  of  the 
pike.  \ ery  little  occurred  while  the  other  corps  were  coming  into 
position  until  about  4 p.  m.  Just  before  this,  order;  had  been 
issued  to  the  division  commanders  to  make  ready  for  battle,  as 
the  enemy  were  reported  advancing  on  our  left.  Now  the  enemy 
opened  from  some  dozen  batteries  to  our  right  and  front  [Benner 
Hill]  bringing  a concentrated  fire  upon  our  position.  The  batteries 
of  Wainwright  and  Osborn  replied  with  great  spirit.  Artillery 
projectiles  often  struck  among  the  men,  but  in  no  case  did  a 
regiment  break,  though  suffering  considerably. 

About  6:30  p.  m.  I sent  word  to  Gen.  Meade  that  the  enemy’s 
batteries  on  our  extreme  right  had  been  silenced  or  withdrawn. 
After  the  cannonading  had  ceased,  and  the  enemy’s  infantry 
attack  upon  the  left  had  been  repulsed,  another  attack,  said  to 
be  by  Rodes’  division,  commenced  between  7 and  8 p.  m.,  be- 
ginning between  Gens.  Slocum  and  Wadsworth,  and  extending 
along  the  front  of  Ames  to  the  town  of  Gettysburg. 

The  attack  was  so  sudden  and  violent  that  the  infantry  in 
front  of  Ames  was  giving  way.  In  fact  at  one  moment  the  enmey 
had  got  within  the  batteries.  A request  for  assistance  had  al- 
ready gone  to  headquarters,  so  that  promptly  a brigade  of  the 
II  corps,  under  Colonel  Carroll,  moved  to  Ames’  right,  deployed 
and  went  into  position  just  in  time  to  check  the  enemy’s  advance. 
At  Wiedrich’s  battery,  Gen.  Ames,  by  extraordinary  exertions, 
arrested  a panic,  and  the  men  with  sponge-staffs  and  bayonets 
forced  the  enemy  back.  This  furious  onset  was  met  and  with- 
stood at  every  point,  and  lasted  less  than  an  hour. 


86 


At  9:30  p.  m.  the  old  position  was  resumed  by  the  regiments  of 
my  corps  Colonel  Carroll  remaining  between  Ames  and  Wads- 
worth. 

Rodes  reports: 

On  July  2,  nothing  of  importance  transpired  in  my  front.  The 
rest  of  the  men  generally  was  only  disturbed  by  the  occasional 
skirmishing  and  desultory  firing  of  the  opposing  sharpshooters; 
but  Daniel’s  brigade,  which  had  been  early  in  the  morning  moved 
by  my  order  so  as  to  connect  with  Pender’s  division,  on  the  crest 
of  the  ridge  before  spoken  of,  was  subjected  to  a galling  artillery 
fire,  especially  in  the  afternoon.  Late  in  the  afternoon,  however, 
an  attack  was  made  upon  the  enemy’s  position  by  some  troops  of 
the  right  wing  of  the  army,  which  produced  some  stir  among  the 
enemy  in  my  immediate  front,  and  seemed  to  cause  there  a dimi- 
nution of  both  artillery  and  infantry. 

Orders  given  during  the  afternoon,  and  after  the  engagement 
had  opened  on  the  right,  required  me  to  co-operate  with  the 
attacking  force  as  soon  as  any  opportunity  of  doing  so  with  good 
effect  was  offered.  Seeing  the  stir  alluded  to,  I thought  that  op- 
portunity had  come,  and  immediately  sought  Gen.  Early,  with  a 
view  of  making  an  attack  in  concert  with  him.  He  agreed  with 
me  as  to  the  propriety  of  attacking,  and  made  preparations  ac- 
cordingly. I hastened  to  inform  the  officer  commanding  the 
troops  on  my  right  (part  of  Pender’s  division)  that  in  accordance 
with  our  plan,  1 would  attack  just  at  dark,  and  proceeded  to  make 
my  arrangements;  but  having  to  draw  my  troops  out  of  town  by 
the  flank,  change  the  direction  of  the  line  of  battle,  and  then  to 
traverse  a distance  of  1200  or  1400  yards,  while  Gen.  Early  had  to 
move  only  half  that  distance  without  change  of  front,  the  result 
was  that,  before  I drove  the  enemy’s  skirmishers  in,  Gen.  Early 
had  attacked  and  had  been  compelled  to  withdraw. 

After  driving  in  the  enemy’s  skirmishers,  the  advance  line  was 
halted  by  Gen.  Ramseur,  who  commanded  the  right  brigade,  to 
enable  him  to  report  to  me  certain  important  facts  (for  statement 
o:  which  I refer  to  his  report)  he  had  discovered  as  to  the  nature 
of  the  ground  and  of  the  defenses.  These  facts,  together  with 
Early’s  withdrawal,  of  which  I had  been  officially  informed,  and 
the  increased  darkness,  convinced  me  that  it  would  be  a useless 
sacrifice  of  life  to  go  on,  and  a recall  was  ordered.  But  instead  of 
falling  back  to  the  original  line,  I caused  the  front  line  to  assume 
a strong  position  in  the  plain  to  the  right  of  the  town,  along  the 
hollow  of  an  old  road  bed.  This  position  was  much  nearer  the 
enemy,  was  clear  of  the  town,  and  was  one  from  which  I could 
readily  attack  without  confusion.  The  second  line  was  placed  in 
the  position  originally  held  by  the  first.  Everything  was  gotten 
ready  to  attack  at  daylight;  but  a short  time  after  assuming  this 
new  position,  I was  ordered  to  send  without  delay  all  the  troops 


87 


I could  spare  without  destroying  my  ability  to  hold  my  position, 
to  reinforce  Maj.  Gen.  Johnson.  As  my  front  line  was  much  more 
strongly  posted  than  my  second  and  was  fully  competent  to  hold 
the  position,  and  as  the  reinforcements  had  to  be  in  position  before 
daylight,  I was  compelled  to  send  to  Gen.  Johnson  the  troops  of 
my  second  line,  viz.,  the  brigades  of  Daniel  and  0’  Neal  (excepting 
the  Fifth  Alabama). 

Two  brigades  of  Pender's  division  that  advanced  to  protect 
Rodes’  right  flank,  remained  with  him  in  the  sunken  lane  during 
July  3. 

Battle  of  July  3. — After  the  battle  of  the  2d,  Meade  sent  the 
following  message  to  Halleck: 

July  2,  1863,  8 p.  m. — The  enemy  attacked  me  about  4 p.  m. 
this  day,  and,  after  one  of  the  severest  contests  of  the  war,  was 
repulsed  at  all  points.  We  have  suffered  considerably  in  killed 
and  wounded.  Among  the  former  are  Brig.  Gens.  Paul  and  Zook, 
and  among  the  wounded  are  Gens.  Sickles,  Barlow,  Graham  and 
Warren  slightly.  We  have  taken  a large  number  of  prisoners.  I 
shall  remain  in  my  present  position  ;o-morrow,  but  am  not  pre- 
pared to  say,  until  better  advised  of  the  condition  of  the  army, 
whether  my  operations  will  be  of  an  offensive  or  defensive  char- 
acter. 

At  a conference  with  his  corps  commanders  later  in  the  evening, 
the  sentiment  was  in  favor  of  a defensive  battle.  It  was  with  this 
object  in  view  therefore,  that  the  disposition  of  the  troops  was 
made.  The  XII  corps  was  to  regain  and  reoccupy  its  lines;  the 
XI  corps,  strengthened  by  a brigade  of  the  II  corps,  which  joined 
it  to  repel  Early’s  attack,  was  lef  in  position;  Doubleday’s  division 
of  the  I corps  which  had  taken  the  position  of  Caldwell’s  division 
on  the  left  of  the  II  corps,  was  left  there  nd  Caldwell  was  assigned 
to  support  the  artillery  reserve  which  was  in  position  on  the  left 
of  Doubleday.  The  remainin  divisions  of  the  I and  II  corps 
remained  in  the  positions  they  had  occupied  on  the  morning  of 
the  2d.  The  V corps  formed  line  from  the  artillery  reserve  to  Big 
Round  Top;  it  was  protected  by  stone  breastworks,  thrown  up 
during  the  night.  Some  of  the  brigades  of  the  VI  corps  were 
employed  as  local  reserves  and  others  to  protect  the  flanks  of  the 
line.  The  III  corps  was  posted  in  rear  of  the  center  as  a general 


reserve. 


88 


In  his  report,  Lee  says  of  July  2: 

In  this  engagement  our  loss  in  men  and  officers  was  large.  Maj. 
Gens.  Hood  and  Pender,  Brig.  Gens.  Jones,  Semmes,  G.  T.  Ander- 
son and  Barksdale  and  Col.  Avery  commanding  Hoke’s  brigade, 
were  wounded,  the  last  two  mortally. 

The  result  of  this  day’s  operations  induced  the  belief  that,  with 
proper  concert  of  action,  and  with  the  increased  support  that  the 
positions  gained  on  the  right  would  enable  the  artillery  to  render 
the  assaulting  columns,  we  should  ultimately  succeed,  and  it  was 
accordingly  determined  to  continue  the  attack.  The  general 
plan  was  unchanged.  Longstreet,  reinforced  by  Pickett’s  three 
brigades — which  arrived  near  the  battlefield  during  the  afternoon 
of  the  2d — was  ordered  to  attack  the  next  morning,  and  Gen. 
Ewell  was  directed  to  assail  the  enemy’s  right  at  the  same  time. 
The  latter  during  the  night  reinforced  Gen.  Johnson  with  two 
brigades  from  Rodes’  and  one  from  Early’s  division. 

It  would  appear  from  this  report  that  Lee  intended  to  make  the 
assault  early  in  the  morning,  and  instructions  to  that  effect  seem 
to  have  ben  given  Ewell  that  night,  as  confirmed  by  the  reports  of 
Ewell. 

Engagement  on  the  Confederate  Right. — Ewell  reports: 

I was  ordered  to  renew  my  attack  at  daylight  Friday  morning, 
and  as  Johnson’s  position  was  the  only  one  affording  hopes  of 
doing  this  to  advantage,  he  was  reinforced  by  Smith’s  brigade  of 
Early’s  division,  and  Daniel’s  and  Rodes’  (old)  [O’  Neal’s]  brigades 
of  Rodes’  division. 

The  initiative  at  this  point  was  not  left  to  the  Confederates,  for 
the  commander  of  the  XII  corps  had  already  decided  to  recapture 
his  abandoned  works. 

Slocum  says: 

Orders  were  at  once  issued  for  an  attack  at  daybreak,  for  the 
purpose  of  regaining  that  portion  of  the  line  which  had  been  lost. 
The  artillery  of  the  XII  corps  was  placed  in  position  during  the 
night  and  opened  the  battle  at  4 a.  m.  on  the  following  morning, 
and  during  the  entire  engagement  all  the  batteries  rendered  most 
valuable  aid  to  our  cause. 

The  enemy  had  been  reinforced  during  the  night,  and  were 
fully  prepared  to  resist  our  attack.  The  force  opposed  to  us,  it  is 
said,  belonged  to  the  corps  under  Gen.  Ewell,  formerly  under  Gen. 
Jackson,  and  they  certainly  fought  with  a determination  and  valor 
which  has  ever  characterized  the  troops  of  this  well  known  corps. 
We  were  reinforced  during  the  engagement  by  Shaler’s  briagde 
of  the  VI  corps,  and  by  two  regiments  from  Gen.  Wadsworth’s 


89 


division  of  the  I corps,  and  also  by  Neill’s  brigade  of  the  VI  corps, 
which  was  moved  across  Rock  Creek  and  placed  in  position  to 
protect  our  extreme  right.  All  these  troops  did  excellent  service. 

The  engagement  continued  until  10:30  a.  m.,  and  resulted  in 
our  regaining  possession  of  our  entire  line  of  intrenchments  and 
driving  the  enemy  back  of  the  position  originally  held  by  him;  in 
the  capture  of  over  500  prisoners  in  addition  to  the  large  number 
of  wounded  left  on  the  field,  besides  several  thousand  stand  of 
arms  and  three  stand  of  colors.  Our  own  loss  in  killed  and 
wounded  was  comparatively  light,  as  most  of  our  troops  were 
protected  by  breastworks. 

The  portion  of  the  field  occupied  by  the  enemy  presented 
abundant  evidence  of  the  bravery  and  determination  with  which 
the  conflict  was  waged.  The  field  of  battle  at  this  point  was  not 
as  extended  as  that  on  the  left  of  our  line,  nor  was  the  force  en- 
gaged as  heavy  as  that  brought  into  action  on  that  part  of  the 
line.  Yet  Gen.  Geary  states  that  over  900  of  the  enemy’s  dead 
were  buried  by  our  own  troops  and  a large  number  left  unburied, 
marching  orders  having  been  received  before  the  work  was  com- 
pleted. 

Johnson  reports: 

Early  the  next  morning  [July  3],  the  Stonewall  brigade  [Walker] 
was  ordered  to  the  support  of  the  others,  and  the  assault  was 
renewed  with  great  determination.  Shortly  after,  the  enemy 
moved  forward  to  recapture  the  line  of  breastworks  which  had 
been  taken  the  night  previous,  but  was  repulsed  with  great  slaugh- 
ter. Daniel’s  and  Rodes’  [O’Neal]  brigades  of  Rodes’  division 
having  reported  to  me,  two  other  [Confederate]  assaults  were 
made;  both  failed.  The  enemy  were  too  securely  intrenched  and 
in  too  great  numbers  to  be  dislodged  by  the  force  at  my  command. 

In  the  meantime  a demonstration  in  force  was  made  upon  my 
left  and  rear.  The  Stonewall  and  Smith  brigades  were  disposed  to 
meet  and  check  it,  which  was  accomplished  to  my  entire  satisfac- 
tion. No  further  [Confederate]  assault  was  made;  all  had  been 
done  that  it  was  possible  to  do. 

I held  my  original  position  [east  of  Rock  Creek]  until  10  o’clock 
of  the  night  of  the  3d,  when  in  accordance  with  orders,  I withdrew 
to  the  hill  north  and  west  of  Gettysburg,  where  we  remained 
until  the  following  day,  in  the  hope  that  the  enemy  would  give 
us  battle  on  ground  of  our  own  selection. 

My  loss  in  this  terrible  battle  was  heavy,  including  some  of  the 
most  valuable  officers  of  the  command. 

That  Longstreet  was  also  informed  of  the  general  plan  for  the 
day  would  appear  from  the  account  given  by  Gen.  E.  P.  Alexander, 
in  Vol.  Ill,  Battles  and  Leaders. 


go 


I then  found  Gen.  Longstreet,  learned  what  I could  of  the  for- 
tunes of  the  day  [July  2]  on  other  parts  of  the  field,  and  got  orders 
for  the  morning.  They  were  in  brief,  that  our  present  position 
was  to  be  held  and  the  attack  renewed  as  soon  as  Pickett  arrived, 
and  he  was  expected  early. 

At  3 [a.  m.]  I began  to  put  the  batteries  in  position. 

While  he  seems  to  have  instructed  Alexander  to  dispose  of  the 
artillery  in  preparation  for  a morning  assault,  Longstreet  does  not 
seem  to  have  given  any  corresponding  orders  to  the  infantry. 
Hood’s  division,  a part  of  which  was  on  the  slope  of  Big  Round 
Top,  could  be  of  no  use  in  an  offensive  operation  and  should  have 
been  withdrawn  to  some  position  nearer  the  center  of  the  field. 
The  explanation  of  this  omission  seems  to  be  that  while  Long- 
street understood  that  the  attack  on  the  right  was  to  be  continued 
on  the  morning  of  the  3d,  he  did  not  accept  the  order  in  the  sense 
in  which  Lee  meant  it.  In  his  report  Longstreet  says: 

On  the  following  morning  our  arrangements  were  made  for 
renewing  the  attack  by  my  right  with  a view  to  pass  around  the  hill 
occupied  by  the  enemy  on  his  left  and  to  gain  it  by  flank  and 
reverse  attack. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  2d,  it  had  been  ascertained  that  there 
were  no  Union  troops  in  rear  of  Big  Round  Top,  and  Longstreet 
probably  intended  to  send  Pickett  around  that  hill.  To  cooperate 
with  Pickett,  Hood  was  left  in  position. 

In  the  early  morning,  Lee  rode  down  to  the  right  and  explained 
that  he  wanted  Longstreet  to  continue  the  attack  of  the  preceding 
day.  Longstreet  now  pointed  out  the  difficulty  of  withdrawing 
Hood  in  daylight  and  the  danger  of  exposing  him  by  withdraw- 
ing McLaws.  Lee  was  therefore  compelled  to  substitute  an  attack 
by  the  center  for  an  attack  by  the  right  and  center.  Heth’s 
division  had  moved  down  to  Seminary  Ridge  the  night  before 
and  Longstreet  was  directed  to  make  the  attack  with  the  divisions 
of  Pickett,  Heth,  Anderson  and  one-half  of  Pender’s  division.  In 
his  report,  Longstreet  says: 

A few  moments  after  my  orders  for  the  execution  of  this  plan 
[described  above]  were  given,  the  commanding  general  joined  me 
and  ordered  a column  of  attack  to  be  formed  of  Pickett’s,  Heth’s 
and  part  of  Pender’s  divisions,  the  assault  to  be  made  directly  at 
the  enemy’s  main  position,  the  Cemetery  Hill.  The  distance  to  be 


9i 


passed  over  under  the  fire  of  the  enemy’s  batteries  and  in  plain 
\iew,  seemed  too  great  to  insure  great  results,  particularly  as 
two-thirds  of  the  troops  to  be  engaged  in  the  assault  had  been  in 
a severe  battle  two  days  previous,  Pickett’s  division  alone  being 
fresh. 

Orders  were  given  to  Maj.  Gen.  Pickett  to  form  his  line  under 
the  best  cover  that  he  cculd  get  from  the  enemy’s  batteries,  and 
so  that  the  center  of  the  assaulting  column  would  arrive  at  the 
salient  of  the  enemy’s  position,  Gen.  Pickett’s  line  to  be  the  guide 
and  to  attack  the  line  of  the  enemy’s  defenses,  and  Gen.  Pettigrew, 
in  command  of  Hetln’s  division,  moving  on  the  same  line  as  Gen. 
Pickett,  was  to  assault  the  salient  at  the  same  moment.  Pickett’s 
division  was  arranged,  two  brigades  in  the  front  line,  supported 
by  his  third  brigade,  and  Wilcox’s  brigade  was  ordered  to  move 
in  rear  of  his  right  flank,  to  protect  it  from  any  force  that  the 
enemy  might  attempt  to  move  against  it. 

Heth’s  division,  under  command  of  Brig.  Gen.  Pettigrew,  was 
arranged  in  two  lines,  and  these  supported  by  part  of  Maj.  Gen. 
Pender’s  division,  under  Maj.  Gen.  Trimble.  All  of  the  batteries 
of  the  First  and  Third  Corps,  and  some  of  those  of  the  Second, 
were  put  into  the  best  positions  for  effective  fire  upon  the  point  of 
attack  and  the  hill  occupied  by  the  enemy’s  left.  Col.  Walton, 
chief  of  artillery  of  the  First  corps,  and  Col.  Alexander  had  posted 
our  batteries  and  agreed  with  the  artillery  officers  of  the  other 
corps  upon  the  signal  for  the  batteries  to  open. 

About  2 p.  m.  Gen.  Pickett,  who  had  been  charged  with  the 
duty  of  arranging  the  lines  behind  our  batteries,  reported  that 
the  troops  were  in  order  and  on  the  most  sheltered  ground.  Col. 
Walton  was  ordered  to  open  the  batteries.  The  signal  guns  were 
fired,  and  all  the  batteries  opened  very  handsomely  and  apparently 
with  effective  fire.  The  guns  on  the  hill  at  the  enemy’s  left  were 
soon  silenced.  Those  at  the  Cemetery  Hill  combated  us,  however, 
very  obstinately.  Many  of  them  were  driven  off,  but  fresh  ones 
were  brought  up  to  replace  them.  Col.  Alexander  was  ordered 
to  a point  where  he  could  best  observe  the  effect  of  our  fire,  and 
to  give  notice  of  the  most  opportune  moment  for  our  attack. 

Sometime  after  our  batteries  opened  fire,  I rode  to  Maj.  {James) 
Dearing’s  batteries.  It  appeared  that  the  enemy  put  in  fresh 
batteries  about  as  rapidly  as  others  were  driven  off.  I concluded, 
therefore,  that  we  must  attack  very  soon,  if  we  hoped  to  accom- 
lish  anything  before  night.  I gave  orders  for  the  batteries  to 
refill  their  ammunition  chests,  and  to  be  prepared  to  follow  up  the 
advance  of  the  infantry.  Upon  riding  over  to  Col.  Alexander’s 
position,  I found  that  he  had  advised  Gen.  Pickett  that  the  time 
had  arrived  for  the  attack,  and  I gave  the  order  to  Gen.  Pickett 
to  advance  to  the  assault.  I found  then  that  our  supply  of  am- 
munition was  so  short  that  the  batteries  could  not  reopen.  The 
order  for  this  attack,  which  I could  not  favor  under  better  auspices, 


92 


would  have  been  revoked  had  I felt  that  I had  that  privilege.  The 
advance  was  made  in  very  handsome  style,  all  the  troops  keeping 
their  lines  accurately,  and  taking  the  fire  of  the  batteries  with 
great  coolness  and  deliberation.  About  half  way  between  our 
position  and  that  of  the  enemy,  a ravine  partially  sheltered  our 
troops  from  the  enemy’s  fire,  where  a short  halt  was  made  for  rest. 
The  advance  was  resumed  after  a moment’s  pause,  all  still  in 
good  order.  The  enemy’s  batteries  soon  opened  upon  our  lines 
with  canister,  and  the  left  seemed  to  stagger  under  it,  but  the 
advance  was  resumed,  and  with  some  degree  of  steadiness. 
Pickett's  troops  did  not  appear  to  be  checked  by  the  batteries,  and 
only  halted  to  deliver  a fire  when  close  under  musket-range. 
Maj.  Gen.  Anderson’s  division  was  ordered  forward  to  support 
and  assist  the  wavering  columns  of  Pettigrew  and  Trimble. 

Pickett’s  troops,  after  delivering  fire,  advanced  to  the  charge, 
and  entered  the  enemy’s  lines,  capturing  some  of  his  batteries,  and 
gained  his  works.  About  the  same  moment,  the  troops  that  had 
before  hesitated,  broke  their  ranks  and  fell  back  in  great  disorder, 
many  more  falling  under  the  enemy’s  fire  in  retiring  than  while 
they  were  attacking.  This  gave  the  enemy  time  to  throw  his 
entire  force  upon  Pickett,  with  a strong  prospect  of  being  able  to 
break  up  his  lines  or  destroy  him  before  Anderson’s  division 
could  reach  him,  which  would,  in  its  turn,  have  greatly  exposed 
Anderson.  He  was  therefore  ordered  to  halt. 

In  a few  moments  the  enemy  marching  against  both  flanks 
and  the  front  of  Pickett’s  division,  overpowered  it  and  drove  it 
back,  capturing  about  half  of  those  of  it  who  were  not  killed  or 
wounded.  Gen.  Wright,  of  Anderson’s  division,  with  all  of  the 
officers,  was  ordered  to  rally  and  collect  the  scattered  troops 
behind  Anderson’s  division,  and  many  of  my  staff  officers  were 
sent  to  assist  in  the  same  service.  Expecting  an  attack  from  the 
enemy,  I rode  to  the  front  of  our  batteries,  to  reconnoiter  and 
superintend  their  operations. 

The  enemy  threw  forward  forces  at  different  times  and  from 
different  points,  but  they  were  only  feelers,  and  retired  as  soon  as 
our  batteries  opened  upon  them.  These  little  advances  and 
checks  were  kept  up  till  night,  when  the  enemy  retired  to  his 
stronghold,  and  my  line  was  withdrawn  to  the  Gettysburg  [Em- 
mitsburg]  road  on  the  right,  the  left  uniting  with  Lieut.  Gen.  A. 
P.  Hill’s  right.  After  night,  I received  orders  to  make  all  the 
needful  arrangements  for  our  retreat. 

Long  street  does  not  do  justice  to  the  troops  of  Hill’s  corps  that 
took  part  in  this  attack.  Pettigrew,  who  commanded  Heth’s 
brigades,  was  killed  in  the  retreat  before  he  made  a report,  and 
Trimble,  who  commanded  Pender’s  two  brigades,  was  badly 
wounded  in  the  attack. 


93 


Davis  reports: 

On  the  evening  of  the  2d  this  division,  under  command  of  Brig. 
Gen.  J.  J.  Pettigrew  (Maj.  Gen.  Heth  having  been  wounded  in  the 
engagement  of  the  1st),  moved  to  the  front,  and  was  formed  in 
line  of  battle,  with  Archer’s  brigade  on  the  right,  commanded  by 
Col.  B.  D.  Fry  (Brig.  Gen.  Archer  having  been  wounded  and 
captured  on  July  1);  Col.  Brockenbrough’ s brigade  on  the  left; 
Pettigrew’s,  commanded  by  Col.  James  K.  Marshal  of  the  52d 
North  Carolina  on  the  right  center,  and  Davis’  on  the  left  center, 
immediately  in  rear  of  our  artillery,  which  was  in  position  on  the 
crest  of  a high  ridge  running  nearly  parallel  to  the  enemy’s  line, 
which  was  on  a similar  elevation  and  nearly  one  mile  distant,  the 
intervening  space  excepting  the  crests  of  the  hills,  being  fields, 
intersected  by  strong  post  and  rail  fences.  In  this  position  we 
bivouacked  for  the  night. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  3d,  the  enemy  threw  some  shells 
at  the  artillery  in  our  front,  from  which  a few  casualties  occurred 
in  one  of  the  brigades.  About  9 a.  m.  the  division  was  moved  to 
the  left  about  a quarter  of  a mile,  and  in  the  same  order  of  battle 
was  formed  in  the  rear  of  Maj.  Pegram’s  battalion  of  artillery, 
which  was  posted  on  the  crest  of  a high  hill,  the  ground  between 
us  and  the  enemy  being  like  that  of  our  first  position. 

About  1 p.  m.  the  artillery  along  our  entire  line  opened  on  the 
enemy,  and  was  promptly  replied  to.  For  two  hours  the  fire  was 
heavy  and  incessant.  Being  immediately  in  the  rear  of  our  bat- 
teries, and  having  had  no  time  to  prepare  means  of  protection,  we 
suffered  some  losses.  In  Davis’  brigade  two  men  were  killed  and 
twenty-one  wounded.  The  order  had  been  given  that  when  the 
artillery  in  our  front  ceased  firing,  the  division  would  attack  the 
enemy’s  batteries,  keeping  dressed  to  the  right,  and  moving  in 
line  with  Maj.  Gen.  Pickett’s  division,  which  was  on  our  right,  and 
march  obliquely  to  the  left. 

The  artillery  ceased  firing  at  3 o’clock,  and  the  order  to  move 
forward  was  given  and  promptly  obeyed.  The  division  moved  off 
in  line,  and,  passing  the  wooded  crest  of  the  hill,  descended  to  the 
open  fields  that  lay  between  us  and  the  enemy.  Not  a gun  was 
fired  at  us  until  we  reached  a strong  post  and  rail  fence  about 
three-quarters  of  a mile  from  the  enemy’s  position,  when  we  were 
met  by  a heavy  fire  of  grape,  canister  and  shell,  which  told  sadly 
upon  our  ranks.  Under  this  destructive  fire,  which  commanded 
our  front  and  left  with  fatal  effect,  the  troops  displayed  great 
coolness,  were  well  in  hand,  and  moved  steadily  forward,  regularly 
closing  up  the  gaps  made  in  their  ranks.  Our  advance  across  the 
fields  was  interrupted  by  other  fences  of  a similar  character,  in 
crossing  which  the  alignment  became  more  or  less  deranged.  This 
was  in  each  case  promptly  rectified,  and  though  its  ranks  were 
growing  thinner  at  every  step,  this  division  moved  steadily  on  in 


94 


line  with  the  troops  on  the  right.  When  within  musket-range, 
we  encountered  a heavy  fire  of  small-arms,  from  which  we  suffered 
severely;  but  this  did  not  for  a moment  check  the  advance. 

The  right  of  the  division,  owing  to  the  conformation  of  the 
ridge  on  which  the  enemy  was  posted,  having  a shorter  distance 
to  pass  over  to  reach  his  first  iine  of  defense,  encountered  him 
first  in  close  conflict;  but  the  whole  division  dashed  up  to  his  first 
line  of  defense — a stone  wall — behind  which  the  opposing  infantry 
was  strongly  posted.  Here  we  were  subjected  to  a most  galling 
fire  of  musketry  and  artillery,  that  so  reduced  the  already  thinned 
ranks  that  any  further  effort  to  carry  the  position  was  hopeless, 
and  there  was  nothing  left  but  to  retire  to  the  position  originally 
held,  which  was  done  in  more  or  less  confusion. 

About  4 p.  m.  the  division  reached  the  line  held  in  the  morning. 

The  report  of  Archer’s  brigade  is: 

In  the  engagement  of  the  3d  the  brigade  was  on  the  right  of  our 
division  in  the  following  order:  1st  Tennessee  on  the  right;  on  its 
left,  13th  Alabama;  next  14th  Tennessee;  on  its  left,  7th  Ten- 
nessee, and  on  the  left,  5th  Alabama  Battalion.  There  was  a 
space  of  a few  hundred  yards  between  the  right  of  Archer’s 
brigade  and  the  left  of  Gen.  Pickett’s  division  when  we  advanced, 
but  owing  to  the  position  of  the  lines  (they  not  being  an  exact 
continuation  of  each  other),  as  we  advanced  the  right  of  our 
brigade  and  the  left  of  Gen.  Pickett’s  division  gradually  approached 
each  other,  so  that  by  the  time  we  had  advanced  a little  over  half 
of  the  way,  the  right  of  Archer’s  touched  and  connected  with 
Pickett’s  left. 

The  command  was  then  passed  down  the  line  by  the  officers, 
“Guide  right;”  and  we  advanced  our  right,  guiding  by  Gen. 
Pickett’s  left.  The  enemy  held  their  fire,  until  we  were  in  fine 
range,  and  opened  upon  us  a terrible  and  well-directed  fire. 
Within  180  or  200  yards  of  his  works,  we  came  to  a lane  [Em- 
mitsburg  road]  inclosed  by  two  stout  post  and  plank  fences.  This 
was  a very  great  obstruction  to  us,  but  the  men  rushed  over  as 
rapidly  as  they  could,  and  advanced  directly  upon  the  enemy’s 
works,  the  first  line  of  which  was  composed  of  rough  stones.  The 
enemy  abandoned  this,  but  just  in  rear  was  massed  a heavy  force. 
By  the  time  we  had  reached  this  work,  our  lines  all  along,  as  far 
as  I could  see,  had  become  very  much  weakened;  indeed  the  line 
both  right  and  left,  as  far  as  I could  observe,  seemed  to  melt 
away  until  there  was  but  little  of  it  left.  Those  who  remained  at 
the  works  saw  that  it  was  a hopeless  case,  and  fell  back.  Archer’s 
brigade  remained  at  the  works  fighting  as  long  as  any  other 
troops  either  on  their  right  or  left,  so  far  as  I could  observe. 

Every  flag  in  the  brigade  excepting  one  was  captured  at  or  within 
the  works  of  the  enemy.  The  1st  Tennessee  had  three  color- 
bearers  shot  down,  the  last  of  whom  was  at  the  works  and  the 


95 


flag  captured;  the  13th  Alabama  lost  three  in  the  same  way,  the 
last  of  whom  was  shot  down  at  the  works;  the  14th  Tennessee  had 
four  shot  down,  the  last  of  whom  was  at  the  enemy’s  works;  the 
7th  Tennessee  lost  three  color-bearers,  the  last  of  whom  was  at 
the  enemy’s  works,  and  the  flag  was  only  saved  by  Captain  (A.  D .) 
Norris  tearing  it  away  from  the  staff  and  bringing  it  out  beneath 
his  coat;  the  5th  Alabama  Battalion  also  lost  their  flag. 

The  report  of  Pender’s  division  is: 

During  the  morning  of  the  3d,  Gen.  Lane  received  an  order 
from  Lieut.  Gen.  Hill  to  report  in  person  with  the  two  brigades 
forming  his  second  line  to  the  right  of  Lieut.  Gen.  Longs’reet,  as 
a support  to  Pettigrew.  Gen.  Longstreet  ordered  him  to  form  in 
rear  of  the  right  of  Heth’s  division,  commanded  by  Gen.  Pettigrew. 

Having  executed  this  order,  Gen.  Lane  was  relieved  of  the  com- 
mand by  Maj.  Gen.  I.  R.  Trimble,  who  acted  under  the  same 
orders  given  to  Gen.  Lane. 

The  two  brigades,  thus  formed  as  a support  to  Pettigrew,  with 
Lowrance  to  the  right,  after  suffering  no  little  from  the  two  hours’ 
exposure  to  the  heavy  artilllery  fire  which  preceded  the  attack  on 
the  3d,  advanced  in  close  supporting  distance  of  Pettigrew’s  line, 
Gen.  Trimble,  with  portions  of  his  own  and  Gen.  Pender’s  staff, 
being  with  and  taking  immediate  command  of  the  movement. 
The  line  moved  forward  through  the  woods  into  the  open  field 
about  one  mile,  in  full  view  of  the  fortified  position  of  the  enemy, 
exposed  to  a murderous  artillery  and  infantry  fire  in  front,  a 
severe  artillery  fire  from  the  right,  and  an  enfilade  fire  of  musketry 
from  the  left.  The  line  moved  forward  handsomely  and  firmly. 
The  division  in  front  gaining  ground  to  the  right,  uncovered  the 
left  of  Lane’s  brigade,  which  caused  it  to  advance  more  rapidly 
than  the  rest  of  the  line,  which  was  checked  by  an  order  from 
Gen.  Trimble. 

When  within  a few  hundred  yards  of  the  enemy’s  works,  the 
line  in  front  being  entirely  gone,  the  division  moved  rapidly  up, 
connecting  with  the  troops  on  the  right,  still  stubbornly  contesting 
the  ground  with  the  enemy,  reserving  their  fire  until  within  easy 
range,  and  then  opening  with  telling  effect,  driving  the  artillerists 
from  their  guns,  completely  silencing  them,  and  breaking  the  line 
of  infantry  supports  formed  on  the  crest  of  the  hill.  All  the  guns 
in  the  immediate  front  of  the  division  were  silenced,  and  the  in- 
fantry had  fallen  behind  their  second  and  third  lines  of  defense, 
when  the  division,  advancing  in  an  oblique  direction,  the  extreme 
right  of  which  had  reached  the  works,  was  compelled  to  fall  back, 
the  troops  on  the  right  having  already  gone,  exposing  the  line  to 
a very  deadly  fire  from  that  direction  immediately  on  the  flank, 
and,  a large  column  of  infantry  appearing  on  the  left,  that  flank 
also  became  exposed.  The  two  extreme  left  regiments  of  Lane’s 


96 


brigade,  under  Cols.  Avery  and  (J.  D.)  Barry,  advanced  some 
minutes  after  the  whole  line  had  given  way,  and  fell  back,  under 
direct  orders. 


In  the  advance,  the  Confederate  line  which  started  on  a front 
of  about  a mile  gradually  closed  in  on  the  center,  until  the  front 
was  contracted  to  an  eighth  of  a mile  when  it  reached  the 
Union  line.  The  final  situation  is  shown  on  the  following  diagram: 


Stannard 


% 

Pickett 


Trimble 


Pettigrew 


8th  Ohio 


69  Pa.  71  Pa. 


Hall  Webb  : 

Objective-clump  of  trees  \f/  : 

Gibbon’s  Div.  72  Pa.  : 

Smyth  (Hays’  Div.) 

The  main  attack  fell  on  Webb’s  brigade,  which  had  only  three 
regiments  that  day,  two  along  a low  stone  wall  in  front  and  one 
in  reserve.  Cushing’s  battery  was  on  Webb’s  front.  Webb 
reports: 


About  1 p.  m.  the  enemy  opened  with  more  than  twenty  bat- 
teries upon  our  line.  By  2 :45  o’clock  he  had  silenced  the  Rhode 
Island  battery  and  all  the  guns  but  one  of  Cushing’s  battery,  and 
had  plainly  shown  by  his  concentration  of  fire  on  this  and  the  3d 
brigade  that  an  important  assault  was  to  be  expected. 

I had  sent,  at  2 p.  m.,  Capt.  Banes,  assistant  adjutant-general 
of  the  brigade,  for  two  batteries  to  replace  Cushing’s  and  Brown’s. 
Just  before  the  assault,  Capt.  Wheeler’s  (Cowan’s)  battery,  1st 
New  York  Artillery  (1st  New  York  Independent  Battery),  had 
gotten  in  position  on  the  left,  in  the  place  occupied  by  the  Rhode 
Island  battery,  which  had  retired  with  a loss  of  all  its  officers  but 
one. 

At  3 o’clock  the  enemy’s  line  of  battle  left  the  woods  in  our 
front;  moved  in  perfect  order  across  the  Emmitsburg  road;  formed 
in  the  hollow  in  our  immediate  front  several  lines  of  battle,  under 
a fire  of  spherical  case  from  Wheeler’s  (Cowan’s)  battery  and 
Cushing’s  guns,  and  advanced  for  the  assault. 

The  71st  Penn,  was  advanced  to  the  wall  on  the  right  of  the 
69th  Penn.  Three  of  Cushing’s  guns  were  run  down  to  the  fence, 
carrying  with  them  their  canister.  The  72d  Penn,  was  held  in 
reserve  under  the  crest  of  the  hill.  The  nem  advanced  steadily 
to  the  fence,  driving  out  a portion  of  the  71st  Penn.  Gen.  Arm- 
istead  passed  over  the  fenc3  with  probably  over  100  of  his  com- 


97 


mand  and  with  several  battle  flags.  The  72d  Penn,  was  ordered 
up  to  hold  the  crest,  and  advanced  to  within  forty  paces  of  the 
enemy’s  line.  Col.  Smith,  commanding  the  71st  Penn.,  threw 
two  companies  of  his  command  behind  the  stone  wall  on  the  right 
of  Cushing’s  battery,  fifty  paces  retired  from  the  point  of  attack. 
This  disposition  of  his  troops  was  most  important.  Col.  Smith 
showed  true  military  intelligence  on  the  field.  The  69th  Penn, 
and  most  of  the  71st  Penn.,  even  after  the  enemy  were  in  their 
rear,  held  their  position.  The  72d  Penn,  fought  steadily  and 
persistently,  but  the  enemy  would  probably  have  succeeded  in 
piercing  our  lines  had  not  Col.  Hall  advanced  with  several  of  his 
regiments  to  my  support.  Defeated,  routed,  the  enemy  fled  in 
disorder.  Gen.  Armistead  was  left,  mortally  wounded,  within  my 
lines,  and  forty-two  of  the  the  enemy  who  crossed  the  fence  lay 
dead. 

While  advancing  to  the  attack,  the  left  flank  of  Hill’s  troops 
was  attacked  by  the  8th  Ohio,  Carroll’s  brigade,  which  was  posted 
to  the  right  of  Smyth’s  brigade.  Its  commander  says: 

This  artillery  duel  was  followed  by  an  immediate  advance  of 
two  divisions  of  the  enemy’s  infantry,  which  advanced  at  the  first 
in  three  long  lines  of  battle,  but  ployed  into  close  column  by 
division  as  they  advanced,  excepting,  perhaps,  a regiment  on  each 
flank.  The  column  directed  itself  upon  our  battery  to  my  left,  and 
the  line  on  the  left  flank  of  the  column  directly  upon  my  position. 
I advanced  my  reserve  to  the  picket  front,  and  as  the  rebel  line 
came  within  about  100  yards,  we  poured  in  a well-directed  fire, 
which  broke  the  rebel  line,  and  it  soon  fled  in  the  wildest  con- 
fusion. 

Being  relieved  from  this  direction,  I changed  front  forward  on 
the  left  company,  thus  presenting  our  front  to  the  left  flank  of 
the  advancing  rebel  column.  Our  fire  was  poured  into  their 
flank  with  terrible  effect  for  a few  minutes  before  the  2d  brigade 
[Smyth’s]  at  the  battery  opened,  but  almost  instantly  on  the  fire 
from  the  front,  together  with  the  concentrated  fire  from  our  bat- 
teries, the  whole  mass  gave  way,  some  fleeing  to  the  front,  some 
to  the  rear,  and  some  through  our  lines,  until  the  whole  plain 
was  covered  with  unarmed  rebels,  waving  coats,  hats  and  hand- 
kerchiefs in  token  of  a wish  to  surrender. 

The  right  flank  of  Pickett’s  division  was  attacked  by  Stannard’s 
brigade  of  Doubleday’s  division,  I corps,  which  was  to  the  left  of 
Hall’s  brigade.  Stannard  reports: 

As  soon  as  the  change  of  the  point  of  attack  became  evident,  I 
ordered  a flank  attack  upon  the  enemy’s  column.  Forming  in 
the  open  meadow  in  front  of  our  lines,  the  13th  [Vt.j  changed 
front  forward  on  first  company;  the  16th  [Vt.]  after  deploying, 


98 


performed  the  same,  and  formed  on  the  left  of  the  13th  [Vt.]  at 
right  angles  to  the  main  line  of  our  army,  bringing  them  in  line 
of  battle  upon  the  flank  of  the  charging  division  of  the  enemy,  and 
opened  a destructive  fire  at  short  range,  which  the  enemy  sus- 
tained but  a very  few  moments  before  the  larger  portion  of  them 
surrendered  and  marched  in — not  as  conquerors,  but  as  captives. 
I then  ordered  the  two  regiments  into  their  former  position.  The 
order  was  not  filled  when  I saw  another  rebel  column  charging 
immediately  upon  our  left  [Wilcox’s  and  Perry’s  brigades].  Col. 
Veazey,  of  the  16th  [Vt.],  was  at  once  ordered  to  attack  it  in  its 
turn  upon  the  flank.  This  was  done  as  successfully  as  before. 
The  rebel  forces  already  decimated  by  the  fire  of  the  14th  [Vt.], 
Col.  Nichols,  were  scooped  almost  en  masse  into  our  lines.  The 
16th  [Vt.]  took  in  this  charge  the  regimental  colors  of  the  2d 
Florida  and  8th  Virginia  regiments,  and  the  battle  flag  of  another 
regiment.  The  16th  [Vt.]  was  supported  in  this  new  and  advanced 
position  by  four  companies  of  the  14th  [Vt.],  under  command  of 
Lieut.  Col.  Rose. 

Twenty  Confederate  regimental  colors  were  captured  or  picked 
up  by  regiments  of  the  II  corps  near  the  point  where  the  attack 
of  Pickett,  Pettigrew  and  Trimble  was  repulsed. 

Pickett’s  right  flank  was  to  be  supported  by  the  brigades  of 
Wilcox  and  Perry,  but  as  they  moved  straight  to  the  front 
while  Pickett  obliqued  to  his  left,  they  advanced  directly  on  the 
position  occupied  by  the  reserve  artillery  of  the  Union  army. 

Wilcox  reports: 

The  advance  had  not  been  made  more  than  twenty  or  thirty 
minutes,  before  three  staff  officers  in  quick  succession  (one  from 
the  major  general  commanding  the  division)  gave  me  orders  to 
advance  to  the  support  of  Pickett’s  division.  My  brigade,  about 
1,200  in  number,  then  moved  forward  in  the  following  order  from 
right  to  left:  9th,  10th,  11th,  8th,  and  14th  Ala.  regiments.  As 
they  advanced,  they  changed  direction  slightly  to  the  left,  so  as 
to  cover  in  part  the  ground  over  which  Pickett’s  division  had 
moved.  As  they  came  in  view  on  the  turnpike,  all  of  the  enemy’s 
terrible  artillery  that  could  bear  on  them  was  concentrated  upon 
them  from  both  flanks  and  directly  in  front,  and  more  than  on 
the  evening  previous.  Not  a man  of  the  division  that  I was 
ordered  to  support  could  I see;  but  as  my  orders  were  to  go  to 
their  support,  on  my  men  went  down  the  slope  until  they  came 
near  the  hill  upon  which  were  the  enemy’s  batteries  and  intrench- 
ments. 

Here  they  were  exposed  to  a close  and  terrible  fire  of  artillery. 
Two  lines  of  the  enemy’s  infantry  were  seen  moving  by  the  flank 
toward  the  rear  of  my  left.  I ordered  my  men  to  hold  their  ground 


99 


until  I could  get  artillery  to  fire  upon  them.  I then  rode  back 
rapidly  to  our  artillery,  but  could  find  none  near  that  had  ammuni- 
tion. After  some  little  delay,  not  getting  any  artillery  to  fire  upon 
the  enemy’s  infantry  that  were  on  my  left  flank,  and  seeing  none 
of  the  troops  that  I was  ordered  to  support,  and  knowing  that  my 
small  force  could  do  nothing  save  to  make  a useless  sacrifice  of 
themselves,  I ordered  them  back.  The  enemy  did  not  pursue. 
My  men,  as  on  the  day  before,  had  to  retire  under  a heavy  artillery 
fire.  My  line  was  reformed  on  the  ground  it  occupied  before  it 
advanced. 

Col.  Long  commanding  Perry’s  brigade  reports : 

Soon  after  Gen.  Pickett’s  troops  retired  behind  our  position, 
Gen.  Wilcox  began  to  advance,  and,  in  accordance  with  previous 
orders  to  conform  to  his  movements,  I moved  forward  also,  under 
a heavy  fire  from  artillery,  but  without  encountering  any  infantry 
until  coming  to  the  skirt  of  woods  at  the  foot  of  the  heights.  Just 
before  entering  the  woods,  a heavy  body  of  infantry  advanced  upon 
my  left  flank. 

The  noise  of  artillery  and  small-arms  was  so  deafening  that  it 
was  impossible  to  make  the  voice  heard  above  the  din,  and  the 
men  were  by  this  time  so  badly  scattered  in  the  bushes  and  among 
the  rocks  that  it  was  impossible  to  make  any  movement  to  meet 
or  check  the  enemy’s  advance.  To  remain  in  this  position,  un- 
supported by  either  infantry  or  artillery,  with  infantry  on  both 
flanks  and  in  front  and  artillery  playing  upon  us  with  grape  and 
canister,  was  certain  annihilation.  To  advance  was  only  to  hasten 
that  result,  and,  therefore,  I ordered  a retreat,  which,  however, 
was  not  in  time  to  save  a large  number  of  the  2d  Florida,  together 
with  their  colors,  from  being  cut  off  and  captured  by  the  flanking 
force  on  the  left.  Owing  to  the  noise  and  scattered  condition  of 
the  men,  it  was  impossible  to  have  the  order  to  retreat  properly 
extended,  and  I am  afraid  that  many  men,  while  firing  from  behind 
rocks  and  trees,  did  not  hear  the  order,  and  remained  there  until 
captured. 

The  flank  attack  mentioned,  was  that  of  Stannard’s  brigade, 
quoted  above. 

The  assault  of  the  divisions  of  Pickett,  Heth  and  Pender  was 
prepared  by  the  fire  of  75  guns  of  Longstreet’ s artillery  posted  on 
the  divide  between  Plum  and  Pitzer  runs,  and  by  63  guns  of 
A.  P.  Hill’s  corps  posted  along  Seminary  Ridge;  the  left  of  Long- 
street’s  line  of  guns  was  opposite  the  northern  end  of  Spangler’s 
woods  and  midway  between  the  woods  and  the  Emmitsburg  road. 
In  advancing  to  the  attack,  the  divisions  of  Heth  and  Pender 
passed  to  the  north  of  Longstreet’ s guns  while  those  t f Pickett 
and  Anderson  marched  through  the  line  of  guns. 


IOO 


The  Union  guns  bearing  on  the  field  of  attack  were  77;  of 
these  26  were  on  the  front  of  the  II  corps  and  41  on  the  front  of 
the  Reserve  Artillery.  The  other  guns  were  on  Little  Round  Top 
and  on  the  front  of  the  XI  corps.  Some  of  the  batteries  on  the 
front  of  the  II  corps  were  replaced  by  others  from  the  Reserve 
Artillery  after  the  bombardment  and  before  the  infantry  attack. 

After  the  repulse,  the  Confederate  troops  rallied  behind  the 
line  of  guns  and  were  not  pursued.  During  the  attack,  Lee  and 
Longstreet  were  near  the  northern  side  of  Spangler’s  woods  and 
supervised  the  rallying  of  their  troops. 

Towards  evening  a reconnaissance  was  made  by  a brigade  of  the 
V corps,  supported  by  two  regiments  of  the  VI  corps,  to  see 
whether  the  Confederates  had  evacuated  the  woods  along  the 
west  branch  of  Plum  Run.  These  troops  reached  and  crossed  the 
stream,  capturing  a number  of  prisoners  of  Hood’s  division,  which 
was  retiring. 

Cavalry  Operations  July  1,  2,  and  3. — On  July  1,  Buford’s 
cavalry  guarded  all  the  roads  leading  into  Gettysburg  until  the 
arrival  of  the  I and  XI  corps,  and  on  the  Mummasburg,  Middle- 
town  and  Heidlersburg  roads  his  patrols  encountered  Jenkins’ 
cavalry  and  some  troops  of  W.  E.  Jones’  brigade  which  were  at- 
tached to  Ewell’s  corps.  Just  before  the  Union  infantry  fell  back 
on  Cemetery  Hill,  Buford  united  his  division  in  the  valley  west  of 
Cemetery  Hill  and  it  encamped  along  Plum  Run  that  night;  Jen- 
kins’ brigade  was  now  the  only  cavalry  on  the  east  flank  of  the 
armies.  Jenkins  took  possession  of  Wolf  Hill  and  guarded  the 
left  flank  of  Ewell’s  corps;  on  Wolf  Hill  that  same  afternoon  he 
was  attacked  by  a brigade  of  the  XII  corps. 

Gregg’s  cavalry  division  marched  from  Manchester  to  Hanover 
Junction,  thirteen  miles  east  of  Hanover,  and  from  that  point 
the  2d  brigade  was  directed  to  return  to  Manchester.  Kilpatrick’s 
cavalry  division  made  a reconnaissance  from  Hanover  through 
Abbottstown  to  Berlin  in  search  of  Stuart,  and  then  encamped  for 
the  night  at  Abbottstown  on  the  York  pike. 

Stuart  reports: 

Reaching  Dover,  Pa.,  on  the  morning  of  July  1,  I was  unable 
to  find  our  forces.  The  most  I could  learn  was  that  Gen.  Early 


IOI 


had  marched  his  division  in  the  direction  of  Shippensburg,  which 
the  best  information  I could  get  seemed  to  indicate  as  the  point 
of  concentration  of  our  troops.  After  as  little  rest  as  was  compati- 
ble with  the  exhausted  condition  of  the  command,  we  pushed 
on  for  Carlisle  where  we  hoped  to  find  a portion  of  the  army. 
I arrived  before  that  village,  by  way  of  Dillsburg,  in  the  after- 
noon. Our  rations  were  entirely  out.  I desired  to  levy  a con- 
tribution on  the  inhabitants  for  rations,  but  was  informed  before 
reaching  it  that  it  was  held  by  a considerable  force  of  militia 
(infantry  and  artillery),  who  were  concealed  in  the  buildings, 
with  the  view  to  entrap  me  upon  my  entrance  into  the  town. 
They  were  frustrated  in  their  intention,  and  although  very 
peaceable  in  external  aspect,  I soon  found  the  information 
I had  received  was  correct.  I disliked  to  subject  the  town  to 
the  consequences  of  attack;  at  the  same  time  it  was  essential  to 
us  to  procure  rations.  I therefore  directed  (Fitz)  Lee  to  send  in 
a flag  of  truce,  demanding  unconditional  surrender  or  bombard- 
ment. This  was  refused.  I placed  artillery  in  position  com- 
manding the  town,  took  possession  of  the  main  avenues  to  the 
place,  and  repeated  the  demand.  It  was  again  refused,  and  I 
was  forced  to  the  alternative  of  shelling  the  place. 

Although  the  houses  were  used  by  their  sharpshooters  while 
firing  on  our  men,  not  a building  was  fired  excepting  the  United 
States  cavalry  barracks,  which  were  burned  by  my  order,  the 
place  having  resisted  my  advance  instead  of  peaceable  sur- 
render, as  in  the  case  of  Gen.  Ewell.  Gen.  Fitz  Lee’s  brigade  was 
charged  with  the  duty  of  investing  the  place,  the  remaining 
brigades  following  at  considerable  intervals  from  Dover.  Maj. 
Gen.  W.  F.  Smith  was  in  command  of  the  forces  in  Carlisle.  The 
only  obstacle  to  the  enforcement  of  my  threat  was  the  scarcity 
of  artillery  ammunition. 

The  whereabouts  of  our  army  was  still  a mystery;  but  during 
the  night  I received  a dispatch  from  Gen.  Lee  (in  answer  to  one 
sent  by  Maj.  Venable  from  Dover,  on  Early’s  trail),  that  the  army 
was  at  Gettysburg,  and  had  been  engaged  this  day  (July  1) 
with  the  enemy’s  advance.  I instantly  dispatched  to  Hampton 
to  move  ten  miles  that  night  on  the  road  to  Gettysburg,  and 
gave  orders  to  the  other  brigades,  with  a view  of  reaching  Gettys- 
burg early  the  next  day,  and  started  myself  that  night. 

Robertson’s  and  W.  E.  Jones’  brigades  of  Stuart’s  cavalry 
reached  Greencastle,  Pa. 

July  2. — About  noon  Buford’s  cavalry  division  left  the  field 
for  Taneytown  and  there  was  no  cavalry  of  either  army  on  the 
south  flank  during  the  remainder  of  that  day.  Jenkins’  cavalry 
brigade  was  posted  to  cover  Johnson’s  skirmish  line  guarding  the 


102 


Hanover  road.  About  noon  Gregg’s  cavalry  division  reached 
the  vicinity  of  the  battlefield  by  the  Hanover  road  and  deployed 
a skirmish  line  in  front  of  that  of  Walker’s  brigade  which  guarded 
Johnson’s  left.  Toward  evening  the  skirmish  lines  became  en- 
gaged and  Walker  discovered  that  there  were  two  brigades  of 
cavalry  on  his  flank.  Therefore,  when  the  other  brigades  of 
Johnson’s  division  advanced  to  attack  Culp  Hill,  Walker  remained 
in  position  and  joined  the  other  brigades  that  night  only  after 
the  fighting  was  over.  Gregg  also  withdrew  that  night  to  the 
Baltimore  pike,  between  Rock  Creek  and  Two  Taverns. 

Kilpatrick’s  division  marched  from  Abbottstown  towards 
Gettysburg  and  joined  Gregg  about  2 p.  m.;  in  accordance  with 
instructions  received  from  Pleasonton  to  give  warning  of  any 
turning  movement  around  the  right  flank  of  the  army,  Kilpatrick 
then  proceeded  to  reconnoiter  towards  Hunterstown.  Custer’s 
brigade  encountered  Hampton’s  near  that  place  and  a short 
engagement  occurred.  During  the  night  Kilpatrick  withdrew  and 
took  station  at  Two  Taverns  on  the  Baltimore  pike  on  the  right 
of  Gregg.  Merritt’s  brigade  of  the  1st  division  moved  from 
Mechanicstown  to  Emmitsburg. 

Stuart  reports: 

My  advance  reached  Gettysburg  July  2,  just  in  time  to  thwart 
a move  of  the  enemy’s  cavalry  upon  our  rear  by  way  of  Hunters- 
town, after  a fierce  engagement,  in  which  Hampton’s  brigade 
performed  gallant  service,  a series  of  charges  compelling  the 
enemy  to  leave  the  field  and  abandon  his  purpose.  I took  my 
position  that  day  on  the  York  and  Heidlersburg  roads,  on  the 
left  wing  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia. 

The  brigades  of  Robertson,  Jones  and  Imboden  all  reached 
Chambersburg  this  day,  where  Imboden  relieved  Pickett  of  the 
care  of  the  army  trains. 

July  3. — The  absence  of  cavalry  on  the  left  flank  of  the  Union 
army  on  the  afternoon  of  July  2 had  been  seriously  felt,  and 
orders  were  issued  to  Kilpatrick  at  Two  Taverns  and  to  Merritt’s 
brigade  of  the  1st  division  at  Emmitsburg,  to  take  station  on 
that  flank  and  to  take  advantage  of  any  favorable  condition  to 
attack.  Kilpatrick,  with  Farnsworth’s  brigade,  reached  that 
flank  about  1 p.  m.  and  Merritt  at  3 p.  m.  Custer’s  brigade,  by 


103 


some  misunderstanding,  took  station  with  Gregg’s  division  along 
the  Hanover  road  near  the  junction  with  the  Low  Dutch  road. 

Cavalry  Engagement  on  the  East  Flank. — On  the  afternoon  of 
July  3,  a cavalry  engagement  took  place  in  a pentagonal  field 
between  the  York  and  Hanover  roads,  about  three  miles  due 
east  of  the  town  square  of  Gettysburg.  The  field  is  limited  on 
the  north  by  a road  connecting  the  York  and  Low  Dutch  roads, 
on  the  east  by  the  Low  Dutch  road,  on  the  south  by  the  Hanover 
road  and  on  the  west  by  Young’s  Branch.  The  field  slopes  from 
north  to  south  and  was  intersected  by  a number  of  fences.  The 
Confederate  cavalry  and  its  artillery  deployed  in  the  northwest 
corner  and  the  Union  cavalry  and  artillery  in  the  southeast 
corner.  The  two  lines  were  about  a mile  apart.  In  this  engage- 
ment Stuart  employed  the  brigades  of  Hampton,  Fitz  Lee,  W.  H.F. 
Lee  and  Jenkins ; Gregg  employed  only  the  brigades  of  McIntosh 
and  Custer,  and  kept  the  brigade  of  J.  Irvin  Gregg  in  reserve. 

Stuart  says: 

On  the  morning  of  July  3,  pursuant  to  instructions  from  the 
commanding  general  (the  ground  along  our  line  of  battle  being 
totally  impracticable  for  cavalry  operations),  I moved  forward 
to  a position  to  the  left  of  Gen.  Ewell’s  left,  and  in  advance  of  it, 
where  a commanding  ridge  completely  controlled  a wide  plain 
of  cultivated  fields  stretching  toward  Hanover  on  the  left,  and 
reaching  to  the  base  of  the  mountain  spurs,  among  which  the 
enemy  held  position.  My  command  was  increased  by  the  addi- 
tion of  Jenkin’s  brigade,  who  here  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy 
allowed  themselves  to  be  supplied  with  but  ten  rounds  of  ammuni- 
tion, although  armed  with  the  most  approved  Enfield  musket. 
I moved  this  command  and  W.  H.  F.  Lee’s  secretly  through  the 
woods  to  a position,  and  hoped  to  effect  a surprise  upon  the 
enemy’s  rear,  but  Hampton  and  Fitz  Lee’s  brigades,  which  had 
been  ordered  to  follow  me,  unfortunately  debouched  into  the 
open  ground,  disclosing  the  movement,  and  causing  a correspond- 
ing movement  of  a large  force  of  the  enemy’s  cavalry. 

Having  been  informed  that  Gens.  Hampton  and  Lee  were  up, 
I sent  for  them  to  come  forward,  so  that  I could  show  them  the 
situation  at  a glance  from  the  elevated  ground  I held,  and  ar- 
range for  further  operations.  My  message  was  so  long  in  finding 
Gen.  Hampton  that  he  never  reached  me,  and  Gen.  Lee  remained, 
as  it  was  deemed  inadvisable  at  the  time  the  message  was  delivered 
for  both  to  leave  their  commands. 


104 


Before  Gen.  Hampton  had  reached  where  I was,  the  enemy 
had  deployed  a heavy  line  of  sharpshooters,  and  were  advancing 
toward  our  position,  which  was  very  strong.  Our  artillery  had 
however  left  the  crest,  which  it  was  essential  for  it  to  occupy  on 
account  of  being  of  too  short  range  to  compete  with  the  longer 
range  guns  of  the  enemy,  but  I sent  orders  for  its  return.  Jenkins’ 
[brigade]  was  chiefly  employed  dismounted,  and  fought  with 
decided  effect  until  the  ten  rounds  were  expended,  and  then  re- 
treated, under  circumstances  of  difficulty  and  exposure  which 
entailed  the  loss  of  valuable  men. 

The  left,  where  Hampton’s  and  Lee’s  brigades  were,  by  this 
time  became  heavily  engaged  as  dismounted  skirmishers.  My 
plan  was  to  employ  the  enemy  in  front  with  sharpshooters,  and 
move  a command  of  cavalry  upon  their  left  flank  from  the  posi- 
tion lately  held  by  me,  but  the  falling  back  of  Jenkins’  men  (that 
officer  was  wounded  the  day  previous,  before  reporting  to  me 
and  his  brigade  was  now  commanded  by  Col.  ( M . J.)  Ferguson, 
(16th  Va.  cav.)  caused  a like  movement  of  those  on  the  left,  and 
the  enemy,  sending  forward  a squadron  or  two,  were  about  to 
cut  off  and  capture  a portion  of  our  dismounted  sharpshooters. 

To  prevent  this,  I ordered  forward  the  nearest  cavalry  regi- 
ment (one  of  W.  H.  F.  Lee’s),  quickly  to  charge  this  force  of 
cavalry.  It  was  gallantly  done,  and  about  the  same  time  a por- 
tion of  Gen.  Fitz  Lee’s  command  charged  on  the  left,  the  1st  Va. 
cavalry  being  most  conspicuous.  In  these  charges,  the  impetuos- 
ity of  those  gallant  fellows,  after  two  weeks  of  hard  marching 
and  hard  fighting  on  short  rations,  was  not  only  extraordinary, 
but  irresistible.  The  enemy’s  masses  vanished  before  them  like 
grain  before  the  scythe,  and  that  regiment  elicited  the  admira- 
tion of  every  beholder,  and  eclipsed  the  many  laurels  already  won 
by  its  gallant  veterans.  Their  impetuosity  carried  them  too  far, 
and  the  charge  being  very  much  prolonged,  their  horses,  already 
jaded,  by  hard  marching,  failed  under  it.  Their  movement  was 
too  rapid  to  be  stopped  by  couriers,  and  the  enemy  perceiving  it, 
were  turning  upon  them  with  fresh  horses.  The  1st  N.  Car.  Cav. 
and  Jeff  Davis  Legion  were  sent  to  their  support,  and  gradually 
this  hand-to-hand  fighting  involved  the  greater  portion  of  the 
command  till  the  enemy  were  driven  from  the  field,  which  was 
now  raked  by  their  artillery,  posted  about  three-quarters  of  a 
mile  off,  our  officers  and  men  behaving  with  the  greatest  heroism 
throughout.  Our  own  artillery  commanding  the  same  ground, 
no  more  hand-to-hand  fighting  occurred,  but  the  wounded  were 
removed  and  the  prisoners  (a  large  number)  taken  to  the  rear. 

The  enemy’s  loss  was  unmistakably  heavy;  numbers  not  known. 
Many  of  his  killed  and  wounded  fell  into  our  hands. 

That  brave  and  distinguished  officer,  Brig.  Gen.  Hampton, 
was  seriously  wounded  twice  in  this  engagement. 


105 


Notwithstanding  the  favorable  results  obtained,  I would 
have  preferred  a different  method  of  attack,  as  already  indicated ; 
but  I soon  saw  that  entanglement  by  the  force  of  circumstances 
narrated  was  unavoidable,  and  determined  to  make  the  best 
fight  possible.  Gen.  Fitz  Lee  was  always  in  the  right  place,  and 
contributed  his  usual  conspicuous  share  to  the  success  of  the  day. 
Both  he  and  the  gallant  1st  Va.  begged  me  (after  the  hot  en- 
counter) to  allow  them  to  take  the  enemy’s  battery,  but  I doubted 
the  practicability  of  the  -ground  for  such  a purpose. 

During  this  day’s  operations,  I held  such  a position  as  not 
only  to  render  Ewell’s  left  entirely  secure,  where  the  firing  of  my 
command,  mistaken  for  that  of  the  enemy,  caused  some  apprehen- 
sion, but  commanded  a view  of  the  routes  leading  to  the  enemy’s 
rear.  Had  the  enemy’s  main  body  been  dislodged,  as  was  con- 
fidently hoped  and  expected,  I was  in  precisely  the  right  position 
to  discover  it  and  improve  the  opportunity.  I watched  keenly  and 
anxiously  the  indications  in  his  rear  for  that  purpose,  while  in 
the  attack  which  I intended  (which  was  forestalled  by  our  troops 
being  exposed  to  view),  his  cavalry  would  have  separated  from 
the  main  body,  and  gave  promise  of  solid  results  and  advantages. 

After  dark,  I directed  a withdrawal  to  the  York  road,  as  our 
position  was  so  far  advanced  as  to  make  it  hazardous  at  night, 
on  account  of  the  proximity  of  the  enemy’s  infantry. 

D.  McM.  Gregg  says: 

On  the  morning  of  July  3,  I was  again  ordered  to  take  a posi- 
tion on  the  right  of  our  line,  and  make  a demonstration  against 
the  enemy.  The  1st  and  3d  brigades  were  again  posted  on  the 
right  of  the  infantry,  but  about  three-fourths  of  a mile  nearer 
the  Baltimore  and  Gettysburg  turnpike.  This  position  was  taken 
because  I learned  that  the  1st  [2d]  brigade  of  the  3d  division  was 
occupying  my  position  of  the  day  before. 

At  12  a.  m.  I received  a copy  of  a dispatch  from  the  commander 
of  the  XI  corps  to  the  major  general  commanding  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  that  large  columns  of  the  enemy’s  cavalry  were 
moving  toward  the  right  of  our  line.  At  the  same  time  I received 
an  order  from  Maj.  Gen.  Pleasonton,  through  an  aide-de-camp, 
to  send  the  1st  [2d]  brigade,  3d  division,  to  join  Gen.  Kilpatrick 
on  the  left.  The  1st  brigade  [McIntosh]  of  my  division  was  sent 
to  relieve  the  brigade  [Custer]  of  the  3d  division.  This  change 
having  been  made,  a strong  line  of  skirmishers  displayed  by  the 
enemy  [ Jenkins ] was  evidence  that  the  enemy’s  cavalry  had 
gained  our  right  and  were  about  to  attack,  with  the  view  of  gain- 
ing the  rear  of  our  line  of  battle.  The  importance  of  successfully 
resisting  an  attack  at  this  point,  which,  if  succeeded  in  by  the 
enemy,  would  have  been  productive  of  the  most  serious  con- 
sequences, determined  me  to  retain  the  brigade  of  the  3d  divi- 
sion until  the  enemy  were  driven  back.  Gen.  Custer,  commanding 


io6 


the  brigade,  fully  satisfied  of  the  intended  attack,  was  well  pleased 
to  remain  with  his  brigade.  The  1st  N.  J.  cavalry  (McIntosh) 
was  posted  as  mounted  skirmishers  to  the  right  and  front  in 
a wood,  the  3d  Pa.  cavalry  (McIntosh)  deployed  as  dismounted 
skirmishers  to  the  left  and  front  in  open  fields,  and  the  1st  Md. 
(McIntosh)  on  the  Hanover  turnpike  in  position  to  protect  the 
right  of  our  line. 

The  very  superior  force  of  dismounted  skirmishers  of  the  enemy 
advanced  on  our  left  and  front  [Jenkins]  required  the  line  to  be 
reinforced  by  one  of  Gen.  Custer’s  regiments.  At  this  time  the 
skirmishing  became  very  brisk  on  both  sides,  and  an  artillery  fire 
was  begun  by  the  enemy  and  ourselves.  During  the  skirmish 
of  the  dismounted  men,  the  enemy  brought  on  the  field  a column 
for  a charge  [1st  Va.].  The  charge  of  this  column  was  met  by  the 
7th  Mich.  [Custer]  but  not  successfully.  The  advantage  gained 
in  this  charge  was  soon  wrested  from  the  enemy  by  the  gallant 
charge  of  the  1st  Mich,  of  the  same  brigade.  This  regiment  drove 
the  enemy  back  to  his  starting  point.  Other  charges  were  made  by 
the  enemy’s  columns  but  in  every  instance  were  they  driven  back. 
Defeated  at  every  point,  the  enemy  withdrew  to  his  left,  and  on 
passing  the  wood  in  which  the  1st  N.  J.  was  posted,  that  regiment 
gallantly  and  successfully  charged  the  flank  of  his  column.  Heavy 
skirmishing  was  still  maintained  by  the  3d  Pa.  with  the  enemy, 
and  was  continued  until  nightfall.  During  the  engagement  a 
portion  of  this  regiment  made  a very  handsome  and  successful 
charge  upon  one  of  the  enemy’s  regiments.  The  enemy  retired 
his  column  behind  his  artillery,  and  at  dark  withdrew  from  his 
former  position.  At  this  time  I was  at  liberty  to  relieve  the  1st  [2d] 
brigade  of  the  3d  division  which  was  directed  to  join  its  division. 

The  batteries  commanded  by  Capt.  A.  M.  Randol  and  Lieut. 
A.  C.  M.  Pennington  rendered  most  effective  service.  The  fire 
of  the  artillery  during  this  engagement  was  the  most  accurate  I 
have  ever  seen. 

The  casualties  in  McIntosh’s  brigade  were  35  and  in  Custer’s 
219. 

Cavalry  Engagement  on  the  South  Flank. — The  appearance 
of  the  Union  cavalry  on  the  south  flank  caused  Law,  who  now 
commanded  Hood’s  division,  to  withdraw  G.  T.  Anderson’s 
brigade  and  a regiment  of  Robertson’s  brigade  to  form  a thin 
line  connecting  the  Confederate  forces  on  the  slope  of  Big  Round 
Top  with  Willoughby  Run.  The  two  Union  brigades  deployed 
west  of  Plum  Run  along  a cross-road  which  connects  the  Emxnits- 
burg  and  Taneytown  roads,  and  is  parallel  to  and  a half-mile  from 
the  new  line  taken  by  G.  T.  Anderson’s  brigade;  Farnsworth  was 
on  the  right,  and  Merritt  on  the  left. 


In  front  of  Farnsworth  was  a wooded  hill  which  was  taken 
possession  of  by  his  battery  supported  by  his  dismounted  men. 
At  the  foot  of  the  northern  slope  of  this  hill  ran  a thin  Confederate 
skirmish  line.  To  the  north  of  the  hill  was  an  open  field,  about 
three-quarters  of  a mile  square,  limited  on  the  north  by  a stone 
wall  in  the  woods  along  the  west  branch  of  Plum  Run,  on  the 
east  by  the  wooded  slopes  of  Big  Round  Top,  and  on  the  west  by 
Snyder  Ridge  along  which  were  posted  four  Confederate  batteries. 
The  field  itself  was  intersected  by  fences,  and  the  woods  on  the 
north  and  east  were  occupied  by  Confederate  infantry. 

About  5:30  p.  m.,  while  Merritt  was  engaged  in  a dismounted 
fight  with  Anderson's  brigade,  Kilpatrick  thought  he  saw  an  op- 
portunity for  making  a diversion  by  a mounted  charge  through 
the  field  into  the  woods  at  the  farther  end.  To  this  duty  he  as- 
signed two  regiments.  One  was  repulsed  by  the  Confederate 
line  at  the  south  end  of  the  field;  the  other,  led  by  Farnsworth, 
broke  through  the  first  line,  but  was  turned  back  by  the  stone 
wall  at  the  northern  end  of  the  field.  It  then  charged  the  brigades 
of  Robertson  and  Law  across  Plum  Run  on  the  slope  of  Round  Top. 
Being  repulsed,  the  regiment  made  its  escape  through  the  gaps 
on  either  side  of  the  wooded  hill.  In  this  charge  Farnsworth  was 
killed  on  the  slope  of  Big  Round  Top. 

Cavalry  Engagement  near  Fairfield. — In  moving  from  Emmits- 
burg  July  3,  Merritt  sent  one  regiment  toward  Fairfield,  to 
attack  the  Confederate  trains  believed  to  be  in  that  vicinity. 
That  morning  the  brigades  of  Robertson  and  W.  E.  Jones  had 
marched  from  Chambersburg  to  Cashtown. 

W.  E.  Jones  reports: 

Near  this  point  an  order  from  Gen.  Lee  required  a force  of 
cavalry  to  be  sent  at  once  to  the  vicinity  of  Fairfield,  to  form  a 
line  to  the  right  and  rear  of  our  line  of  battle.  In  the  absence  of 
Gen.  Robertson,  I determined  to  move  my  command  at  once  into 
position.  About  two  miles  from  Fairfield  we  encountered  the 
6th  U.  S.  regular  cavalry  en  route  to  capture  our  cavalry  division 
train,  which  must  have  fallen  an  easy  prey  but  for  our  timely 
arrival. 

We  met  in  a lane,  both  sides  of  which  were  of  post  and  rail 
fences,  too  strong  to  be  broken  without  the  axe.  No  estimate 
could  be  made  of  the  opposing  force;  but  knowing  a vigorous 


io8 


assault  must  put  even  a small  force  on  a perfect  equality  with  a 
large  one  until  a wider  field  could  be  prepared,  I at  once  ordered 
the  7th  regiment,  which  was  in  front,  to  charge.  Before  the  enemy 
could  be  reached  he  succeeded  in  throwing  carbineers  through 
gates  right  and  left,  who  poured  into  our  flanks  a galling  fire.  The 
leading  men  hesitated;  the  regiment  halted  and  retreated.  The 
6th  Va.  Cav.  was  next  ordered  to  charge,  and  did  its  work  nobly. 
It  passed  the  skirmishers,  assailing  and  routing  one  of  the  best 
U.  S.  regiments,  just  flushed  with  victory. 

The  Union  regiment  numbered  about  400  and  its  casualties 
were  232,  of  whom  184  including  the  commanding  officer  were 
captured.  The  Confederate  casualties  were  60. 

The  column  which  was  charged  in  the  lane  consisted  of  four 
troops,  two  others  were  reconnoitering  in  the  vicinity,  and  four 
were  in  the  skirmish  line. 

The  Retreat. — On  the  night  of  July  3 the  entire  Confederate 
army  was  withdrawn  to  Seminary  and  Snyder  ridges,  and  orders 
were  issued  and  instructions  given  for  the  retreat  to  the  Potomac 
at  Williamsport  and  Falling  Waters.  Lee  says: 

The  severe  loss  sustained  by  the  army  and  the  reduction  of  its 
ammunition,  rendered  another  attempt  to  dislddge  the  enemy 
inadvisable,  and  it  was  therefore  determined  to  withdraw. 

The  trains  with  such  of  the  wounded  as  could  bear  removal, 
were  ordered  to  Williamsport  on  July  4,  part  moving  through 
Cashtown  and  Greencastle,  escorted  by  Gen  Imboden,  and  the 
remainder  by  the  Fairfield  road. 

The  army  retained  its  position  until  dark,  when  it  was  put  in 
motion  for  the  Potomac  by  the  last-named  route. 

A heavy  rain  continued  throughout  the  night,  and  so  much 
impeded  its  progress  that  Ewell’s  corps,  which  brought  up  the 
rear,  did  not  leave  Gettysburg  until  late  in  the  forenoon  of  the 
following  day.  The  enemy  offered  no  serious  interruption,  and 
after  an  arduous  march,  we  arrived  at  Hagerstown  in  the  after- 
noon of  the  6th  and  the  morning  of  July  7. 

The  great  length  of  our  trains  made  it  difficult  to  guard  them 
effectually  in  passing  through  the  mountains,  and  a number  of 
wagons  and  ambulances  were  captured.  They  succeeded  in  reach- 
ing Williamsport  on  the  6th,  but  were  unable  to  cross  the  Potomac 
on  account  of  the  high  stage  of  water.  Here  they  were  attacked 
by  a strong  force  of  cavalry  and  artillery,  which  was  gallantly 
repulsed  by  Gen.  Imboden,  whose  command  had  been  strength- 
ened by  several  batteries  and  two  regiments  of  infantry,  which 
had  been  detached  at  Winchester  to  guard  prisoners,  and  were 
returning  to  the  army. 


109 


While  the  enemy  was  being  held  in  check,  Gen.  Stuart  arrived 
with  the  cavalry,  which  had  performed  valuable  service  in  guard- 
ing the  flanks  of  the  army  during  the  retrograde  movement, 
and  after  a short  engagement,  drove  him  from  the  field.  The 
rains  that  had  prevailed  almost  without  intermission  since  our 
entrance  into  Maryland,  and  greatly  interfered  with  our  move- 
ments, had  made  the  Potomac  unfordable,  and  the  pontoon 
bridge  left  at  Falling  Waters  had  been  partially  destroyed  by 
the  enemy.  The  wounded  and  prisoners  were  sent  over  the  river 
as  rapidly  as  possible  in  a few  ferry-boats,  while  the  trains  awaited 
the  subsiding  of  the  waters  and  the  construction  of  a new  pontoon 
bridge. 

On  July  8,  the  enemy’s  cavalry  advanced  toward  Hagerstown, 
but  was  repulsed  by  Gen.  Stuart,  and  pursued  as  far  as  Boons- 
boro. 

With  this  exception,  nothing  but  occasional  skirmishing  oc- 
curred until  the  12th,  when  the  main  body  of  the  enemy  arrived. 
The  army  then  took  a position  previously  selected,  covering  the 
Potomac  from  Williamsport  to  Falling  Waters,  where  it  remained 
for  two  days,  with  the  enemy  immediately  in  front,  manifesting 
no  disposition  to  attack,  but  throwing  up  intrenchments  along 
his  whole  line. 

By  the  13th,  the  river  at  Williamsport,  though  still  deep,  was 
fordable,  and  a good  bridge  was  completed  at  Falling  Waters, 
new  boats  having  been  constructed  and  some  of  the  old  recovered. 
As  further  delay  would  enable  the  enemy  to  obtain  reinforce- 
ments, and  as  it  was  found  difficult  to  procure  a sufficient  supply 
of  flour  for  the  troops,  the  working  of  the  mills  being  interrupted 
by  high  water,  it  was  determined  to  await  an  attack  no  longer. 

Orders  were  accordingly  given  to  cross  the  Potomac  that  night, 
Ewell’s  corps  by  the  ford  at  Williamsport,  and  those  of  Longstreet 
and  Hill  on  the  bridge. 

The  cavalry  were  directed  to  relieve  the  infantry  skirmishers, 
and  bring  up  the  rear. 

The  movement  was  much  retarded  by  a severe  rain  storm  and 
the  darkness  of  the  night.  Ewell’s  corps,  having  the  advantage 
of  a turnpike  road,  marched  with  less  difficulty  and  crossed  the 
river  by  8 o’clock  the  following  morning.  The  condition  of  the 
road  to  the  bridge  and  the  time  consumed  in  the  passage  of  the 
artillery,  ammunition  wagons  and  ambulances,  which  could  not 
ford  the  river,  so  much  delayed  the  progress  of  Longstreet  and 
Hill  that  it  was  daylight  before  their  troops  began  to  cross. 
Heth’s  division  was  halted  about  a mile  and  a half  from  the 
bridge  [on  the  Maryland  side]  to  protect  the  passage  of  the  column. 
No  interruption  was  offered  by  the  enemy  until  about  11  a.  m., 
when  his  cavalry  supported  by  artillery  appeared  in  front  of  Gen. 
Heth. 


I IO 


A small  number  in  advance  of  the  main  body  was  mistaken 
for  our  own  cavalry  retiring,  no  notice  having  been  given  of  the 
withdrawal  of  the  latter,  and  was  suffered  to  approach  our  lines. 
They  were  immediately  destroyed  or  captured,  with  the  exception 
of  two  or  three,  but  Brig.  Gen.  Pettigrew,  an  officer  of  great  merit 
and  promise,  was  mortally  wounded  in  the  encounter.  He  sur- 
vived his  removal  to  Virginia  only  a few  days. 

The  bridge  being  clear,  Gen.  Heth  began  to  withdraw.  The 
enemy  advanced,  but  his  effort  to  break  our  lines  was  repulsed 
and  the  passage  of  the  river  was  completed  by  1 p.  m.  Owing  to 
the  extent  of  Gen.  Heth’s  line,  some  of  his  men  most  remote  from 
the  bridge  were  cut  off  before  they  could  reach  it,  but  the  greater 
part  of  those  taken  by  the  enemy  during  the  movement  (sup- 
posed to  amount  in  all  to  about  500)  consisted  of  men  from 
various  commands  who  lingered  behind  overcome  by  previous 
labors  and  hardships  and  the  fatigue  of  a most  trying  night 
march.  There  was  no  loss  of  materiel  excepting  a few  broken 
wagons  and  two  pieces  of  artillery,  which  the  horses  were  unable 
to  draw  through  the  deep  mud.  Other  horses  were  sent  back  for 
them,  but  the  rear  of  the  column  had  passed  before  their  arrival. 

The  position  taken  up  by  the  Confederate  army  on  July  12 
was  on  a ridge  which  crosses  the  National  road  just  west  of  Hagers- 
town and  extends  in  the  general  direction  of  Downsville.  Long- 
street  was  on  the  right,  Hill  in  the  center  and  Ewell  on  the  left. 
It  covered  Williamsport  and  Falling  Waters  where  the  army 
was  to  recross  the  Potomac. 

Meade  reports: 

On  the  morning  of  the  4th,  reconnaissances  developed  that 
the  enemy  had  drawn  back  his  left  flank,  but  maintained  his 
position  in  front  of  our  left,  apparently  assuming  a new  line 
parallel  to  the  mountains. 

On  the  morning  of  the  5th,  it  was  ascertained  the  enemy  was 
in  full  retreat  by  the  Fairfield  and  Cashtown  roads.  The  VI 
corps  was  immediately  sent  in  pursuit  on  the  Fairfield  road  and 
the  cavalry  on  the  Cashtown  road  and  by  the  Emmitsburg  and 
Monterey  passes. 

July  5 and  6 were  employed  in  succoring  the  wounded  and  bury- 
ing the  dead.  Maj.  Gen.  Sedgwick,  commanding  the  VI  corps, 
having  pushed  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy  as  far  as  the  Fairfield 
Pass  in  the  mountains  and  reporting  that  the  pass  was  a very 
strong  one  in  which  a small  force  of  the  enemy  could  hold  in  check 
and  delay  for  a considerable  time  any  pursuing  force,  I determined 
to  follow  the  enemy  by  a flank  movement,  and  accordingly  leav- 
ing McIntosh’s  brigade  of  cavalry  and  Neill’s  brigade  of  infantry 
to  continue  harassing  the  enemy,  put  the  army  in  motion  for 


1 1 1 


Middletown,  Md.  Orders  were  immediately  sent  to  Maj.  Gen. 
French  at  Frederick  to  reoccupy  Harpers  Ferry  and  send  a force 
to  occupy  Turner’s  Pass  in  South  Mountain.  I subsequently 
ascertained  that  Maj.  Gen.  French  had  not  only  anticipated  these 
orders  in  part  but  had  pushed  a cavalry  force  to  Williamsport 
and  Falling  Waters,  where  they  destroyed  the  enemy’s  pontoon 
bridge  and  captured  its  guard.  Buford  was  at  the  same  time 
sent  to  Williamsport  and  Hagerstown. 

The  duty  above  assigned  to  the  cavalry  was  most  successfully 
accomplished,  the  enemy  being  greatly  harassed,  his  trains 
destroyed,  and  many  captures  of  guns  and  prisoners  made. 

After  halting  a day  at  Middletown  to  procure  necessary  sup- 
plies and  bring  up  the  trains,  the  army  moved  through  the  South 
Mountain  and  by  July  12  was  in  front  of  the  enemy,  who  occupied 
a strong  position  on  the  heights  of  Marsh  Run,  in  advance  of 
Williamsport.  In  taking  this  position,  several  skirmishes  and 
affairs  had  been  had  with  the  enemy,  principally  by  the  cavalry 
and  the  XI  and  VI  corps. 

The  13th  was  occupied  in  reconnaissances  of  the  enemy’s  posi- 
tion and  preparations  for  attack,  but  on  advancing  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  14th  it  was  ascertained  he  had  retired  the  night  previ- 
ous by  a bridge  at  Falling  Waters  and  the  ford  at  Williamsport. 
The  cavalry  in  pursuit  overtook  the  rear-guard  at  Falling  Waters 
capturing  two  guns  and  numerous  prisoners. 

On  July  10,  when  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  at  Antietam 
Creek,  it  was  reinforced  by  French’s  division  of  four  brigades, 
which  had  formerly  belonged  to  the  Middle  Department  and 
was  at  Harpers  Ferry  when  Meade  took  command  of  the  army. 
This  division  was  assigned  to  the  III  corps  of  which  French  as- 
sumed command.  On  July  12  a division  of  militia  troops,  which 
had  marched  from  Harrisburg,  also  joined  the  army. 

When  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  deployed  along  the  Hagers- 
town-Sharpsburg  road  on  the  12th,  the  I and  XI  corps  formed 
the  right  wing,  the  V and  VI  corps  the  center,  the  II  and  XII 
corps  the  left  wing,  and  the  III  corps  the  reserve. 


Itinerary  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 


Right  Wing 

Center 

Left  Wing 

Reserve 

Corps 

i 

XI 

V 

VI 

XII 

II 

hi 

July 

5 

Gettysburg 

Gettysburg 

Marsh 

Creek 

Fairfield 

Littlestown 

Two  Taverns 

Gettysburg 

6 

Emmitsburg 

Emmitsburg 

Marsh 

Creek 

Emmitsburg 

Littlestown 

Two  Taverns 

Gettysburg 

7 

Hamburg 

Middletown 

Utica 

Hamburg 

Walkers- 

ville 

Taneytown 

Mechanics- 

town 

8 

Turner  Gap 

Turner  Gap 

Middle- 

town 

Middletown 

Jefferson 

Frederick 

Frederick 

9 

Turner  Gap 

Turner  Gap 

Boonsboro 

Boonsboro 

Rohrers- 

ville 

Rohrersville 

Fox  Gap 

10 

Beaver 

Creek 

Beaver 

Creek 

Antietam 

Creek 

Beaver 

Creek 

Bakersville 

Tilghmantown 

Antietam 

Creek 

11 

Beaver 

Creek 

Beaver 

Creek 

Beaver 

Creek 

Beaver 

Creek 

Fair  Play 

Lappans 

Antietam 

Creek 

12 

Funkstown 

Funkstown 

Antietam 

Creek 

Funkstown 

Fair  Play 

Lappans 

Antietam 

Creek 

I 12 


Cavalry  Operations  During  the  Retreat. — The  orders  issued 
by  Lee  for  Stuart’s  cavalry  were: 

Gen.  Stuart  will  designate  a cavalry  command,  not  exceeding 
two  squadrons,  to  precede  and  follow  the  army  in  its  line  of 
march,  the  commander  of  the  advance  reporting  to  the  commander 
of  the  leading  corps,  the  commander  of  the  rear  to  the  commander 
of  the  rear  corps.  He  will  direct  one  or  two  brigades,  as  he  may 
think  proper,  to  proceed  to  Cashtown  this  afternoon,  and  hold 
that  place  until  the  rear  of  the  army  has  passed  Fairfield,  and 
occupy  the  gorge  in  the  mountains;  after  crossing  which,  to  pro- 
ceed in  the  direction  of  Greencastle,  guarding  the  right  and  rear 
of  the  army  on  its  march  to  Hagerstown  and  Williamsport. 
Gen.  Stuart  with  the  rest  of  the  cavalry  will  this  evening  take 
the  route  to  Emmitsburg  and  proceed  thence  toward  Cavetown 
and  Boonsboro,  guarding  the  left  and  rear  of  the  army. 

It  will  be  observed  that  no  provision  was  made  for  Monterey  Gap 
on  the  Fairfield  road  and  no  orders  were  issued  for  Robertson’s  two 
brigades  at  Fairfield.  Stuart  says  in  his  report: 

I had  at  the  instance  of  the  commanding  general,  instructed 
Brig.  Gen.  Robertson,  whose  two  brigades  (his  own  and  Jones’) 
were  now  on  the  right  at  Fairfield,  Pa.,  that  it  was  essentially 
necessary  for  him  to  hold  the  Jack  Mountain  passes.  These  in- 
cluded two  prominent  roads — the  one  north  and  the  other  south 
of  Jack  Mountain,  which  is  a sort  of  peak  in  the  Blue  Ridge 
chain. 

Imboden,  who  conducted  the  trains  by  the  Cashtown  road,  re- 
ceived his  instructions  from  Lee  in  person  that  night. 

July  4,  1863. 

Brig.  Gen.  J.  D.  Imboden,  Commanding,  etc. 

General: — In  pursuance  of  verbal  directions  given  you  last 
night,  I desire  you  to  take  charge  of  the  train  belonging  to  this 
army,  which  I have  directed  to  be  assembled  in  the  vicinity  of 
Cashtown  this  afternoon. 

I advise  you  to  start  the  train  at  least  by  5 p.  m.  today,  and 
endeavor  to  push  it  through  to  Greencastle  by  tomorrow  morn- 
ing by  the  road  turning  off  at  Greenwood.  Thence  you  can  follow 
the  direct  road  to  Williamsport,  where  the  train  must  be  put 
across  the  Potomac  at  once,  and  advance  beyond  Falling  Waters, 
whence  it  can  proceed  more  leisurely  to  Winchester.  It  will  be 
necessary  to  escort  it  beyond  Martinsburg,  at  least  as  far  as 
Bunker  Hill.  I have  directed  two  batteries  to  report  to  you  this 
afternoon  to  accompany  the  train,  so  that  you  may  have  suffi- 
cient artillery  to  guard  the  front  and  rear,  and  distribute  along 


”3 


at  intervals,  in  order  to  repel  any  attack  that  may  be  made  along 
the  line  by  parties  of  the  enemy.  I advise  that  in  turning  off  at 
Greenwood  you  have  your  scouts  out  on  the  Chambersburg 
road  until  the  rear  of  your  train  has  passed  it,  and  that  you  also 
keep  scouts  out  on  your  left  towards  Waynesborough.  From 
Greencastle  you  had  better  send  a scouting  party  through  Hagers- 
town, and  hold  that  place  until  the  train  shall  have  crossed  the 
river.  At  the  river  you  can  post  your  artillery  to  hold  the  ford, 
keeping  out  your  scouts  toward  Hagerstown,  Boonsboro,  etc., 
until  further  orders.  After  the  train  has  reached  a place  of  saftey, 
you  can  return  to  the  Maryland  side,  taking  position  in  front  of 
Hagerstown,  so  as  to  keep  open  communications.  I need  not 
caution  you  as  to  preserving  quiet  and  order  in  your  train, 
secrecy  of  your  movements,  promptness  and  energy,  and  in- 
creasing vigilance  on  the  part  of  yourself  and  officers.  I enclose 
a letter  to  the  commanding  officer  at  Winchester,  which  I wish 
you  would  forward  to  him  immediately  upon  crossing  the  river, 
unless  you  can  find  opportunity  to  send  it  securely  before. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

R.  E.  LEE, 

General. 

P.  S. — I desire  you  to  turn  back  everybody  you  may  meet  on 
the  road  coming  to  join  this  army,  to  Falling  Waters. 

(Inclosure) 

Headquarters  Army  of  Northern  Virginia, 

July  4,  1863. 

Commanding  Officer  at  Winchester: 

Sir: — I wish  you  to  convey  to  the  commanding  officers  of  the 
regiments  of  Ewell’s  corps  [Early’s  regiments  left  at  Winchester] 
instructions  from  me  to  proceed  to  Falling  Waters,  where  they 
will  take  position,  and  guard  the  pontoon  bridge  at  that  place, 
and  also  the  ford  at  Williamsport,  holding  there  all  persons 
belonging  to  this  army,  and  collecting  all  stragglers  from  it. 
Any  sick,  of  course,  will  be  forwarded  to  Winchester.  The 
senior  officer  present  will  take  command.  Should  it  be  necessary 
that  a part  of  that  force  remain  in  Winchester,  you  have  my 
authority  for  retaining  it  there.  Upon  the  arrival  of  the  sick  and 
wounded  at  Winchester,  they  will  be  forwarded  to  Staunton  as 
rapidly  as  possible,  as  also  any  surplus  articles  not  needed  for 
the  army  in  the  field. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

R.  E.  LEE, 

General. 

It  had  apparently  been  planned  to  assign  Iverson’s  brigade  as 
a guard  for  Ewell’s  trains  going  through  Monterey  Gap,  but  by 
some  oversight  he  was  not  notified  until  the  trains  were  well 


under  way.  They  therefore  started  through  the  gap  on  the  after- 
noon of  July  4 with  no  adequate  escort,  and  the  gap  was  practi- 
cally unguarded  as  Robertson  was  still  near  Fairfield. 

On  the  morning  of  July  4,  Kilpatrick  was  ordered  to  move  to 
Emmitsburg  with  his  two  brigades  and  there  take  command  of 
Huey’s  brigade  of  Gregg’s  division,  which  was  ordered  to  the 
same  place  from  Westminster,  and  with  the  three  brigades  to 
move  through  Monterey  Gap  and  attack  the  Confederate  trains. 
Buford  was  ordered  that  morning  to  move  from  Westminster  to 
Frederick  for  the  same  purpose  and  his  3d  brigade  was  ordered 
from  Gettysburg  to  join  him  there.  From  Frederick  he  was  to 
move  to  Williamsport. 

July  4. — On  the  afternoon  of  July  4th,  one  long  Confederate 
train  of  wagons  was  moving  through  Cashtown,  and  another 
through  Fairfield,  en  route  for  the  Potomac.  The  cavalry  bri- 
gades of  Hampton  and  Fitz  Lee,  under  the  latter  officer,  were  at 
Cashtown  to  guard  the  rear  of  that  train,  while  Imboden  with 
his  brigade  guarded  the  front  and  flanks;  the  other  train  was 
practically  unguarded.  Stuart,  with  the  brigades  of  W.  H.  F.  Lee 
and  Jenkins  was  circling  around  the  Confederate  army  to  reach 
the  Emmitsburg  road  south  of  Marsh  Run.  Kilpatrick  ran  into 
and  broke  the  Confederate  train  in  Monterey  Pass  that  night 
and  captured  about  forty  of  Ewell’s  wagons.  These  he  took  to 
Cavetown. 

July  5. — Stuart  reached  Emmitsburg  on  the  morning  of  the 
5th  and  learned  that  Kilpatrick  had  gone  through  there  the  even- 
ing before  to  Monterey  Pass.  Assuming  that  Kilpatrick  would 
be  stopped  by  Robertson,  he  made  his  way  through  the  mountains 
toward  Cavetown  and  reached  that  vicinity  in  the  evening  and 
found  Kilpatrick  in  his  front.  After  a short  engagement,  Kil- 
patrick moved  on  to  Boonsboro.  When  the  report  was  received 
of  the  attack  on  the  trains,  the  brigades  of  Robertson  and  Jones 
were  pushed  to  the  front,  followed  by  Iverson’s. 

July  6. — The  morning  of  the  6th  found  Buford’s  division  at 
Frederick;  Kilpatrick  with  three  brigades  at  Boonsboro;  and 
Stuart  with  four  brigades  at  Leitersburg  on  the  Hagerstown- 


Gettysburg  road.  Buford  started  that  morning  for  Williamsport 
via  Boonsboro.  Kilpatrick  conferred  with  Buford  and  it  was 
decided  that  Kilpatrick  should  move  to  Hagerstown,  thus  pro- 
tecting Buford’s  rear,  and  if  not  seriously  engaged,  he  was  to 
move  on  Williamsport  from  Hagerstown.  Of  Stuart’s  command, 
two  brigades,  followed  by  Iverson’s  infantry  brigade,  moved  on 
Hagerstown  from  Leitersburg,  while  Stuart  with  his  other  two 
brigades  moved  southward  and  then  on  Hagerstown  by  the 
Cavetown  road. 

Kilpatrick  reached  Hagerstown,  and  having  driven  out  the 
Confederates,  left  a brigade  there  while  he  proceeded  to  Williams- 
port with  his  other  two.  A little  later,  Stuart’s  four  brigades 
with  Iverson  reached  Hagerstown  and  drove  out  the  Union  troops 
and  started  for  Williamsport.  Imboden  had  reached  that  town 
with  his  wagon  train  the  preceding  day  and  was  there  reinforced 
by  two  regiments  of  Early’s  division,  which  had  been  detached 
at  Winchester.  Having  no  means  to  cross  the  river  but  two 
small  ferry-boats,  Imboden  had  been  obliged  to  take  up  a defen- 
sive position  to  guard  his  trains.  This  position  Buford  and  Custer’s 
brigade  of  Kilpatrick’s  division  attacked  late  in  the  afternoon, 
but  they  were  unable  to  carry  it  before  dark,  at  which  time 
Stuart  reached  Williamsport  from  Hagerstown  and  Fitz  Lee  with 
his  two  brigades  from  Greencastle.  That  night  Buford  and  Kil- 
patrick encamped  at  Lappans,  or  Jones’  Cross  Roads,  the  junction 
of  the  Williamsport-Boonsboro  and  Hagerstown-Sharpsburg 
roads. 

July  7 . — The  next  day  Buford  and  Kilpatrick  retired  to  Boons- 
boro, as  Longstreet’ s corps  had  reached  Hagerstown  the  pre- 
ceding evening  and  was  moving  southward. 

J.  I.  Gregg’s  brigade  followed  Imboden’ s train  as  far  as  Green- 
castle but  was  prevented  from  making  an  attack  by  Fitz  Lee’s 
brigades.  McIntosh’s  brigade  of  infantry,  followed  the  Con- 
federate army  through  Monterey  Gap. 

When  the  Union  army  took  up  its  position  in  front  of  the  Con- 
federate line,  Kilpatrick’s  division  was  on  the  right  flank,  Buford’s 
division  on  the  left  flank,  and  Gregg’s  division  in  reserve  at 
Boonsboro. 


As  the  right  flank  of  the  Confederate  army  was  protected  by 
the  Potomac  River,  Stuart’s  cavalry  was  united  on  the  left  flank 
of  the  army. 


Itinerary  of  the  Cavalry  Corps,  Army  of  the  Potomac. 


BUFORD 

KILPATRICK 

| D.  McM. 

GREGG 

Gamble 

Devin 

Merritt 

Custer 

Farnsworth 

Huey 

McIntosh 

J.  I.  Gregg 

3 

Westmins- 

Westmins- 

Gettys- 

Gettysburg 

Gettysburg 

Westmins- 

Gettys- 

Gettysburg 

ter 

ter 

burg 

ter 

burg 

4 

On  road  to  Frederick 

On  road  to  Monterey  Pass 

Gettys- 

Hunterstown 

via  Emmitsburg 

burg 

5 

Frederick 

Frederick 

Frederick 

Boonsboro  via  Smithburg 

Emmits- 

Greenwood 

burg 

6 

Moved  to  Williamsport  and 

Moved  to  Hagerstown  and  after 

Fairfield 

Marion 

after  engagement  to  Lappans 

engagement  to  Lappans 

7 

The  six  brigades  moved  to  Boonsboro 

Waynes- 

Chambers- 

borough 

burg 

8 

Skirmishing  on  Boonsboro — Funkstown  road 

Waynes- 

On  the  road  to 

borough 

Middletown 

9 

Skirmishing  on  Boonsboro — Funkstown  road 

Waynes- 

On  the  road  to 

borough 

Middletown 

10 

Funks- 

Funks- 

Funks- 

Funkstown 

Funkstown 

Lappans 

Leiters- 

On  the  road  to 

town 

town 

town 

burg 

Middletown 

11 

Bakers- 

Funks- 

Funks- 

Hagerstown 

Hagerstown 

Lappans 

Leiters- 

Boonsboro 

ville 

town 

town 

burg 

12 

Bakers- 

Funks- 

Funks- 

Hagerstown 

Hagerstown 

Lappans 

Boons- 

Boonsboro 

ville 

town 

town 

boro 

While  Imboden’s  long  train  of  wagons  was  passing  through 
Greencastle,  it  was  attacked  by  some  of  Milroy’s  cavalry  which 
captured  or  destroyed  about  sixty  wagons.  This  cavalry  had 
retreated  from  Winchester  to  Hancock  and  had  been  rallied  west 
of  McConnellsburg. 


APPENDIX  A 


Strength  of  the  Armies. — It  is  impossible  to  ascertain  with  accuracy  the 
strength  of  either  of  the  armies  in  the  battle  of  Gettysburg. 

Infantry. — It  is  generally  accepted  that  the  Union  infantry,  which  was  the 
principal  arm  engaged,  exceeded  the  Confederate  infantry  by  the  infantry  of 
the  VI  corps.  As  will  be  seen  by  the  casualty  lists  given  below,  only  a part  of 
the  VI  corps  was  actually  engaged  in  the  battle;  its  presence  however  had  an 
important  influence  on  the  morale  of  the  Union  army.  In  round  numbers  the 
Union  infantry  was  probably  about  77,000  and  the  Confederate  infantry  63,000. 
In  the  encounters  between  infantry  units  of  the  same  kind,  the  numerical 
advantage  was  usually  with  the  Confederates,  as  the  average  strength  of  the 
infantry  units  was  greater. 


Regiment.  Brigade.  Division.  Corps. 

Union 320  1,500  4,000  11,000 

Confederate 370  1,700  7,000  21,000 


Artillery. — Of  artillery,  each  army  had,  attached  to  its  infantry  units,  about 
4 guns  for  each  1,000  men.  Nearly  every  battery  of  each  army,  both  of  the 
corps  and  reserve  artillery,  was  engaged  in  the  battle.  The  Union  artillery  had 
the  greater  influence  on  the  course  of  the  battle,  as  it  was  more  often  employed 
at  close  range  in  repelling  infantry  assaults.  Only  in  Longstreet’s  attack  on 
the  second  day  did  the  Confederate  artillery  make  any  material  impression 
on  the  Union  infantry,  although  the  Union  artillery  of  the  II  corps  suffered 
greatly  on  July  3d. 

Cavalry. — The  Union  cavalry  had  an  important  influence  on  the  battle, 
while  the  Confederate  had  none.  Buford’s  division  caused  the  battle  to  be 
fought  at  Gettysburg,  and  probably  prevented  Lee  from  moving  by  the  more 
advantageous  route  through  Fairfield  and  Emmitsburg.  Gamble’s  brigade 
prevented  the  brigades  of  Archer  and  Lane  from  attacking  the  I corps  on  the 
afternoon  of  July  1,  and  thus  prolonged  the  defense  of  the  key-point  of  the 
position,  Seminary  Hill;  on  the  2d,  Gregg’s  division  prevented  Walker’s  brigade 
from  engaging  in  the  attack  on  Culp  Hill  and  perhaps  saved  that  important 
point;  on  the  3d,  Gregg  prevented  Stuart  from  having  any  influence  on  the 
battle. 

The  Confederate  cavalry  was  however  very  effective  in  covering  the  move- 
ment of  the  army  from  the  Rappahannock  to  the  Potomac,  and  in  protecting 
its  trains  on  the  retreat. 


Casualties  July  1,  2,  and 

3. 

Union. 

Infantry  Divisions. 

Killed. 

Wounded. 

Missing. 

Total. 

Grand 

Total. 

Wadsworth 

I Corps. 

....  299  1,229 

627 

2,155 

Robinson 

91 

616 

983 

1,690 

Doubleday 

....  265 

1,297 

541 

2,103 

5,948 

II 

Corps. 

Caldwell 

....  189 

880 

208 

1,275 

Gibbon 

....  344 

1,002 

101 

1,647 

Hays 

....  238 

987 

66 

1,291 

4,213 

III 

Corps. 

Birney 

....  271 

1,384 

356 

2,011 

Humphreys 

....  314 

1,562 

216 

2,092 

4,103 

V Corps. 

Barnes 

....  167 

594 

143 

904 

Ayres 

....  164 

802 

63 

1,029 

Crawford 

26 

181 

3 

210 

2,143 

VI 

Corps. 

Wright 

1 

17 

— 

18 

Howe 

1 

12 

2 

16 

Wheaton 

20 

148 

28 

196 

230 

XI 

Corps. 

Barlow 

....  122 

677 

507 

1,306 

Steinwehr 

....  107 

507 

332 

946 

Schurz 

....  133 

684 

659 

1,476 

3,728 

XII  Corps. 

Williams 

96 

406 

31 

533 

Geary 

....  108 

397 

35 

540 

1,073 

Cavalry  Corps. 

Buford 

28 

116 

274 

418 

Gregg 

6 

38 

12 

56 

Kilpatrick 

53 

181 

121 

355 

829 

Artillery  Brigades. 

I Corps 

9 

86 

11 

106 

II  “ 

27 

119 

3 

149 

Ill  “ 

8 

81 

17 

106 

V “ 

8 

33 

2 

43 

VI  “ 

4 

8 

12 

XI  “ 

7 

53 

9 

69 

XII  “ 

9 

9 

1st  Res.  Reg 

13 

53 

2 

68 

1st  Res.  Vol 

17 

71 

5 

93 

2d  “ “ 

1 

5 

2 

8 

3d  “ “ 

10 

24 

3 

37 

4th  “ “ 

2 

34 

36 

Infantry  Divisions. 

Killed. 

Wounded. 

Missing. 

Total. 

Grand 

Total. 

Horse  Artillery. 

1st 

2 

6 

— 

8 

2d 

2 

13 

15 

759 

Army  of  the  Potomac. 

3,155 

14,529 

5,365 

23,059 

46,108 

Confederate. 

Longstreet’s  Corps. 

McLaws 

....  305 

1,509 

327 

2,141 

Pickett 

....  228 

1,140 

1,499 

2,863 

Hood 

....  339 

1,481 

442 

2,262 

7,266 

Ewell’s  Corps. 

Early 

....  154 

800 

226 

1,180 

Johnson 

. . . . 219 

1,229 

375 

1,823 

Rodes 

. . . . 415 

1,693 

684 

2,788 

5,791 

A.  P 

. Hill’s  Corps. 

Anderson 

....  144 

1,107 

836 

2,085 

Heth 

. . . . 411 

1,900 

517 

2,828 

Pender 

....  260 

1,288 

110 

1,658 

6,571 

Cavalry. 

Stuart  (5  brigades) . . . 

....  36 

140 

64 

240 

240 

Artillery. 

First  Corps 

42 

209 

22 

273 

Second  Corps 

21 

100 

24 

145 

Third  Corps 

22 

112 

30 

164 

Cavalry  Division 

— 

— 

— 

— 

582 

Army  of 

Northern  Virginia. 

2,592 

12,709 

5,150 

20,451 

An  analysis  of  these  tables  indicates  that  the  ratio  of  the  total  casualties 
to  the  total  numbers  actually  engaged,  was  about  the  same  in  the  infantry  of 
each  army  and  was  about  30%.  The  casualties  in  the  artillery  were  also  about 
the  same  and  were  about  two  men  per  gun.  The  casualties  in  the  cavalry 
were  small  on  both  sides  but  proportionally  larger  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

Its  principal  losses  were  in  the  6th  U.  S.  Cavalry,  Buford’s  division,  at 
Fairfield,  and  in  Custer’s  brigade,  Kilpatrick’s  division,  both  on  July  3. 

Of  the  Union  corps,  the  infantry  casualties  were  much  the  greatest  in  the 
I corps  which  also  had  the  greatest  number  in  the  missing  column.  Robinson’s 
division,  and  especially  Paul’s  brigade,  which  was  near  the  Mummasburg  road, 
had  many  of  its  men  captured  in  the  retreat  on  July  1.  The  II  corps  had 
the  second  greatest  number  in  the  killed  and  wounded  columns;  together  they 
were  nearly  equal  to  those  of  the  I corps.  The  casualties  were  noticeably 


greater  in  Webb’s  division,  which  was  made  the  objective  of  the  Confederate 
attack  on  July  3.  The  III  corps  had  the  third  greatest  casualty  list;  its  retreat 
having  been  covered  by  other  troops,  its  missing  list  was  not  excessive.  The  XI 
corps  had  the  fourth  greatest  casualty  list,  of  which  40%  was  made  up  of  men 
captured  in  the  retreat  through  the  town  on  July  1.  The  casualties  in  the  V 
corps  were  mainly  in  the  1st  and  2d  divisions,  and  occurred  on  July  2.  The 
casualties  in  the  XII  corps  were  small  as  compared  with  those  of  Johnson’s 
division  although  the  latter  formed  only  a part  of  the  Confederate  force  with 
which  the  XII  corps  was  engaged.  The  losses  of  the  Confederates  engaged 
with  the  XII  corps  cannot  be  accurately  ascertained,  since  Johnson  was 
reinforced  by  three  brigades  from  other  divisions  on  the  3d,  all  of  which 
were  engaged  on  that  day.  The  losses  in  the  VI  corps  indicate  that,  as  a corps, 
it  was  not  seriously  engaged  in  the  battle. 

The  infantry  casualties  in  the  three  Confederate  corps  did  not  differ  among 
themselves  so  greatly  as  did  those  in  the  seven  Union  corps.  The  casualties 
in  the  divisions  were  also  much  more  uniform.  Longstreet’s  corps  had  the 
greatest  casualty  list,  and  Ewell’s  had  the  smallest.  Although  engaged  for  a 
very  short  time,  Pickett’s  division  had  the  largest  casualty  list;  over  half  of  this 
list  was  made  up  of  men  who  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  Heth’s  division, 
which  was  heavily  engaged  both  on  July  1 and  3,  had  the  next  greatest  casualty 
list  and  the  largest  number  in  the  killed  and  wounded  columns.  Rodes’ 
division  had  the  third  greatest  casualty  list,  which  was  made  up  principally  of 
the  losses  in  the  brigades  of  O’Neil,  Iverson  and  Daniels.  Early  had  the 
smallest  casualty  list;  none  of  his  brigades  was  seriously  engaged  on  more 
than  one  day. 


* 6v 

vi* 


973  ,7349 


F452C 


468595 


